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United States, I took care before leaving the capital, to convey through a person having confidential relations with the President, a hint, that these embarrassments might be relieved, if satisfactory arrangements for boundary could be made.

Mexico. B. E. Green. November 10, 1843-April 25, 1846. Department of State. Vol. 12, doc. núm. 8. NAW.

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17 de febrero de 1846. Jalapa. J. Slidell a J. Buchanan.

Después de una larga reseña política sobre los sucesos del país comenta en el último párrafo:

I shall anxiously await your definitive instructions by the *Mississippi*. The advance of the general Taylor's force to the left bank of the Rio del Norte, and the strengthening of our squadron on the Gulf are wise measures, which may exercise a salutary influence upon the course of this government.

Mexico. B. E. Green. November 10, 1843-April 25, 1846. Department of State. Vol. 12, despacho 9. NAW.

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1o. de marzo de 1846. Jalapa. J. Slidell a J. Buchanan.

In conformity with your instructions I have addressed a note to the minister of Foreign Relations, resubmitting the question of my recognition, for final decision. I send a copy. I have not fixed in my note, any precise term for an answer; but I have requested our consul at Mexico to hand the note personally to Mr. Castillo y Lanzas and if he finds him disposed to converse upon the subject, to say to him that I thought it more conciliatory and courteous not to mention it in my official communication, but that if a definite and favorable reply were not received by me on the 15th instant I should then apply for my passports. This will allow an

entire week for consultation and the preparation of the answer.

My note will be presented at the most propitious moment that could have been selected: all attempts to effect a loan have completely failed; the suspicion of an intention to introduce a foreign monarch has tended very much to abate the clamor against the United States, and many now begin to look in that direction for support and protection against European interference.

If however, I should not be received, I think that my prospects of successful negotiation will be better than if no obstacles had been afforded to my recognition in the first instance.

Mexico. B. E. Green. November 10, 1843-April 25, 1846. Department of State. Vol. 12, despacho 10. NAW.

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10. de marzo de 1846. Jalapa. J. Slidell a J. M. del Castillo y Lanzas.

Le explica cómo presentó sus credenciales, en su fecha, al anterior gobierno y cómo no fueron admitidas por alegar la dificultad de su título y que se deseaba un comisionado ad hoc en vez de un ministro plenipotenciario que pudiera permanecer indefinidamente en el país. Respondió a las notas que envió De la Peña diciendo que no veía el motivo de la objeción y que en lo personal hizo una interpretación diferente del significado de la negativa que le dieron. Se retiró a Jalapa para recibir nuevas instrucciones de su gobierno y esto había sucedido.

El presidente de los Estados Unidos había aprobado todos y cada uno de los pasos que había dado y, en vista de haber cambiado el gobierno de México, antes de actuar deseaba agotar todos los medios posibles para una reconciliación honorable a fin de demostrar, en caso de que esto no se lograra, que la responsabilidad era del gobierno mexicano y que así lo expondría ante el mundo civilizado.

En vista del mucho tiempo que se había perdido rogaba que le contestaran lo antes posible de manera final y definitiva sobre el tema.

Mexico. B. E. Green. November 10, 1843-April 25, 1846. Department of State. Vol. 12, anexo 1 al doc. núm. 10. NAW.

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5 de marzo de 1846. México. J. Black a J. Slidell.

Your favor of the 1st instant with the enclosure I received by yesterday's mail, the enclosure I delivered the same day in person, at about two o'clock, and in the presence of the Spanish minister, and the English minister and consul. I had but little chance to converse with Mr. Castillo y Lanzas, but he received me very politely and offered to be well disposed, but he was suddenly called of by the president. I however watched an opportunity to say to him as you requested, he appeared to be much pleased at the respect paid him and said he would not fail to reciprocate the same.

It is said a cabinet council was called yesterday on the subject and another today, but what was done is not known, but I am under the impression the decision will be favorable. I will keep you advised of every thing I may learn on the subject.

Mexico. B. E. Green. November 10, 1843-April 25, 1846. Department of State. Vol. 12, anexo al doc. núm. 10. NAW.

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7 de marzo de 1846. México. J. Black a J. Slidell.

I had the honor of addressing you on the 5th instant in answer to your communication of the 1st and although yesterday it was currently reported here that you would be totally rejected by this government, it is now said after warm debates on the subject in council at which the president and ministers attended, it has been decided that you shall be received as commissioner, and not as minister, to reside near the government as in ordinary cases, I am therefore induced to hope that you may be provided with the necessary credentials in order that this government may have no further pretext to put off negotiation. It is said this affair was decided yesterday, if so you may perhaps receive an answer by to-night's mail.

You will please find enclosed herewith a communication enclosed to me by George...

John Black

Consul of the United States of America

Mexico. B. E. Green. November 10, 1843-April 25, 1846. Department of State. Vol. 12, doc. sin núm. NAW.

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10 de marzo de 1846. México. J. Black a J. Slidell.

Habla visitado a Castillo y Lanzas el día anterior y éste le expresó que según tenía entendido el límite puesto por Slidell para que le contestara era el día quince, y así se lo confirmó. Castillo que había tenido mucho trabajo ofreció ocuparse en seguida en la respuesta y Black esperaba que sería recibida con oportunidad bien por el correo de la noche o por el del jueves con lo que todo estaría a tiempo.

We have a great deal said here about war with the United States; and you would think by the present excitement that war was inevitable, and it is the opinion of many that it will take place but after the pretext made use of by general Paredes for overthrowing the former government. To appear consistent, the government must show its teeth, even if it has no intention of biting, yet I think it will endeavor to evade a war, at least for the present.

It is said that general Paredes is to leave here soon for Veracruz, some say it is to wage war on the American fleet, and others say to prevent Santa Anna from landing and Spanish armed vessels to show that he intends to resist European intervention.

It is said that Mexican troops are marching from various parts on towards the Texan lines.

J. Black

Mexico. B. E. Green. November 10, 1843-April 25, 1846. Department of State. Vol. 12, doc. sin núm. NAW.

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17 de marzo de 1846. Jalapa. J. Slidell a J. Black.

Hace de su conocimiento haber recibido su carta que contenía la del ministro mexicano negándose a recibirla. Le escribe pidiendo sus pasaportes y le agradecerá que entregue esa comunicación en mano y que ruegue que sus pasaportes sean acompañados con la orden necesaria para que le proporcionen la escolta.

I agree with you in the opinion that the English counsels have probably an influence on the decision of general Paredes.

Mexico. B. E. Green. November 10, 1843-April 25, 1846. Department of State. Vol. 12, doc. sin núm. NAW.

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12 de marzo de 1846. México. J. M. del Castillo y Lanzas a J. Slidell.

El infraescrito ministro de Relaciones Exteriores y Gobernación de la república tiene el honor de acusar recibo de la nota que su excelencia el señor Juan Slidell, nombrado ministro plenipotenciario y enviado extraordinario de los Estados Unidos de América, se ha servido dirigirla con fecha 10. del presente mes desde Jalapa.

Tan luego como dicha comunicación fue puesta en manos del infraescrito, pasó a dar cuenta con ella al excelentísimo señor presidente interino; e impuesto detenidamente de su contenido, y después de meditado con madurez el negocio, ha tenido a bien ordenar al infraescrito que participe al señor Slidell en contestación, como tiene el honor de hacerlo, que el gobierno mexicano no puede recibirle como enviado extraordinario y ministro plenipotenciario para residir cerca del mismo gobierno.

Aquí podría el infraescrito dar por terminada su nota, si motivos de gran peso no le persuadiesen de la necesidad de hacer algunas reflexiones en este lugar: no por temor a las consecuencias que pueda producir esa decisiva resolución, sino por el respeto que debe a la razón y a la justicia.

Verdad es que ese aparato de guerra con que la Unión Americana se presenta por mar con sus escuadras en ambas costas, por tierra con sus fuerzas invasoras avanzando por las fronteras del norte, al mismo tiempo que por su ministro plenipotenciario se hacen al gobierno de México proposiciones de avenimiento y conciliación, sería una causa bastante poderosa para no escucharlas mientras no se removiese toda amenaza y hasta la menor apariencia de hostilidad. Mas aun de ello prescinde el gobierno de la república para entrar franca y lealmente en la discusión apoyándose únicamente en la razón y en los hechos. Referir lisa y llanamente la verdad basta para que se conozca la justicia que a México asiste en la cuestión que se ventila.

Palpable ha sido, muchos años hace, el anhelo del gobierno de los Estados Unidos por acrecentar su ya inmenso territorio a costa del territorio mexicano; y está hoy fuera de toda duda, que, respecto a Texas, al menos ha sido ésa su firme y constante determinación, puesto que así lo ha declarado categórica y oficialmente un representante autorizado de la Unión cuyo aserto, a pesar de su peregrina e injuriosa franqueza no ha sido desmentido aún por el gobierno de los Estados Unidos.

Prescindiendo ahora de todos los sucesos a que ese marcado propósito ha dado lugar en una larga serie de años, sucesos que han servido, no sólo para comprobarlo más y más, sino también para hacer ver que ningún medio de cualquiera clase que fuese, habría de perdonarse para su realización, baste atender únicamente a lo que en el año pasado ha transcurrido, es cuanto importa al caso presente.

Considerando que había llegado el tiempo de llevar a cabo la agregación de Texas, los Estados Unidos, en unión y de acuerdo con sus naturales aliados y adictos en dicho territorio, concertaron medios de intento. Inicióse en el congreso americano el proyecto relativo. Frustróse éste en sus principios, gracias a las razones de prudencia y a la circunspección y sabiduría con que entonces procedió el senado de la Unión.

Reprodujose, sin embargo, el proyecto en las siguientes sesiones, y entonces fue aprobado y sancionado en la forma y términos de todo el mundo conocidos.

Un hecho tal, o por hablar con más exactitud, un acto tan notable de usurpación hacía imperiosa la necesidad de que México, por su propio honor, lo repudiese con la debida firmeza y dignidad. El supremo gobierno había declarado de

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antemano que miraría semejante acto como un *casus belli*; y consiguiente a esa declaración, las negociaciones estaban por su propia naturaleza concluidas, y era la guerra el único recurso del gobierno mexicano.

Mas, antes de proceder a reivindicar sus ultrajados derechos, le fueron dirigidas por el llamado presidente de la república de Texas proposiciones que tenían por objeto entrar en una transacción amistosa sobre la base de su independencia, y el gobierno se prestó a oírlas y consintió en recibir los comisionados que con ese motivo le fuesen enviados de Texas.

No desperdiciaron tan preciosos instantes los agentes de los Estados Unidos en este último territorio; y aprovechándose del *statu quo* de México, prepararon las cosas y dirigieron los negocios de tal modo, que se siguiese casi inmediatamente la ya concertada agregación a la Unión Americana.

Así esta agregación de un territorio que había sido parte integrante del de México durante la larga época del dominio de España, y después de su emancipación, sin interrupción alguna en tan largo espacio de tiempo y que, además, había sido reconocido y sancionado por el tratado de límites entre la República Mexicana y los Estados Unidos de América; esta agregación vino a efectuarse por los medios reprobados de la violencia y del dolo.

Las naciones civilizadas han observado con asombro que, en esta época de ilustración, y cultura, una potencia fuerte y consolidada, aprovechándose de las disensiones interiores de una nación vecina, adormeciendo su vigilancia con protestas de amistad, poniendo en juego todo género de resortes y artificios, apelando alternativamente a la intriga y a la violencia, se haya arrojado a despojarla de una parte valiosa de su territorio, desatendiendo los incontrovertibles derechos de la más incuestionable propiedad y de la más constante posesión.

He aquí, pues, la verdadera posición de la República Mexicana: despojada, ultrajada, desatendida, aún se pretende someterla a una humillante degradación. Los sentimientos de su propia dignidad no le permitirán consentir en semejante ignominia.

No es fácil comprender cómo, a pesar de las terminantes y claras explicaciones dadas a su excelencia el señor Slidell en la nota que cita de 20 de diciembre último, crea el ejecutivo de los Estados Unidos hallar motivo para insistir en lo que en ella se denegaba con hartó fundamento.

El cónsul de los Estados Unidos en esta capital dirigió una nota confidencial, en 13 de octubre al entonces ministro de Relaciones Exteriores, en la que contrayéndose a lo que le había manifestado con anterioridad en una entrevista del mismo carácter, le expone "que al suspenderse las relaciones diplomáticas entre los dos países, se aseguró al general Almonte que el presidente deseaba se arreglasen amistosamente todos los motivos de queja entre ambos gobiernos y cultivar las más amistosas y benévolas relaciones con las repúblicas hermanas. Continúa animado de los mismos sentimientos. Desea que todas las diferencias existentes se terminen amistosamente y no por medio de los armas. Impelido el presidente por estos sentimientos me ha ordenado prevenga a usted, por no haber agente diplomático en México, que se informe al gobierno mexicano si recibirá un enviado de los Estados Unidos revestido con plenos poderes para arreglar todas las cuestiones que se controvertan entre los dos gobiernos. Si la respuesta fuera afirmativa, inmediatamente se despachará a México el referido enviado".

A esto se contestó por el ministro del actual cargo del infraescrito, y con fecha 15 del referido mes, "que a pesar de que la nación está gravemente ofendida por la de los Estados Unidos en razón de los hechos cometidos por ésta con el departamento de Texas propia de aquélla, mi gobierno está dispuesto a recibir al comisionado que de los Estados Unidos venga a esta capital con plenos poderes de su gobierno para arreglar de un modo pacífico, razonable y decoroso la contienda presente dando con esto una nueva prueba de que, aun en medio de los agravios y de su firme decisión para exigir la reparación competente, no repele ni desprecia el partido de la razón y de la paz a que le invita su contrario".

Por estos extractos se echa de ver que fue la firme intención del gobierno mexicano admitir sólo a un plenipotenciario de los Estados Unidos con poderes *ad hoc*, esto es, especiales para tratar sobre el asunto de Texas; y sobre éste únicamente, como preliminar a la renovación de las relaciones amistosas entre ambos países, si diere lugar a ella el resultado y a la admisión consiguiente entonces, y no antes, de un enviado extraordinario y ministro plenipotenciario cerca del mismo gobierno.

Ni podía el gobierno de la república extender a más en la ocasión su compromiso; porque admitir a cualquier persona enviada por los Estados Unidos por el simple carácter de los agentes ordinarios de las naciones amigas hallándose

aún pendiente la grave cuestión de Texas, que afecta directa e inmediatamente la integridad del territorio mexicano, y aún la misma nacionalidad, equivaldría a dar por terminada la cuestión, prejuzgándola sin haberla abordado siquiera, y por restablecidas desde luego de hecho las relaciones de amistad y armonía entre ambas naciones.

Tan sencilla verdad es ésta, que el nombramiento de un enviado extraordinario y ministro plenipotenciario por el ejecutivo de los Estados Unidos, y su ratificación posterior, no obstante cuanto manifestó sobre el asunto el gobierno de México, hace aparecer este acto como una tentación que el infraescrito no se permite calificar.

Si la buena fe preside, como es de suponer, a las disposiciones del gobierno de los Estados Unidos, ¿qué motivo ha podido existir para rechazar con tanto afán la restricción indispensable con que México ha accedido a la propuesta hecha espontáneamente por aquél? Si se deseaba real y positivamente reanudar los lazos de buena inteligencia y amistad entre ambas naciones, muy fácil era el medio: el gobierno mexicano ofreció admitir al plenipotenciario o comisionado de los Estados Unidos que viniese con poderes especiales para tratar sobre la cuestión de Texas.

Sobre este punto la resolución del gobierno mexicano es inmutable. Y pues, en el último caso, son los derechos de la nación mexicana los que habrán de afirmarse, siendo su honor el que ha sido ultrajado y el que habrá de vengarse por consiguiente, el gobierno hará, si necesario fuese el llamamiento debido a todos los ciudadanos para que cumplan con el sagrado deber de la defensa de la patria.

Amante de la paz, desearía apartar esa funesta contingencia; y sin temer la guerra, quisiera evitar tan grave calamidad para ambos países. Por esto se ha prestado y se prestará dócil a todos los medios honoríficos de conciliación y anhela sinceramente que la presente contienda se transija de un modo razonable y decoroso.

En la actualidad, decir que México guarda una posición de casi hostilidad respecto de los Estados Unidos es añadir una nueva ofensa a sus anteriores agravios. Su actitud es de defensa, porque se ve injustamente atacada; porque una parte de su territorio está ocupada por las fuerzas de una nación que intenta, sin derecho alguno, hacerse dueño de él; porque sus puertos están amagados por las escuadras de la misma potencia. En tales circunstancias ¿habrá de permanecer inactiva sin tomar medidas adecuadas a tan rigurosa emergencia?

No es, pues, a México, visto su presente estado a quien toca decidir si se seguirá una negociación amistosa o un rompimiento abierto. Tiempo ha que sus intereses lo han hecho preciso, que su dignidad lo ha reclamado; mas con la esperanza de una transacción honrosa y pacífica a la vez, ha acallado el clamor de esas exigencias imperiosas.

De lo expuesto se deduce que si la guerra se hiciera al fin inevitable, y si a consecuencia de ella hubiera de ser turbada la paz de las naciones civilizadas, no sería de México la responsabilidad, sino toda de los Estados Unidos, y exclusivamente de ellos. No de México que admitió con una generosidad sin igual a los ciudadanos americanos que quisiesen venir a colonizar a Texas; y si de los Estados Unidos, que resueltos a apoderarse tarde o temprano de ese territorio, fomentaban con esa mira la emigración a él, para que a su tiempo, convirtiéndose de colonos en dueños sus habitantes, reclamasen por suya la tierra para traspasarla a aquéllos. No de México, que habiendo reclamado con oportunidad tan enorme atentado, quiso alejar todo motivo de contienda y de hostilidad; y si de los Estados Unidos que con escándalo del mundo e infracción manifiesta de los tratados daban protección y auxilio a los culpables de tan inicua rebelión. No de México, que aun en medio de tan grandes y tan repetidos agravios se ha prestado a admitir proposiciones de conciliación; y si de los Estados Unidos que, pretextando un sincero deseo de un arreglo amistoso y honorífico, han desmentido con sus hechos la sinceridad de sus propósitos. No de México, en fin que prescindiendo de sus más caros intereses en obsequio de la paz, ha aguardado cuanto se ha querido las proposiciones que con ese objeto pudieran hacersele; y si de los Estados Unidos que con frívolos pretextos evitan la conclusión de semejante arreglo, proponiendo la paz al mismo tiempo que hacen avanzar sus escuadras y sus tropas a los puertos, a las fronteras mexicanas, exigiendo una humillación imposible para hallar un pretexto si no un motivo que dé ocasión al rompimiento de las hostilidades.

Y pues así es, a los Estados Unidos y no a México toca resolver en la alternativa que el señor Slidell propone, es decir, entre una negociación amistosa y un abierto rompimiento.

El infraescrito no duda hacer conocer a su excelencia el señor Slidell, que en vista de lo que se ha expuesto en la presente nota, el gobierno mexicano confía en que el ejecutivo de los Estados Unidos acordará la resolución que estime

conveniente con la madurez y deliberación que demandan los gravísimos intereses complicados en cuestión tan espinosa.

El gobierno mexicano preparándose, si lo exigen las circunstancias, para la guerra mantendrá siempre viva su lisonjera esperanza de que no será turbada la paz en el nuevo continente; y al hacer esta declaración a la faz del mundo, rechaza del modo más terminante toda responsabilidad de los males de una lucha que no ha provocado y que ha hecho cuanto está de su mano para evitar.

Al manifestar todo esto el infraescrito de orden de su gobierno a su excelencia el señor Slidell, aprovecha la oportunidad para ofrecerle las protestas de su muy distinguida consideración.

J. M. de Castillo y Lanzas

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17 de marzo de 1846. Jalapa. J. Slidell a J. M. del Castillo y Lanzas.

Da cuenta de haber recibido las notas del día 12 en que el gobierno de México se niega a recibirlo y de acuerdo con sus instrucciones tienen que volver a su país de inmediato quedando sólo en espera de que le envíen sus pasaportes a Jalapa.

Comenta que la nota que le envió Castillo sólo difiere en fraseología de la que recibió de De la Peña y las remitirá a su gobierno, pero no puede pasar por alto los comentarios referentes a Texas y a la política atribuida a los Estados Unidos. Tratará, al hacer los comentarios, de conservar la calma y de cuidar el lenguaje digno de los casos de justicia aun cuando los comentarios de Castillo no habían dado el ejemplo.

Con toda confianza su país podía apelar a la historia de los últimos veinte años para demostrar que resultaba un exceso el atribuirles todos los hechos de injusticia, robo, artificio, usurpación y violencia como lo hace Castillo en su nota.

It has never been pretended that the scheme of colonization of the territory of Texas by citizens of the United States was suggested by their government, it was in conformity with a policy deliberately adopted by that of Mexico, and she must accuse herself alone, for results which the slightest foresight must have anticipated from the introduction of a population whose character, habits and opinions were so widely divergent from those of the people, with whom it was attempted to amalgamate them. There is no ground for the assertion that "the United States, profiting by the generosity with which their citizens had been invited to Texas, and resolved sooner or later to take possession of that territory, encouraged emigration thither with the view that its inhabitants, changing the character of colonist for that of masters, should seize upon the territory for the purpose of transferring it to the United States.

Resultaba cierto que nunca se había opuesto el menor impedimento a la emigración pues en ello se apoyaba uno de los credos políticos de los Estados Unidos por el cual los habitantes si lo creían necesario buscaban la manera de hacer fortuna en tierras ajenas.

Stimulated by the gracious allotment of lands to emigrants and by the similarity approaching, with the exception of religious toleration, almost identity, with the political institutions of the Mexican Republic to those under which they had been reared, the population of Texas soon attained a development that authorized the demand of a privilege which had been solemnly guaranteed to them by the Constitution of 1824: admission into the Mexican union as a separate state. A convention was held and a state constitution formed in conformity with the provisions of the fundamental compact of 1824; it was presented to the general congress with a petition to be admitted into the union, the application was rejected, and the delegates imprisoned. Soon after the constitutional congress of Mexico was dissolved by military force, the same arbitrary power convened a new congress, by which the federal Constitution was abrogated, and a consolidated or central government established in its stead. Texas, as she had an unquestionable right to do, refused to acknowledge the authority of a government which had been imposed upon the other states, by a successful military usurpation. The compact which had bound her to the Mexican Republic was dissolved, and an abortive effort having been made to reduce her to subjection, she on the 3rd March 1836 declared

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herself an independent republic, and nobly sustained that declaration on the battle field of San Jacinto, by the complete army, commanded by the president of the Mexican Republic in person. She then demanded the recognition of her independence and asked to be annexed to the United States. He advised that no change should be made in the attitude of the United States, "if not until Mexico herself or one of the great foreign powers should recognise the independence of the new government, at least, until the lapse of time or course of events should have proved beyond cavil or dispute the ability of the people of Texas to maintain their sovereignty or to uphold the government constituted by them". These overtures on the part of Texas were pending for several years, but were not entertained by the government of the United States, until the period had arrived, when in the language of president Jackson above quoted, the lapse of time and course of events had proved beyond cavil or dispute, the ability of the people to maintain separate sovereignty. Her independence must be considered as a settled fact, which cannot be called in question. Nearly four years since, Mr. Webster then secretary of State, in a despatch to the minister of the United States at Mexico said: "from the time of the battle of San Jacinto, in April 1836 to the present moment Texas has exhibited the same external signs of national independence as Mexico herself, an independence acknowledged as a political sovereignty by the principal powers of the world no hostile foot finding rest within her territory, for six or seven years; and Mexico herself refraining, for all that period, from any further attempt to re-establish her own authority on the territory". Three additional years of inaction on the part of Mexico, elapsed, before the final action of the United States upon the question of annexation with the assent of the same Senate, whose prudence, circumspection and wisdom your excellency so justly eulogizes; and if any additional sanction could have been required to a measure so evidently just and proper it has been afforded by Mexico herself, who through her minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Cuevas, authorized by the national congress on the 19th May last declared: "The supreme government received the four articles above mentioned as the preliminaries of a normal and definitive treaty and further that it is disposed to commence the negotiation as Texas may desire and to receive the commissioners which she may name for the purpose". The first condition was, "Mexico consents to

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acknowledge the independence of Texas": truth, is that, by the second condition, Texas engaged that she would stipulate in the treaty not to annex herself or become subject to any country whatever. When it is recollected that this preliminary arrangement was made through the intervention of the ministers of Great Britain and France, consequent upon the passage of the act of annexation, it cannot be denied that it was intended to apply solely to the United States, and that when Mexico acknowledged her inability to contest the independence of Texas, and was prepared to abandon all its pretensions to that territory, she was induced to make this tardy and reluctant recognition not by any abatement of her hostile sentiments toward her, so called, rebellious subjects, but in the hope of gratifying her unfriendly feelings against the United States.

The undersigned cannot but express his unfeigned surprise, that in the face of this incontrovertible evidence that Mexico had abandoned all intention or even hope of ever reestablishing her authority over any portion of Texas, your excellency should have asserted that, "Texas had been an integral part of Mexico, not only during the long period of the Spanish dominion, but since its emancipation *without any interruption whatever*, during so long a space of time" and again that, "the United States had despoiled Mexico of a valuable portion of her territory regardless of the incontrovertible rights of the most unquestionable proprietorship and of the *most constant possession*". How weak must be the course which can only be sustained by assertions so inconsistent with facts that are notorious to all the world and how unfounded are all these vehement declamations against the usurpations, and thirst for territorial aggrandizement of the United States. The independence of Texas then, being a fact conceded by Mexico herself, she had no right to prescribe restrictions as to the form of government Texas might choose to *assume*, nor can she justly complain that Texas, with a wise appreciation of her true interests has thought proper to merge her sovereignty in that of the United States.

The Mexican government cannot shift the responsibility of war upon the United States, by assuming that they are the aggressors. A plain unanswerable fact responds to all the subtleties and sophistries by which it is attempted to obscure the real question. That fact is, the presence in Mexico of a minister of the United States, clothed with full power to settle all the questions in dispute; between the two nations,

and among them that of Texas. These complaints are mutual, the consideration of them cannot be separated, and they must be settled by the same negotiation, or by the arbitrament which Mexico herself has elected. With what reason does Mexico attribute to the United States the desire of finding a pretext to commence hostilities? The appearance of a few ships of war on the Mexican coasts, and the advance of a small military force to the frontier of Texas, are cited as evidence, that the declarations of a desire to preserve peace are insincere. Surely, it cannot be necessary to remind your excellency that the menaces of war here all proceeded from Mexico and it would seem that the elevation to power of its actual government was too recent to have afforded your excellency time to forget the ostensible reason for which that, which preceded it was overthrown. The crime imputed to the then president, a crime so odious as to justify his forcible expulsion from the presidency to which he had been, but a few months previous elected with unparalleled unanimity and in accordance with all the forms of the Constitution was that of not having prosecuted the war against Texas, or in other words, against the United States, a crime of which the enormity was aggravated in a tenfold degree, by his having accepted the proposal of the United States, to negotiate. To suppose that the present government has not always intended and does not still intend vigorously to prosecute an offensive war, would be to insinuate the degrading charge of making declarations which it did not design to fulfill, with the unworthy motive of supplanting a rival.

With these avowed intentions on the part of Mexico and so far as words can constitute war, that state actually existing; with what fairness can she complain of precautions having been taken by the United States, to guard against the attacks with which they have been menaced, so far at least as their very moderate peace establishment, would permit them to do so. Are they patiently and meekly to abide the time wherein Mexico shall be prepared to strike with due effect the threatened blow?

Your excellency has alluded to the internal dissensions of Mexico and accused the United States "of taking advantage of them, beguiling its vigilance by protestations of friendship bringing into play every kind of device and artifice and appealing alternately to intrigue and violence". Were the disposition of a United States such as your excellency is pleased to attribute to them, they would have eagerly availed

themselves of the opportunity afforded by the first refusal to receive the undersigned, and certainly no moment more propitious than the present, to carry their ambitious schemes into effect, could have been selected. Instead of availing themselves of it, they have, with a degree of forbearance, that by many perhaps by most impartial observers, will be considered humiliating: repeated the overtures for negotiation which had been rejected under circumstances the best calculated to offend national pride and this most conciliatory advance, made by the aggrieved party, is said by your excellency to be an attempt, which he cannot permit himself to call by its proper name (*una tentación que el infraescrito no se permite calificar*). This reserve is remarkable when contrasted with the terms of vituperation so freely, employed in other parts of the note or, is it that your excellency could discover no epithet sufficiently energetic to stigmatize an offence so enormous as, a renewed proposition to enter upon negotiations?

The undersigned has already exceeded the limits which he had prescribed to himself for the reply, the question has now reached a point where words must give place to acts. While he deeply regrets a result so little contemplated when he commenced the duties of his mission of peace, he is consoled by the reflection that no honorable efforts, to avert the calamities of war, have been spared by his government and that these efforts cannot fail to be properly appreciated, not only by the people of the United States, but by the world.

The undersigned begs leave to renew to his excellency don J. M. de Castillo y Lanzas the assurances of his distinguished consideration.

John Slidell

Mexico. B. E. Green. November 10, 1843-April 25, 1846. Department of State. Vol. 12, anexo al doc. núm. 11. NAW.

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12 de marzo de 1846. México. J. Black a J. Slidell.

Explicaba haber sostenido una entrevista con Castillo y Lanzas quien le dijo tener preparada la nota con la contestación

a Slidell pero que debía someterla a la aprobación del presidente por si éste deseaba hacer algún añadido.

Perhaps the news that arrived here yesterday in relation to the Oregon question, may have induced the Mexican government to make some alteration in the answer.

Some of the troops destined for Veracruz left here this morning and it is said more will leave soon. Some think this it to oppose Santa Anna if he should attempt to enter the country to head a revolution as there have been reports to that effect.

Anuncia también que el gobierno mexicano le ha entregado la nota de contestación aludida y que la hace seguir.

Mexico. B. E. Green. November 10, 1843-April 25, 1846. Department of State. Vol. 12, doc. sin núm. NAW.

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12 de marzo de 1846. Washington. J. Buchanan a J. Slidell.

No cree necesario modificar las instrucciones excepto al considerar el cambio de gobierno pues el del momento no podía considerarse como la continuidad del gobierno de Herrera y por lo tanto no debía salir de México sin plantear de nuevo el problema al gobierno del momento y que si continuara negándose a recibirlo contestaría retirándose.

On your return to the United States, energetic measures against Mexico would at once be recommended by the president and these might fail to obtain the support of congress, if it could be asserted that the existing government had not refused to receive our minister. It would not be a sufficient answer to such an allegation that the government of Herrera had refused to receive you and that you are therefore justified in leaving the country, after a short delay because in the meantime, the government of Paredes had not voluntarily offered to reverse the decision of its predecessor.

Todo esto se proponía en consecuencia de que México era un país endeble y que había que convencer primero al pueblo americano de que se había hecho todo lo posible para conseguir justicia en el caso de las reclamaciones antes de proceder a la apertura de hostilidades.

Para poder volver a plantear su problema era preferible

que volviera a establecerse en la capital. Parecía que el gobierno de Paredes estaba necesitado de dinero:

It would be easy for you to make known to him in some discreet manner that the United States were both able and willing to relieve his administration from pecuniary embarrassment if he would do us justice and settle the question of boundary between the two republics.

Consideraba que se podía arreglar un tratado de inmediato que sería ratificado y mientras tanto Paredes podría girar sobre Washington. Mejor que nadie Slidell sabía cuándo ocurría la mejor oportunidad para volverse a presentar ante el gobierno mexicano. Igualmente dejaban a su discreción el momento de su salida del territorio mexicano.

Hablando de los rumores de monarquía en México que podía ser encabezada por Enrique, hijo de Francisco de Paula o por D. Carlos que había que vigilar muy de cerca pues si Inglaterra y Francia intentaban imponer un príncipe europeo en el gobierno mexicano habría que resistirse con toda la fuerza.

It is unnecessary to State to one so well informed upon the subject as yourself the reasons why the United States could never suffer foreign powers to erect a throne for a European prince on the ruins of a neighboring republic, without our most determined resistance.

The Oregon question is rapidly approaching a crisis. By the steam packet which will leave Liverpool in the 4th April, if not by that which left on the 4th instant, the president expects information which will be decisive on the subject. The prospect is that our differences with Great Britain may be peacefully adjusted, though this is by no means certain. Your return to the United States, before the result is known, would produce considerable alarm in the public mind and might possibly exercise an injurious influence on our relation with Great Britain.

En conclusión cree muy difícil prever lo que pueda suceder en un país como México en una situación de revolución y tanto el gobierno como el presidente le creían suficientemente capacitado para obrar de acuerdo con las circunstancias que tuvieran lugar.

Mexico. Instructions. November 10, 1845-April 6, 1854. Department of State. Vol. 16, doc. núm. 7, p. 37-44. NAW.

14 de marzo de 1846. México. J. Black a J. Slidell.

There is no doubt the present government is in a very tight place in respect to the pending question and have been put to their trumps in making out their answer to your note, and no doubt have solicited advice on the subject from other quarters, on Thursday last the day the said answer was received I am credibly informed that president Paredes made no less than five distinct visits, to Mr. Bankhead at his house, in the course of the day an affair so extraordinary could not help but be noticed by the neighbors, who with reason concluded that some very important business was about being transacted between the Mexican president and his British Majesty's minister, but we undoubtedly with more effect can judge, what was the true cause of these repeated unceremonious visits, the results of which perhaps has had some bearing on the answer given to you, and which was put off to the eleventh hour.

The question of monarchy and European intervention agitated here under the eye of this governments has operated in favor of our country, and the people explain we will rather a thousand times prefer to be annexed to the United States as sovereign states, than live under a monarchy of whatever nature and particularly that of a foreign prince.

J. Black

Mexico. B. E. Green. November 10, 1843-April 25, 1846. Department of State. Vol. 12, doc. sin núm. NAW.

15 de marzo de 1846. Jalapa. J. Slidell a J. Buchanan.

I have barely time to say, that I have this moment received the definitive answer of this government refusing to receive me. I shall immediately apply as instructed for my passports. I send this letter to be forwarded by a merchant vessel about to sail from Vera Cruz. I shall request commander Conner to have a vessel in readiness to convey my official despatch

with the note of Mr. Castillo y Lanzas and the reply which I shall make. Be assured that nothing is to be done with these people, until they shall have been chastised. Believe me...

J. Slidell

Mexico. B. E. Green. November 10, 1843-April 25, 1846. Department of State. Vol. 12, doc. sin núm. NAW.

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18 de marzo de 1846. Jalapa. J. Slidell a J. Buchanan.

On the 15th instant, I received from the minister of Foreign Relations a reply to my communication of the 1st. instant of which you have already been advised.

It is a peremptory refusal to receive me in the capacity of Envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotenciary. I have consequently in conformity with your instructions, applied for my passports, and so soon as they are received I shall proceed to Vera Cruz, there to embark for New Orleans. I send you copies of the note of the minister of foreign relations and of my reply.

The state of affairs in this country is not materially varied since I had the honor of addressing you on the 1st. instant, the downward course of the Paredes government is continued with accelerated speed. I do not think that he can sustain himself until the period fixed for the meeting of his constituent congress, and I should not be surprised at his ejection from his usurped power, at a much earlier day. My letters from the capital, all concur, as to the extreme precariousness of his tenure of office, and the great excitement that exists, not only there, but throughout the departments. The apprehension of his intention to introduce an alien monarchy has excited the public mind, to a degree of which I had not considered it capable.

I am at a loss whether to ascribe his refusal to receive me, at a moment when his position is so critical, to the deed of having the pretext which he had so successfully used against Herrera employed against himself, or to a reliance upon foreign intervention. Perhaps his motive may be a mixed one,

adherence to principle is the last and least cause of action, which must be looked for in Mexico.

Hasta el momento no había dado importancia a los proyectos de la monarquía, no por el deseo existente de cierto número de partidarios que había, sino por la imposibilidad que veía en combinar los intereses de Francia e Inglaterra cuando se tratara de decidir quien le encabezara. No habría príncipe en cuyo consejo no hubiera una preponderancia de una de estas dos naciones y tampoco dudaba de que estaban de por medio insuperables dificultades económicas que llevarían a una guerra con los Estados Unidos. Muchas personas informadas decían que se estaba negociando en ese sentido, la prensa lo tomaba como base de ataque en contra del gobierno y el órgano oficial se negaba a admitir que existían esas negociaciones.

El día que se negaron a recibirlo, el presidente visitó a Bankhead. Sin duda se exageró el número de las visitas que hizo pero el sólo hecho de que fuera una era suficiente para pensar que Bankhead actuaba de consejero confidencial del gobierno:

And taking in consideration the circumstances which I mentioned in my despatch of 29th. December authorizes the belief that he has interfered with the question of my reception, in no friendly spirit.

In my reply to Mr. Castillo y Lanzas I have not alluded to any such presumed interference as well because I have no positive testimony to justify the charge as from the apprehension that if negotiations be in progress on the Oregon question, it might tend to embarrass them.

With a view to this possible contingency of an attempt to establish a foreign dynasty, I trust that you will pardon me for suggesting the importance of prompt and decisive action with Mexico; such a course, indeed, is imperatively called for by other circumstances; but if either Great Britain or France, or both combined, favor such a project, they cannot, without incurring the odium of a war, of unqualified aggression, interfere in the internal affairs of Mexico, while hostilities actually exist between her and the United States.

As to any change of native rules in Mexico, I look upon them as a matter of great indifference; we shall never be able to treat with her, on fair terms, the strongest moral position before our own people and the world, by exhausting every possible means of conciliation; but here, all amicable advances are considered as indicative either of weakness

or treachery. The next movement will probably a "pronunciamiento" of the federal party sustained by a portion of the army; it is said, and strange as it may appear, on good authority, that the expelled dictator Santa Anna, will be invited to head this liberal movement; the leading military men are in favor, and should he accept the invitation, he will have little difficulty in putting down Paredes. My last letters from Mexico state that an express had just arrived from San Luis Potosi, bringing intelligence that the division of general Ampudia (who has recently been appointed to the command of the army of the north) which had been ordered to the frontier of the Rio del Norte has mutinied and refused to proceed. You may recollect that the same thing occurred when Paredés himself was ordered to march upon Texas, in that case, the mutiny was believed to have been merely simulated, to afford him a pretext for not obeying his orders. The future course of Ampudia may offer other features of coincidence.

...should war be declared, it will of course be desirable to give the earliest possible intelligence to our Pacific Squadron: this can best be done through Veracruz; letters can be conveyed thence to Mazatlan in eight days.

Mexico. B. E. Green. November 10, 1843-April 25, 1846. Department of State. Vol. 12, despacho 11. NAW.

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18 de marzo de 1846. Jalapa. J. Slidell a J. Buchanan.

Privado.

My dear sir,

I have nothing to add to the accompanying despatches, except to say that while at Vera Cruz, I will make arrangements to convey by express to the Pacific Squadron, any order which may be sent there. There can be no difficulty on doing this if a steamer convey the first intelligence of war to Vera Cruz, it can be kept secret until the express is well on its way to Mexico. I do not know that I can give any useful information at Washington, but should you think my presence there desirable, I will cheerfully make the journey.

I expect to receive my passports on Tuesday next (24th instant), and in that case I ought to reach New Orleans about the 5th April. I am very well satisfied with my last note to Mr. Castillo y Lanzas, but it is no easy matter to preserve one *sang froid* with these people. Depend upon it, we can never get along well with them, until we have given them a good drubbing. Believe me.

I have...

Mexico. B. E. Green. November 10, 1843-April 25, 1846. Department of State. Vol. 12, doc. sin núm. NAW.

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21 de marzo de 1846. México. J. M. del Castillo y Lanzas a J. Slidell.

El infraescrito, ministro de Relaciones Exteriores y Gobernación, tiene el honor de acusar recibo de la nota que, el excelentísimo señor Juan Slidell, nombrado enviado extraordinario y ministro plenipotenciario de los Estados Unidos, se ha servido dirigirlle en fecha 1o. [debe ser del 17] del presente mes desde la ciudad de Jalapa.

Como quiera que en esta comunicación el señor Slidell sólo reproduce argumentos y razones históricas presentadas anteriormente por el gobierno mexicano, infructuoso sería que el infraescrito emprendiese actualmente de nuevo la inútil tarea de entrar en el examen de tales razones y argumentos.

Y sobre todo, pues que el señor Slidell, de conformidad con las instrucciones de su gobierno, regresa a los Estados Unidos y pide que al efecto se le libren los pasaportes necesarios a su excelencia en cumplimiento de la orden respectiva del señor presidente interino de la república.

Con este motivo el infraescrito se aprovecha de la oportunidad para renovar a su excelencia el señor Juan Slidell las seguridades de su distinguida consideración.

J. M. Castillo y Lanzas

Mexico. B. E. Green. November 10, 1843-April 25, 1 46. Department of State. Vol. 12, doc. anexo al despacho 10. NAW.

27 de marzo de 1846. Jalapa. J. Slidell a J. Buchanan.

Le comunica que todavía no cuenta con los pasaportes que pidió para retirarse y no sabe si se los enviaron directamente a Veracruz, pues ya se dio la orden para que le facilitaran la escolta hasta el puerto. Al día siguiente pensaba salir hacia Veracruz para ver si allí se encuentran. Los papeles de la legación ya estaban en poder de Parrot para, que como conductor de despachos, los llevara de inmediato a Washington.

I am informed that the council of government has been deliberating on the question of issuing "patentes de corso" or letters of marque, in anticipation of hostilities with the United States. I do not learn that any final decision was made.

Entre tanto había dimitido el secretario de Hacienda y todo parecía indicar que el gobierno de Paredes estaba desintegrándose en pedazos.

Se hablaba de la vuelta de Santa Anna y había rumores de monarquía, sobre todo negándose que semejante intención estuviera en pie.

Mexico. B. E. Green. November 10, 1843-April 25, 1846. Department of State. Vol. 12, doc. núm. 12. NAW.

10. de abril de 1846. Londres. T. Murphy a su gobierno.

En el oficio reservado número 2 de 28 de enero le dicen que la opinión que se ha formado el gobierno mexicano sobre el asunto de las Californias es la misma que la expuesta en oficios anteriores; si Inglaterra y Francia no consideraban conveniente prestar una ayuda directa en ese tema, en caso de agresión por los Estados Unidos tal como ellos mismos lo habían dicho, efectivamente no quedaba otra cosa que hacer que ver las proposiciones inglesas y que México no tenía por qué hacer sugerencias en ese sentido.

A pesar de saber que Inglaterra había suspendido toda discusión sobre el asunto, hasta que se hubiera visto lo que sucedía con la proposición de paz y de guerra que tenían

pendiente con los Estados Unidos por el problema de Oregon, visitó a Aberdeen. En la visita trató de averiguar lo que los ingleses pensarán pudiera ocurrir, y expuso sus dudas en cuanto a que, a pesar de que existieran las declaraciones de Polk y el mélico discurso del general Cass y otros del mismo estilo, se resolvieran a hacer la guerra para la que todavía nada se había preparado. En cambio Inglaterra lo tenía todo a punto y desdeñaba los desórdenes que tendrían lugar y la confusión que se suscitaría en todas las gestiones mercantiles de los Estados Unidos. A juzgar por los periódicos parecía que la opinión pública deseaba la lucha a pesar de que, en el fondo, se pensaba que el arbitraje propuesto por Inglaterra sería aceptado pues de lo contrario, se suscitaría una escisión en la población norteamericana.

Lord Aberdeen contestó que la política que la Inglaterra seguiría en este negocio es la que había anunciado en la cámara de los lores, y sir Robert Peel en la de los comunes hace algunas noches, esto es, hacer cuantos esfuerzos sean compatibles con el honor nacional para asegurar la paz y prepararse al propio tiempo para la guerra si ésta ha de ser inevitable; que en cuanto al resultado final de las cuestiones pendientes, no era posible decir con certeza cuál será; que nadie más que él se había lisonjeado de que se arreglarían definitivamente de un modo pacífico; “pero” añadió con aire de reserva “ni yo ni mis colegas en el día estamos lejos de creer que al fin no tengan un éxito favorable”. Tales fueron las palabras, en cuanto me ha sido posible conservarlas en la memoria, de que hizo uso el secretario de Negocios Extranjeros. Prosiguió diciendo que el público también comenzaba a conocer que los americanos habían estado jugando con la Inglaterra y que esto hacía más difícil para el gobierno el ir muy adelante en punto a concesiones para asegurar la paz que, sin embargo, repetía nada dejaría de hacerse que fuese compatible con el honor nacional, háy harto susceptible respecto del negocio por evitar el conflicto.

Lord Aberdeen hizo alusión a las relaciones de México con los Estados Unidos. Dijo que veía por ciertas declaraciones de la administración actual que se trataba de llevar adelante los proyectos de guerra. Contesté que por poco que se lograra establecer el orden en el país, tal guerra no tendría nada de terrorífica para México; que por tierra no tenemos que temer la invasión del territorio por ejércitos americanos, porque los americanos no tienen ejército y por mar todo el mal que podrían hacernos [sería] con el bloqueo de nuestros puertos,

al paso que nosotros con patentes de corso podríamos hacerles mucho daño; que el único punto débil eran las Californias; pero que aún esa debilidad cesaría en el momento que medio se arreglase la hacienda pública. "Para nosotros, milord, proseguí, una guerra con los Estados Unidos es cuestión puramente de recursos para hacerla, para la Inglaterra es cuestión que afecta su principio vital: su industria y su comercio". Lord Aberden hizo la observación de que siempre lo más sabio y más prudente era tratar de evitar la guerra. Repuse que sin negar la exactitud del principio generalmente, era muy cuestionable que la paz con los Estados Unidos fuese más ventajosa para México que la guerra por lamentables que fuesen sus consecuencias, en el supuesto de que los americanos no harían otro uso de la paz sino, a su sombra, llevar adelante los proyectos de engrandecimiento a expensas de México. Dirigir su emigración hacia los puntos menos poblados de nuestro territorio; echar de allí a sus pacíficos habitantes; declarar después la independencia de aquel punto, y en seguida la agregación a la gran Unión Americana, tal era el proceso que ellos intentaban poner en juego; esto es lo que habían hecho en Texas, y esto es lo que harán en cualquier parte de nuestro territorio en donde, mediante la paz puedan introducirse. Independientemente. De estas consideraciones, yo creía que en circunstancias en que era posible una guerra entre la Inglaterra y los Estados Unidos era el momento menos a propósito para que nosotros entrásemos en negociaciones de paz con ellos. Lord Aberdeen replicó que no había duda en que sería más acertado no concluir esas negociaciones mientras estuviese pendiente la cuestión con Inglaterra; en el supuesto de que México se encontrara entonces con su aliado no despreciable, sin que la Inglaterra despreciase tampoco la alianza de México.

ASREM, 4-14-6447, f. 80-82.

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2 de abril de 1846. Alta mar, U. S. Mississippi. J. Slidell a J. Buchanan.

Recibió los pasaportes en Jalapa y remitía copia de la última nota recibida de Castillo junto con los pasaportes. Hacía no-

tar que le había contestado de inmediato al recibir su escrito, cosa poco frecuente en el gobierno mexicano.

El Mississippi llegó a Veracruz el 29 último y le entregó el despacho del gobierno norteamericano número 7 de 12 de marzo que mucho sintió no haber recibido con anterioridad, pues hubiera tratado de quedarse por más tiempo en México. Sin embargo creía que su presencia en la ciudad no hubiera hecho la menor diferencia en cuanto a que lo recibieran. Por lo contrario creía que su movimiento hacia la capital hubiera causado sospechas en los círculos mexicanos. Si el gobierno nacional hubiera deseado tenerlo a mano de alguna forma hubiera buscado la manera de hacer su estancia compatible con el honor y el orgullo nacional.

Por su despacho del día 8 podía notar que también había sugerido, antes de salir de la capital, que el gobierno de Paredes podía ser ayudado económicamente por los Estados Unidos, si se avenía a arreglar las dificultades de las fronteras; pero la sugestión se hizo primero por una persona que mantenía relaciones confidenciales con el presidente y más tarde todavía se volvió a repetir por otra de carácter similar.

It is however very satisfactory to me to find that I have acted in precise conformity with the letter and the spirit of those [instrucciones] of the 12th March excepting in one particular which your previous communications had not given me reason to anticipate, viz: that my return to the United States, before the settlement of the Oregon question, might exercise an injurious influence on our relations with Great Britain. Had such a hint been sooner given to me, there could have been no difficulty in procrastinating indefinitely an issue with the Mexican government, and however disagreeable, and even false, my personal position might have been to you, but do me justice in supposing that no inconvenience to myself would have prevented me from performing my duty.

Las notas de Castillo mostraban el temperamento del gobierno de Paredes:

And although it will probably soon be replaced by another, we have no reason to expect a change of tone towards us, until Mexico shall have been made to feel our strenght.

Después de repetir la situación política de México, indica que Paredes lanzó un manifiesto por el que decía estar dispuesto a no hacer agresión alguna a los Estados Unidos hasta

que el congreso hubiera considerado el asunto, pero que repelerían cualquiera que les pudieran hacer desde aquel país.

This declaration however, under existing circumstances, even if made in good faith, leaves a wide range of discretion; for the advance of our troops to the banks of the Del Norte, can at any time be made the ground for commencing hostilities. The best security for the inaction of Paredes is his utter inability, to concentrate on the frontier, a sufficient force to cope with general Taylor, he cannot at present by any effort unite six thousand men for that object and from what I have seen of Mexican troops, I should have no apprehension of the result of any attack with that number.

Mexico. B. E. Green. November 10, 1843-April 25, 1846. Department of State. Vol. 12, doc. núm. 13. NAW.

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14 de mayo de 1846. Washington. J. Buchanan a L. McLane.

I transmit to you herewith a proclamation of the president of yesterday's date declaring that war exist between the United States and Mexico. Congress adopted the measure with unprecedented unanimity. There were but fourteen dissenting voices on the House and two in the Senate. The truth is, that we had endured so many insults and grievous wrongs from Mexico with such unexampled patience that at the last she must have mistaken our forbearance for pusillanimity. *The Union* of the 11th and 12th instant, which has been forwarded to you contains the president's message and all the proceedings upon it in congress resulting in the declaration of war.

The vote in congress will serve to convince the world that in this country at a crisis when it becomes necessary to assert the national rights, and vindicate the national honor all party distinctions vanish.

You will observe from the president's message the extreme reluctance with which the United States have engaged in this war. It is our interest as it has ever been our inclination, that Mexico should be an independent and powerful republic, and that our relations with her should be of the

most friendly character. The successive revolutions my which she has been afflicted and the avaricious and unprincipled men who have placed themselves at the head of her government have brought her to the brink or ruin. We feel deeply interested that she should establish a stable government sufficiently powerful and pacific to prevent and punish aggressions upon her neighbors. For some years in our intercourse with her we have incurred much of the expense, and suffered many of the inconveniences, of war whilst nominally at peace. This state of things had at last become intolerable.

We go to war with Mexico solely for the purpose of conquering a honorable and permanent peace. Whilst we intend to prosecute the war with vigor, both by land and by sea, we shall bear the olive branch in one hand and the sword in the other; and whenever she will accept the former, we shall sheathe the latter.

A strict blockade of the ports of Mexico, both on the Atlantic and the Pacific will be immediately established. This, by depriving her of the revenue which she derives from customs will, it is hoped, speedily bring her to offer or to accept reasonable terms. Besides, it will then become the interest of the foreign nations who now enjoy the monopoly of her commerce to exert their influence with her government for the restoration of peace, upon just and liberal principles.

It is but fair that you should announce to the Earl of Aberdeen the intention of the president to blockade the ports of Mexico; but you may assure him that the same facilities which the French granted in their recent blockade of Veracruz to the British mail steamers, shall be extended to them at least for the present. In conversing with his lordship on the objects and purposes of the war, you will be guided by the sentiments contained in the president's message and this dispatch. I am . . .

J. Buchanan

Great Britain. Instructions. April 16, 1840-July 21, 1849. Department of State. Vol. 15, p. 290-292. NAW.

10. de junio de 1846. Londres. T. Murphy a su gobierno.

Ha recibido las noticias del gobierno sobre la declaración de guerra hecha por los Estados Unidos en el mensaje del presidente y con la autorización del congreso.

En consecuencia visitó a Aberdeen para comunicarle la llegada del señor Almonte que iba a Europa a conseguir ayuda de Francia y de Inglaterra pues la guerra tenía el flanco débil de California y se deseaba que Inglaterra prestara sus fuerzas navales, de que México carecía. Lord Aberdeen contestó que lo que México se proponía era nada menos que Inglaterra y Francia entraran en guerra con los Estados Unidos y que no lo podían aceptar por los asuntos mexicanos. Se podía tratar de una mediación para poner término a la guerra entre ambos contendientes, en el concepto de que Francia también se prestaría a tomar esta medida.

También se ofreció a dirigir una declaración al gobierno estadounidense comentando la causa inmediata y determinante de la guerra cual era la "ocupación injustificable, en su concepto, del territorio entre el río Nueces y el Bravo del Norte, y que él no dudaba de que el influjo moral de Francia y la Inglaterra, unidos, en esta mediación bastaría para que se restableciese la paz entre México y los Estados Unidos bajo principios que inspiren nuestra confianza y la hagan sólida y duradera".

Murphy contestó que México apreciaría el influjo moral del gobierno inglés y francés pero que creía que los Estados Unidos no harían una paz duradera si no veían que sus ambiciones podían acarrearles la guerra con otras naciones y que era necesario que la expansión de que los Estados Unidos estaban llevando a cabo encontrara un fuerte correctivo.

México pensaba resistir con todas sus fuerzas pero las circunstancias exigían la cooperación de otros para que pudiera contener las agresiones. Como había hecho con anterioridad volvió a pedir la ayuda de Aberdeen que se negó a ofrecer más de lo que había hecho y creía poder afirmar con seguridad que Francia tampoco estaría dispuesta a otra cosa. Sin embargo no había manera de prever lo que los sucesos de la guerra produjeran y la parte que tuvieran que tomar las demás naciones ante ellos.

Preguntado sobre la situación habida en el asunto de Oregon Aberdeen contestó que había mandado instrucciones

al ministro de Washington para que protestara y presentara una proposición de arreglo en calidad de ultimátum y "añadió, que el ministro de los Estados Unidos aquí era de opinión que esa proposición no se aceptaría por el gobierno americano. Supongo, milord, le dije, que en ese caso la guerra es el otro extremo de la disyuntiva. Replicó Lord Aberdeen con vacilación 'no... no... no es absolutamente necesaria esa consecuencia'".

Murphy pensaba que Francia no entraría en ninguna combinación que se buscara y que la pudiera llevar directa o indirectamente a la guerra con los Estados Unidos. Inglaterra sin la cooperación de Francia tampoco entraría en el problema por los asuntos mexicanos, pero en cambio si tenía que tomar las armas por lo de Oregon, entonces habría alianza ofensiva y defensiva entre Inglaterra y México. Esto resultaba remoto porque Inglaterra evitaría la guerra y México, sin contar con ayuda externa, tendría que hacer lo posible para salir airoso de la guerra con sus propios recursos.

Expedir patentes de corso y buscar la manera de promover una sublevación de los esclavos negros en la Luisiana y sobre todo la unión y fraternidad de todos los mexicanos era lo indicado y el único recurso a mano para defender el país.

Satisfacía observar la unidad de opinión de la prensa británica en favor de México y en condena de los americanos. Se habían ofrecido soldados para alistarse en las banderas mexicanas y hubo también ofrecimiento de corsos. Cada patente que se expidiera se haría con cartas de naturalización a fin de que la responsabilidad no recayera en otros países. Aberdeen apuntó esta necesidad.

ASREM, 4-14-6447, f. 84-88.

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15 de agosto de 1846. Londres. Washington Irving, exministro plenipotenciario de los Estados Unidos en Madrid, a J. Buchanan.

Sir,

A few mornings before my departure from Madrid, after I had my audience of leave, general Sounders called upon

me, and had some conversation with me, about the state of our affairs with Mexico. He expressed his conviction of the desire of the government to bring the war to a close as speedily as possible, and thought that an offer of mediation on the part of Spain would be well received by our government and might facilitate the return of peace. He enquired, therefore, whether I did not think I could in my present position, advantageously and without any official responsibility, suggest such a measure to the Spanish government.

As I considered general Sounders in the confidence of the president and the cabinet and fully possessed of their policy and as I viewed the measure itself in a favorable light I immediately sought an interview with Mr. Isturiz and made him the proposed suggestion: I let him know however that it was entirely unofficial, and unauthorized by any instructions from government, but made on my individual responsibility, in consequence of my general conviction of the wished and views of the American cabinet, and of conversations with general Sounders who was recently from Washington and in the confidence of the executive. Mr. Isturiz was evidently surprised and gratified by the suggestion, but enquired whether an offer of mediation would be accepted by our government. To this I could only reply that I was sure it would be more readily accepted from Spain than from any other government; that circumstances induced me to believe it would be favorably entertained and that, since if it were declared, it would be in such terms as to testify to our high respect and consideration for the Spanish government and our friendship for the Spanish Nation. That such an offer would come with peculiar grace from Spain and would contribute to strengthen her amicable relations with her ancient colonies, etc.

Mr. Isturiz wanted to know my idea as to the terms on which they should mediate, I replied that Spain should act not as an arbitrator, but a mutual friend; listening to the claims of both parties, and suggesting such modifications and compliances as would be fair and expedient upon all the circumstances of the case. Mr. Isturiz said it would be necessary to have a cabinet council on the subject and externated a wish that, should the measure be adopted I would be the bearer of the proposition to our government I replied that the measure to be effective ought to be as prompt as possible. That I was on the point of departure from Madrid, and, should it be deemed expedient I should

be the bearer of the offer and if it were confided to me forthwith, I should endeavor to arrive in England in time to depart in the steamer of the 19th August.

I had a subsequent conversation with Mr. Isturiz in which he again expressed doubts of the offer being accepted by our government. I could only repeat what I had before said on the subject adding that I made the suggestion the more confidently from the sincere good will I entertained for Spain and my conviction that the proposition, whether accepted or declined would be treated in such a manner that it could not but redound to the dignity and advantage of the Spanish government.

Mr. Isturiz then suggested the idea of sending intructions to their minister at Washington to sound our government whether a proposition of the kind would be accepted if made, and to act accordingly. I agreed that such appeared to me the most judicious plan, but again urged that the instructions should be sent in time for the steamer of the 19th August as promptness was all important in the matter. He told me there was to be a cabinet council on the following day when the matter would be considered, and, if the measure were determined upon, he would endeavor to send off the necessary despatches, to the minister at Washington by the time I designated. He afterwards, on the same day had a conversation with general Sounders on the subject, a statement of which I believe the general sends to the government by the same steamer which takes this letter . . .

Washington Irving

Spain, Washington Irving. February 18, 1842-October 8, 1846. Department of State. Vol. 34, doc. núm. 84. NAW.

31 de agosto de 1846. México. Manuel Crescencio Rejón a J. Buchanan ministro de Estado de los Estados Unidos.

El infraescrito ministro de Relaciones Exteriores de la República Mexicana ha dado cuenta al excelentísimo señor general en jefe del ejército libertador encargado interinamente del supremo poder ejecutivo de la nación, con la nota de

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vuestra excelencia de 27 del próximo pasado julio, en que propone parte de su gobierno la apertura de negociaciones que tienden a la conclusión de una paz justa y honrosa para ambos países.

Enterado su excelencia de los términos de la citada nota, no ha podido menos que fijar mucho la atención en que al rehusarse la discusión sobre las causas de la guerra que existe entre las dos repúblicas, se quiera ahora considerar aquéllas como un simple pasado que pertenece a la historia. Aceptar el ejecutivo tal propuesta bajo esa base, cuando se trata de un negocio en que se interesa el honor del país, la integridad de su territorio, y se compromete su nacionalidad para lo futuro, sería prescindir de su justicia y acabar de irritar la opinión pública ya sumamente alarmada según lo comprueban las discusiones que se han tenido sobre el particular al temerse el desenlace de la cuestión de la manera indicada. Así es que, traídas las cosas de la república por las citadas causas a la situación en que se encuentran respecto de los Estados Unidos, ha sido preciso llamar a la nación para que por medio de representantes elegidos con la más amplia libertad se ocupe de su suerte y provea a su seguridad, a su honor y futuro bienestar. Convocado para esto un congreso que empezará sus sesiones el 6 de diciembre próximo, que deberá encargarse, entre otros graves asuntos, de todo lo relativo a la guerra con esos Estados, a él se someterá la referida nota de vuestra excelencia para que resuelva lo que juzgue conveniente a los intereses de la nación. Espera por consiguiente el gobierno del infraescrito la determinación de la citada asamblea para dar la correspondiente respuesta a lo esencial de la mencionada comunicación, continuando entre tanto las relaciones de México con esa república en el mismo estado en que las halló su excelencia el general en jefe del ejército libertador cuando se hizo cargo del ejecutivo de la nación.

Manuel Crecencio Rejón

Mexico. Notes. February 4, 1837-June 28, 1848. Department of State. Vol. 4; doc. sin núm. NAW.

8 de octubre de 1846. Nueva York. W. Irving a J. Buchanan.

Sir,

I had the honor to address a letter to you from London in August last in which I stated the probability that the Spanish government would send instructions by the steamer of August 18 to their minister at Washington, authorizing him, with certain provisos, to make an offer of mediation on the part of that government, in our war with Mexico. These instructions however being sent via Havre did not reach Mr. Calderón until a very few days since. Yesterday he communicated them to me confidentially, having long been in habits of intimacy with me and having been authorized by his government to consult me on the matter. I found that his instructions restricted him from taking any step, great or small, in the affair unless it should appear to be desired by one other of the conflicting parties; nor was he to make any offer of mediation to our government unless with the certainty that it would not be refused, and would not give offense to these powers with which her Spanish majesty desires to maintain close relations of friendship.

Mr. Calderon seemed at a loss how to proceed, nor did I pretend to advice him. The face of affairs had changed considerably since the time I made the suggestion to the Spanish government and the very delay in forwarding the despatch to Mr. Calderon was alculated to defeat the proposed measure.

Mr. Calderon expressed an intention of writing to his official correspondents in Mexico on the subject: and of so wording his communications to that government as to leave an opening for the speculating intimation on our part that might lead up to our offer of mediation. Should it be within the scope of our present policy to accept one.

I have ...

Washington Irving

Spain. Washington Irving. February 18, 1842-October 8, 1846. Department of State. Vol. 34, doc. sin núm. NAW.

27 de octubre de 1846. México. M. de la Peña y Peña a T. Murphy.

Se dio por enterado del informe número 12 y de la opinión que se tiene en Inglaterra sobre la guerra con los Estados Unidos.

No extraña a su excelencia, atendiendo a los antecedentes de la materia, la frialdad con que en ese país se mira este negocio, y las pocas simpatías que se manifiestan a nuestro favor. Confía su excelencia en que sin embargo de todo vuestra excelencia no habrá dejado de aprovechar todas las circunstancias favorables para rectificar las ideas que se devanan con el concepto tan poco favorable que se ha formado de la república.

El gobierno de ella en medio de las muy angustiadas circunstancias del erario y de las complicaciones que aún no puede vencer a pesar de su celo y actividad, se esfuerza en poner a aquélla en estado de defenderse contra las agresiones que puedan intentar los Estados Unidos y si en último resultado fuere necesario emprender la guerra para conservar su territorio y nacionalidad no duda que se hará como corresponde, atendiendo al patriotismo de los mexicanos y el ardiente deseo que les ha inferido la república vecina.

Debo comunicar a vuestra excelencia en calidad de muy reservado que el incidente ocurrido en estos últimos días con respecto a las desavenencias entre la república y los Estados Unidos, de que instruyen los adjuntos documentos. El supremo gobierno no creyó exponer en nada la dignidad nacional con la admisión propuesta a que aquellos se refieren. Sin embargo por más asegurarse, dio cuenta a las cámaras y después se pasó la comunicación de este ministerio al cónsul de los Estados Unidos. En ella se sigue lo que es muy justo y natural, previamente a cualquier otro paso, y hoy se espera la resolución que en su vista adopte aquel gabinete.

Nada se tratará que no sea conforme a la razón, la justicia, el honor y el verdadero interés de su república; y si este último esfuerzo de conciliación y de paz no diese el resultado apetecido entonces sólo queda el recurso de decidir con las armas una contienda a la que tan inicuamente se nos ha provocado.

M. de la Peña y Peña

ASREM, 4-14-6447, f. 48-49.

21 de noviembre de 1846. Washington. J. Buchanan a Moses Y. Beach, su agente en México.

The president having learned that you were about to visit the city of Mexico on your private business, and reposing full confidence in your patriotism, ability and discretion, has thought proper to appoint you as confidential agent to the Republic of Mexico. You are well aware that the president has resorted to every honorable means to avoid the existing war; and whilst prosecuting it with vigor, he has been anxious ever since its commencement to make peace on just and honorable terms. It is known that you entertain the same desire and in all your conduct and conversation in Mexico, you ought to keep this object constantly in view.

The trust, thus confided to you, is one of great delicacy and importance. In performing the duties which it imposes, great prudence and caution will be required. You ought never to give the slightest intimation to any person, either directly or indirectly, that you are an agent of this government, unless it be to Mr. Black and to the latter only after you shall have clearly discovered that this may smooth the way to peace. Be upon your guard against the vile diplomacy and take care that they shall obtain no advantage over you.

You will communicate to this department, as often as perfectly safe opportunities may offer, all the useful information which you shall acquire. Should you have any very important intelligence to transmit, it may be sent through Mr. Black to the commander of our naval force off Veracruz. Who upon his request, will doubtless despatch it to Panzacola.

Your compensation ...

J. Buchanan

Special Missions. December 15, 1823-November 13, 1852. Department of State. Vol. 1, p. 257-258. NAW.

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14 de diciembre de 1846. Washington. R. Pakenham a J. Buchanan.

Comenta la proclama hecha por el capitán Stockton de la marina norteamericana, declarando todos los puertos mexicanos del Pacífico bloqueados. Le han informado que la marina de los Estados Unidos está en California y que, de allí a México, hay aproximadamente mil millas pero, además, considera que con las unidades que se encuentran en aquellos mares resulta imposible el bloqueo de los puertos mexicanos en esa costa y que los ingleses no tendrán en cuenta el mencionado bloqueo hasta que sea efectivo.

British Legation, Sir R. Pakenham. April 30, 1845-December 16, 1846. Department of State. Vol. 23. NAW.

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9 de febrero de 1847. Washington. J. Buchanan a J. Slidell.

Buchanan aceptaba la dimisión de Slidell y le daba las gracias por el desarrollo de su misión, con palabras muy elogiosas, acerca del servicio que había prestado a la nación.

Mexico. Instructions. November 10, 1845-April 6, 1854. Department of State. Vol. 16, doc. núm. 9. p. 45-46. NAW.

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22 de febrero de 1847. México. J. M. Ortiz Monasterio al secretario de Estado de los Estados Unidos, J. Buchanan.

Le comunicaba estar en posesión de su misiva de 18 de enero anterior en que le hablaban de la buena disposición del presidente norteamericano para buscar el término de la guerra e ir en busca de relaciones amistosas entre las dos naciones.

El presidente de México hizo todo lo posible para evitar que se derramara sangre de los dos pueblos que debían vivir en paz y amistad.

La cuestión de Texas envolvía designios ulteriores que estaban ya descubiertos. La invasión sucesiva del territorio mexicano, es ya una realidad, y cada día nuevas agresiones aumentan los motivos de queja. Sin embargo su excelencia el vicepresidente en ejercicio del supremo poder ejecutivo que alimenta en su pecho los más vivos sentimientos de humanidad, se prestará al avenimiento que se le indica, tan luego como conciba la esperanza de que se salven los derechos incontestables de México. La alta misión de que está encargado le obliga a conservar la independencia y la integridad de la república; y en el concepto de que jamás convendrá en que se pierda la una o la otra, accederá gustoso a la invitación que se le hace nombrando comisionados que, en unión de los que elija su excelencia el presidente de los Estados Unidos, arreglen en La Habana o en Jalapa un tratado de paz y amistad sincera; pero tal nombramiento no lo verificará sin que antes se acepte como condición preliminar el levantamiento del bloqueo de nuestros puertos y la evacuación completa del territorio de la república por las tropas invasoras.

Antes de concluir esta nota juzga su excelencia el vicepresidente indispensable manifestar la sorpresa que le ha causado el temor que indica el gobierno de vuestra excelencia de que el mundo pueda estimar como una excesiva concesión hacia México el paso dado iniciando nuevamente la negociación de paz pues no concibe la razón en que pudiera apoyarse semejante cargo, cuando todas las naciones civilizadas han reconocido la justicia de los derechos de esta república y la imperiosa necesidad en que se ha visto de sostenerlos con las armas, oponiéndose a la inacción menos justificable de cuantas refiere la historia de los pueblos cultos.

Aprovecho la oportunidad.

José María Ortiz Monasterio

Mexico. Notes, February 4, 1837-June 28, 1848. Department of State, Vol. 4, doc. sin núm. NAW.

15 de abril de 1847. Washington. J. Buchanan a Nicholas P. Trist.

Since the glorious victory of Buena Vista and the capture of Veracruz and the Castle of San Juan D'Ulloa [*sic*] by the American arms, it is deemed probable that the Mexican government may be willing to conclude a treaty of peace with the United States. Without any certain information, however, as to its disposition, the president would not feel justified in appointing public commissioners for this purpose inviting it to do the same. After so many overtures rejected by Mexico this course might not only subject the United States to the indignity of another refusal, but might, in the end, prove prejudicial to the cause of peace. The Mexican government might thus be encouraged in the mistaken opinion which it probably already entertains respecting the motives which have actuated the president in his repeated efforts to terminate the war. He deems it proper, notwithstanding, to send to the headquarters of the army a confidential agent fully acquainted with the views of this government and clothed with full powers to conclude a treaty of peace with the Mexican government, should it be so inclined. In this manner he will be enabled to take advantage, at the propitious moment, of any favorable circumstances which might dispose that government to peace. The president, therefore, having full confidence in your ability, patriotism and integrity, has selected you as a commissioner to the United Mexican States to discharge the duties of this important mission and for your services in this character you will be allowed the outfit and salary of a chargé d'affaires.

You are herewith furnished with the project of a treaty (marked A) embraced in eleven articles and founded upon just and liberal principles toward Mexico, which together with your instructions, you will communicate confidentially to major Scott and commodore Pérry.

Should a Mexican plenipotentiary meet you, duly authorized by his government to conclude a treaty of peace you will after a mutual exchange of your full powers, deliver him a copy of this project with the sum in blank contained in the 5th article, as a consideration for the extension of our boundaries and inform him that you are prepared to sign it on behalf of the government of the United States,

as soon as the sum with which the blank is to be filled shall be agreed upon by the parties. This sum ought to be as much below the fifteen millions mentioned in the article as you can accomplish. Considering the heavy expenses and sacrifices of the war on our part, and the brilliant success of our arms, as well as the large amount which, under the project this government has assumed to pay our own citizens for claims due to them by Mexico, justice would seem to require that the treaty should not stipulate for the payment of any very large sum. You may in conversation with him ascertain what change in the terms of the project the Mexican government would require and if this should become indispensable to attain the object, you may modify these terms, including the amount to be paid to Mexico, in the following particulars:

1. Instead of fifteen millions of dollars stipulated to be paid by the fifth article for the extension of our boundary over New Mexico and Upper and Lower California, you may increase the amount to any sum not exceeding thirty millions of dollars, payable by installments of three millions per annum; provided the right of passage and transit across the Isthmus of Tehuantepec, secured to the United States by the eighth article of the project, shall form a part of the Treaty.

2. Whilst it is of the greatest importance to the United States to extend their boundaries over Lower California as well as New Mexico and Upper California, you are not to consider this as a *sine qua non* to the conclusion of a treaty. You will therefore not break off the negotiation if New Mexico and Upper California can alone be acquired. In that event, however, you will not stipulate to pay more than twenty millions of dollars for these two provinces, without the right of passage and transit across the Isthmus of Tehuantepec.

3. You are authorized to stipulate for the payment of any sum not exceeding twenty five millions of dollars for New Mexico and Upper California without Lower California provided the stipulations securing the right of passage and transit across the Isthmus of Tehuantepec shall be retained in the treaty; if these should be stricken out, you are authorized to stipulate for the payment of the like sum of twenty five millions of dollar for Lower California in addition to New Mexico and Upper California.

Should Lower California not be embraced in the treaty, then it will become necessary to change the delineation of

boundary contained in the fourth article of the project in the following manner. Instead of the concluding words "to the Pacific Ocean", let it read "to a point directly opposite the division line between Upper and Lower California; thence, due West, along the said line which runs north of the parallel 32o. and South of San Miguel to the Pacific Ocean: and the vessels and citizens of the United States shall, in all time to come, have free and uninterrupted access to and from the oceans through the Gulf of California from and to their possessions north of the said division line".

You will not fail to observe that the sums of thirty, twenty and twenty-five millions of dollars, respectively, which you are authorized to offer, are all maximums; and you will not go to the extent of either, unless you shall find this absolutely necessary to the conclusion of a treaty. You will not exceed the fifteen millions of dollars contained in the fifth article of the project until you shall have good reason to believe that the Mexican government would break off the negotiation unless it should be increased, and in departing from this sum, you will go as little beyond it as practicable.

Whilst it would be most convenient for the treasury of the United States to pay any sum for which you may stipulate in annual installments of three millions each; yet this is not indispensable. If necessary, therefore, to the conclusion of the treaty, you may agree that, for the remainder of the sum, above the three millions of dollars to be paid upon its ratification by Mexico, the government of the United States shall create a six per cent stock, similar to that created for the purchase of Louisiana, to be transferred to the government of Mexico, the interest on the same to be payable annually at the city of Washington, and the principal to be redeemable there at the pleasure of this government any time after two years from the exchange of ratifications.

Should this stock not be created, then if insisted upon by the Mexican government, each of the annual installments may bear an interest of six per cent, but the interest on each installment to be payable only when the principal shall be paid.

If you can obtain the postponement of the payment of the territory over which the boundaries of the United States shall be extended, will be amply protected by the Constitution and laws of the United States. An article therefore, to secure these rights has not been inserted in the project but

should this be deemed necessary by the Mexican government, no strong objection exists against inserting in the treaty an article similar to the third article of the Louisiana treaty. It might read as follows: "The inhabitants of the territory over which the jurisdiction of the United States has been extended by the fourth article of this treaty, shall be incorporated in the Union of the United States as soon as possible, according to the principles of the Federal Constitution, to the enjoyment of all the rights, advantages and immunities of the citizens of the United States, and in the meantime, they shall be maintained and protected in the free enjoyment of their liberty, property and the religion which they profess".

In the event of the insertion of this article, it would be proper to add to it the following: "provided that all grants or concession whatever of any lands, made or issued by the Mexican government since the thirteen day of May, one thousand eight hundred and forty-six, within the said territory, shall be absolutely null and void". The date might if necessary be changed from the day when congress recognized the existence of the war to the month of September, 1846, when the American forces took possession of California.

The extension of our boundaries over New Mexico and Upper California for a sum not exceeding twenty millions of dollars is to be considered a *sine qua non* of any treaty. You may modify, change or omit the other terms of the project if needful, but not so as to interfere with this ultimatum.

If you should not succeed in accomplishing the chief objective of your mission, you are authorized to make the necessary preliminary arrangement with the Mexican government for the conclusion of a treaty of peace by commissioners to be appointed by both parties, according to the proposition contained in my note of the 18th January last to the Mexican minister of Foreign Relations; provided a reasonable prospect shall exist that such Mexican commissioners will agree to the ultimatum which I have specified.

So rapidly does revolution follow revolution in Mexico, that it would be difficult to conjecture what form of government you may find in existence, over that ill fated country, on your arrival at the headquarters of the army. The Constitution of 1824 may then have been abolished and a dictatorship be again existing in its stead. You will not hesitate, however, to conclude a treaty with whatever government you shall find there upon your arrival, provided

it presents a reasonable prospect of being able to maintain itself. Should a dictator be established who has subverted the Constitution of 1824 and acquired the supreme power, his ratification of the treaty will be sufficient without the previous approbation of the general congress. Were this government to refuse to conclude a treaty of peace until the Mexican government shall assume a permanent constitutional form, the war might yet continue for many years to come.

If the contingency shall occur on the happening of which, as provided by the third article of the proposed treaty, hostilities are required to be suspended, you will without delay, communicate this fact to the commanders of our land and naval forces respectively; the secretaries of war and the Navy having already issued orders to them for the suspension of hostilities upon the receipt of such a notice from yourself.

Continúa explicando que el dinero ya está a disposición para el trato, la burocracia y los trámites que tienen que hacerse con los recibos.

Mexico. Instructions. November 10, 1845-April 6, 1854. Department of State. Vol. 16, doc. núm. 1, p. 46-54. NAW

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15 de abril de 1847. Washington. Anexo A a las instrucciones de J. Buchanan a N. Trist.

The United States of America and the United Mexican States desirous of terminating the war which has unhappily subsisted between the two republics, and of restoring peace, friendship and good understanding between them, have, for that purpose appointed their respective plenipotentiaries, that is to say the president of the United States has appointed Nicholas P. Trist... and... who after a reciprocal communication of their respective full powers have agreed upon the following articles.

Article 1

There shall be a firm and universal peace between the United States of America and the United Mexican States, and between the respective countries, territories, cities, towns and

people, without exception of places or persons. All hostilities, both by sea and land, shall definitively cease, so soon as the ratification of this treaty shall have been exchanged by the parties.

Article 2

All prisoners of war taken on either side, as well by land as by sea, shall be restored as soon as practicable after the exchange of the ratifications of this treaty.

Article 3

So soon as the present treaty shall have been duly ratified by the United Mexican States, this fact shall be made known with the least possible delay to the military and naval commanders of both parties, whereupon a suspension of hostilities shall take place, both by land and by sea, as well on the part of the military and naval forces of the United States, as on the part of those of the United Mexican States, and the said suspension of hostilities shall be inviolably observed on both sides. Immediately after the exchange of the ratifications of the present treaty, all the forts, territories, places and possessions whatsoever taken by the United States from the Mexican States during the war, except such as are embraced within the limits of the United States as defined by the fourth article of this treaty shall be restored without delay, and without causing any destruction carrying away of the artillery or other public property originally captured in the said forts or places, and which shall remain therein upon the exchange of the ratifications of this treaty: And in like manner, all the forts, territories, places and possessions whatsoever taken by the United Mexican States from the United States during the war; and, also, all such forts, territories, places and possessions embraced within the limits of the United States under the fourth article of this treaty, shall be restored, evacuated and delivered over to the United States without delay, and without causing any destruction or carrying away any of the artillery or the other public property from the said forts or places and which shall remain therein upon the exchange of the ratification of this treaty.

Article 4

The boundary line between the two republics shall com-

mence in the Gulf of Mexico three leagues from land opposite the mouth of the Rio Grande, from thence up the middle of that river to the point where it strikes the southern line of New Mexico, thence westwardly along southern boundary of New Mexico to the South Western corner of the same, thence Northward along the Western line of New Mexico until it intersects the first branch of the river Gila, or if should not intersect any branch of that river, then to the point on the said line nearest to such branch and thence in a direct line to the same and down the middle of said branch of the said river until it empties into the river Colorado, thence down the middle of the Colorado and the middle of the Gulf of California to the Pacific Ocean.

Article 5

In consideration of the extension of boundaries if the United States as defined by the last preceding article, the United States agree to pay to the United Mexican States at the city of Veracruz the sum of fifteen millions of dollars, in five equal annual installments, each of three millions of dollars, the first installment to be paid immediately after this treaty shall have been duly ratified by the government of the United Mexican States.

Article 6

As a further consideration for the extension of the boundaries of the United States as defined by the fourth article of this treaty, the United States agree to assume and pay to the claimants all the installments now due or hereafter to become due, under the convention between the two republics concluded at the city of Mexico on the 30th day of January 1843 "further to provide for the payment of awards in favor of claimants under the convention between the United States and the Mexican republic of the 11th April 1839". And hereby the United States also agreed to assume and pay to an amount not exceeding three millions of dollars, all claims of citizens of the United States not heretofore decided against the government of the United Mexican States, which may have arisen previous to the thirteenth of May 1846, and shall be found to be justly due by a board of commissioners to be established by the government of the United States, whose awards shall be final and conclusive,

provided, that in deciding upon the validity of these claims, the board shall be guided and governed by the principles and rules of decision prescribed by the first and fifth articles of the unratified convention concluded at the city of Mexico, on the 20th day of November, 1843, and, in no case shall an award be made in favor of any claim not embraced by these principles and rules. And the United States do hereby forever discharge the United Mexican States from all liability for any of the said claims, whether the same shall be rejected or allowed by the said board of commissioners.

Article 7

If in opinion of the said board of commissioners, or of the claimants any book, records or documents in possession or power of the government of the United Mexican States shall be deemed necessary to the just decision of any of said claims the commissioners, or the claimants through them, shall within such a period as Congress may designate, make a demand in writing for the same, addressed to the Mexican minister for Foreign Affairs, to be transmitted by the secretary of State of the United States; and the Mexican government engages, at the earliest possible moment after the receipt of such a demand, to cause any of the said books, records, or documents in their possession or power, which shall be specified, to be transmitted to the said Secretary of State who shall immediately deliver them over to the said board of commissioners; provided that no such demand shall be made at the instance of any claimant, until the facts which it is expected to prove by such books, records or documents, shall first have been stated under oath or affirmation.

Article 8

The government of the United Mexican States hereby grant and guaranty forever to the government and citizens of the United States the right to transport across the Isthmus of Tehuantepec, from sea to sea, by any modes of communications now existing whether by land or water, free of any toll or charges whatever, all and any articles, the growth, produce, or manufacture of the United States or of any foreign country belonging to the said government or citizens; and also the right of free passage over the same to all citizens

of the United States: and the government of the United Mexican States, also, grant and guarantee to the government and citizens of the United States the same right of passage for their merchandize and articles aforesaid as well as for such citizens over any railroad or canal which may hereafter be constructed across the said Isthmus by the government of the United Mexican States or by its authority, paying no more than fair and reasonable tolls for the same: and no higher tolls and charges shall be levied and collected upon any of the before mentioned articles and merchandize belonging to the government or citizens of the United States or upon the persons of such citizens, for passing over the said railroad or canal than shall be levied and collected upon like articles and merchandize belonging to the government or citizens of Mexico, being the growth, produce and manufacture of Mexico or or any foreign country, or upon the persons of such citizens. And none of the said articles whatever belonging to the government or citizens of the United States thus passing in transit over the said Isthmus from sea to sea, either by the existing modes of communication over any railroad or canal which may hereafter be constructed, in either direction, for the purpose of being transported to any port of the United States or of any foreign country, shall be liable to any import or export duty whatever. The two governments hereby engage, with as little delay as possible, mutually to agree upon such regulations as may be necessary to prevent fraud and smugglings in consequence of the right of passage thus granted and perpetually guaranteed to the government and citizens for the United States.

Article 9

All goods, wares or merchandize which shall, during the war, have been imported into any of the ports or places of either party whilst in the military occupation of the other by the citizens of either, or by the citizens or subjects of any neutral power, shall be permitted to remain exempt from confiscation, or from any tax or duty upon the sale or exchange of the same, or upon the withdrawal of the said property from the country: and the owners thereof shall be permitted to sell and dispose of the said property in the same manner, in all respects whatever, as if it had been imported into the country in time of peace and had paid the duties under the laws of either party respectively.

Article 10

The Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation concluded at the city of Mexico on the 5th day of April, 1831, between the United States of America and the United Mexican States and every article thereof, with the exception of the additional article, are hereby revived for the period of eight years from the day of the exchange of the ratification of this treaty, with the same force and virtue as if they made part of the context of the same, it being understood that each of the contracting parties reserves to itself the right at any time after the said period of eight years shall have expired, to terminate the same by giving one year notice of such intention to the other party.

Article 11

This treaty shall be approved and ratified by the president of the United States of America, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate thereof, and by the president of the United Mexican States, with the previous approbation of their General Congress: and the ratifications shall be exchanged in the city of Washington within six months from the date of the signature hereof, or sooner if practicable.

In faith whereof, we the respective plenipotentiaries, have signed this treaty and have hereunto affixed our seals.

Done in duplicate at ... the ... day of ... one thousand eight hundred and forty seven.

Mexico. Instructions. November 10, 1845-April 5, 1854. Department of State. Vol. 16, p. 54-66, doc. núm. 2, NAW.

22 de abril de 1847. Londres. Mora a Palmerston.

En vista de que México se hallaba en una situación crítica que acabaría con un tratado de paz con los Estados Unidos solicitaba de la Gran Bretaña que aceptara ser garante de las obligaciones mutuas que podían contraerse o al menos de las relativas a los límites que en dicho tratado se establecerían.

No se pretendía que, en caso de contravención, Inglaterra tomara las armas en defensa del tratado sino que su intervención les diera prestigio y respeto.

El gobierno estaba muy alejado de creer en la necesidad de abandonar tierras de su patrimonio a los Estados Unidos, pero podrían ocurrir sucesos que lo requirieran como una necesidad indeclinable y el gobierno de México;

Jamás acordaría este abandono en favor de los Estados Unidos de América, ni haría acto ninguno que pudiera servir de tributo legal al gobierno de dicha nación para poseer parte alguna del territorio, que ha sido reconocido como mexicano por el tratado de las Floridas de 1819, y reconocido más tarde en favor de México por el gobierno americano.

Además México no haría algo que el día de mañana pudieran esgrimir los Estados Unidos como título legal de posesión.

Para mantener esta línea de conducta sería satisfactorio contar con la aprobación de su majestad británica y se agradecería que ayudara a los mexicanos para llevarla a cabo.

Chávez Orozco, *La gestión diplomática del Dr. Mora*, p. 23-24.

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10. de mayo de 1847. Madrid. R. M. Sounders a J. Buchanan.

The minister of State, in his expose before the Cortes, announced his policy, in his intercourse with foreign nations, would be strictly national and impartial. In my first interview after his coming into office, he referred to the Mexican war, and expressed his wish to see it terminated, but assured me there would be no change in the neutrality of his government, and of its strict adherence to the provisions of the treaty. I expressed, in reply, the earnest desire of the president to have the war terminated on honorable terms, and of the repeated efforts on his part for the renewal of negotiation, all of which had been rejected by Mexico, except on terms (the withdrawal of our troops), which never could be acceded to; I assured him that during the continuance of the war, so far as Spain was concerned, he might reply upon a like observance of the treaty on the part of the United States. He said nothing in regard to the blockade, or of the treasury circular.

Spain. R. M. Sounders. March 10, 1846-September 29, 1849. Department of State. Vol. 35, doc. núm. 11. NAW.

7 de mayo de 1847. Jalapa. W. Scott a N. Trist.

Sir: I have just received your note of yesterday, accompanied by communications to me from the Secretary of War and one (Sealed!) from the Department of State to the Minister of foreign affairs of the Republic of Mexico.

You are right, in doubting, whether there be a government, even *de facto*, in this Republic. General Santa Anna, the nominal president, has been, until within a day or two, in the neighborhood of Orizaba, organizing bands of rancheros, bandits or guerillas, to cut off stragglers of this army, and probably, the very train, all important to us, which you propose to accompany into the interior—the safety of which train has detained me here and caused me a high degree of solicitude. Hence I regret that colonel Wilson, commanding at Vera Cruz, has allowed himself, a second time, to be persuaded, to detach, to bring up despatches (for your accommodation) a material portion of the force I had relied upon, as the escort of that train. The other detachment, to which I allude, came up, some days ago to escort Lieutenant Semmes, of the Navy, duly accredited, by Commodore Perry, to the Mexican Minister of foreign affairs, to negotiate the exchange of Passed Midshipman Rogers, now a prisoner of war. That matter, also, seems to have been considered too important to be intrusted to my agency.

But to return to the actual government of Mexico: Señor Anaya, is, I believe, President *ad interim*. But you may have learned that the Congress, after hearing of the affair of Cerro Gordo, passed many violent decrees, breathing war, to the uttermost, against the United States—declaring that the executive has no power, and shall have none, to conclude a treaty, or even an armistice, with the United States, and denouncing, as a traitor, any Mexican functionary who shall entertain either proposition. I have communicated a copy of those decrees to the War Department, and until further orders, thereupon, or until a change of circumstances, I very much doubt whether I can so far commit the honour of my government as to take any direct agency in forwarding the sealed despatch you have sent me from the Secretary of State of the United States.

On this delicate point, however, you will do as you please, and when, if able, I shall have advanced near to the capital,

I may, at your instance, lend an escort to your flag of truce; and it may require a large fighting detachment to protect even a flag of truce against the *rancheros* and bandits who now infest the national road all the way up to the capital.

I see that the Secretary of War proposes to degrade me, by requiring that, I, the commander of this army, shall defer to you the chief clerk of the Department of State, the question of continuing or discontinuing hostilities.

I beg to say to him and to you, that here, in the heart of a hostile country, from which, after a few weeks, it would be impossible to withdraw this army, without a loss, probably, of half its members, by the *vomito*;—which army, from necessity, must soon become a *self-sustaining machine*—cut off from all supplies and re-inforcements from home, until perhaps, late in November;—not to speak of the bad faith of this government and people of Mexico,—I say, in reference to those critical circumstances, this army must take *military* security for its own safety. Hence the question of an armistice, or no armistice is, most peculiarly, a *military* question, appertaining of necessity, if not of universal right in the absence of direct instructions, to the commander of the invading forces. Consequently, if you are not clothed with military rank over me, as well as with diplomatic functions; I shall demand, under the peculiar circumstances, that, in your negotiations, if the enemy should entertain your overtures, you refer that question to me, and all the securities belonging to it. The safety of this army demands no less, and I am responsible for that safety, until duly superseded or recalled. Indeed, from the nature of the case, if the enemy, on your petition, should be willing to concede an armistice, he would, no doubt, demand the military guaranty of my signature for his own safety.

Should you, under the exposition of circumstances I have given, visit the moveable head quarters of this army, I shall receive you with respect due to a functionary of my government; but whether you would find me here, at Perote, Puebla, or elsewhere, depends on events changeable at every moment.

The sealed despatch from the Department of State, I suppose you to desire me to hold until your arrival, or until I shall hear farther from you.

I remain [etc.].

William Manning, *Diplomatic correspondence of the United States. Interamerican Affairs. 1831-1860.* Washington, Carnegie Endowment Vol. VIII, p. 902-903, notes.

20 de mayo de 1847. Jalapa. N. Trist a W. Scott.

Sir:

The enclosed reply to the tirade against our Government, which you saw fit to put into the shape of a letter to me, (I regret exceedingly that it did not receive a more appropriate form and direction, by being made up, *at once*, into an "article", to adorn the columns of some reckless partizan press) was commenced at San Juan del Río; where, after taking time to recover from the amazement which your letter occasioned, and coolly to reflect upon its extraordinary character—as I have repeatedly done since, on the journey—I passed nearly the whole night in writing; so desirous did I feel to dismiss the unpleasant subject from my mind. Having motive also for wishing that my reply should reach you before my arrival here, I purposed finishing it at the first place where it could be resumed. With this view, when we reached El Encero, I got out my writing materials, intending to pass the greater part of the night in this labour and that of taking a copy. This design having, however, been defeated by the *alerte* which we had there, just about sunset, causing Colonel Riley to order the advance of the train, with which I was, to retire from its position, in and around the house outbuildings; the completion of my task has, from this and subsequent causes, been unavoidably delayed until now.

I was, most assuredly, not sent to Mexico for any such purpose as that of engaging in a correspondence with you; above all, in one of the nature of that which I have so unexpectedly found forced upon me; and I doubt whether the Government will approve of my having allowed myself to employ any portion of my time in it. Certain, I am, that this would be censured, but for the fact that your letter found me under circumstances rendering it impossible that I should occupy myself upon the object to which I was sent here. The same excuse will not exist hereafter; and even if it should, numberless other good and sufficient reasons will always exist to compell me to decline the honour of maintaining a correspondence with you.

The communication from the Department of State to the Mexican Minister of Foreign Relations, transmitted to you by me from Vera Cruz, has been returned to me, since my

arrival at this place by your military Secretary, Lieutenant Lay. So soon as I shall be enabled to ascertain that the condition of the Government of this Country is such as to admit of its delivery, it will be again placed in the hands of the General in Chief of our forces, for that purpose.

Upon recurring to your letter, I find both its tone and its matter, with respect to the transmission of this communication, so perfectly in keeping with the rest of it, and especially with the light in which you have seen fit to consider me—that of an emissary of the Secretary of war, through whom and to whom you may “say” whatever your humor suggests—that I deem it necessary to make a special endeavor, in regard to this very important point, to bring down your thoughts, from the lofty regions into which they have soared, to the one alone appropriate to such plain matters of business as I am charged with.

You say, that, some time hence, perhaps, “I (you) *may*, at your (my) instance, *lend* an escort to *your* (my) flag of truce; and it may require a large fighting detachment to protect even a flag of truce against the rancheros and banditti”.

Now, Sir, in reply to this, all I have to do is, to deliver to you—as I hereby do *in writing*, (and this, *for the second time*, unless my first letter was far more enigmatical than I believe it could seem to any honest men; who, upon their conscience and honor, should be called upon to respond to the question, whether you had or had not, in this instance, been guilty of a wanton contempt of orders; and whether this offence had or had not been aggravated by the character of the pretences under which the contempt was indulged in, and the contumacy sought to be covered up)—I have, I say, sir, to deliver to you this message from your commander in chief, the President of the United States, to wit: *When the communication, bearing the seal of the Department of State, and addressed, “To His Excellency the Minister of Foreign Relations of the Mexican Republic, shall be placed in the hands of the General in Chief of the United States Army in Mexico, it is the will, order and command of the President of the United States, that the said communication shall forthwith be transmitted to its destination, under a flag of truce: which flag of truce is to proceed from the Head Quarters of the army, and is to be a flag of truce from the General in Chief. It is to be protected by such escort as, the General in chief shall deem necessary and proper for its security against all dangers of the road, in general, (includ-*

ing these from "rancheros and banditti" in particular). Whether the escort necessary and proper for the purpose shall, in the judgment of the General in Chief, be a corporal's guard, a company, a regiment, or a brigade; such necessary and proper escort—whatever it may be—is to be furnished. The President, at the same time, commands, that the General in chief shall not, for the sake of carrying out this order, do aught which may jeopard the existence of the army, or interfere with any movements or operations whatever, which he may deem necessary or expedient for the most rigorous possible prosecution of the war. The transmission of the communication above referred to is, at all times, to be deemed a secondary consideration to any of those just mentioned; but it is also to be deemed, at all times paramount to every thing else: and, so far as may be compatible with them, the utmost attention is demanded to it.

This, sir, is the order and command of the President of the United States, which—standing as I do to him, for this special purpose, in precisely the same relation that one of your aides de camp bears to yourself, when entrusted with a verbal order from you to a subordinate officer.—I do hereby convey to the General in chief of the army.

You will now, sir, I trust, understand, when the communication referred to shall again be placed in your hands, that—greatly deficient in wisdom, as the present (and indeed any democratic) administration of the Government must necessarily be—it has not, in this particular instance fallen into so egregious a blunders as to make the transmission and delivery of that communication dependent upon the amiable affability and gracious condescension of general Winfield Scott. I am, sir, very respectfully [etc.].

Manning, *op cit.*, Vol. VIII, nota 2, p. 902-904.

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21 de mayo de 1847. Jalapa. N. Trist a J. Buchanan.

No. 4

Sir:

I have the honor to transmit herewith a very extraordinary

letter, (if indeed anything from his pen can properly be so designated) received by me from General Scott, together with a copy of my reply and of a letter enclosing that reply.

Although the explicit order delivered to him in the latter, on behalf of the President, with respect to the transmission of the communication from yourself to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, may perhaps prove effectual, I beg leave to suggest for consideration, whether it would not be advisable to dispatch to General Scott a special order through the War Department, confirming the one thus delivered by me: for, from the officer capable of writing such a letter, under any circumstances and above all such as it was written in, to totally wanting in anything like provocation—I do not know what to anticipate or not to anticipate...

P. S. on the occasion of transmitting this correspondence with General Scott, I should do him injustice—although he could not be injured thereby with any person at all conversant with his character were I to omit to mention, that, so far as “respect” for the Government can be proved by such outward acts as bear the same relation to this sentiment which genuflections and upturnings of the eyes bear to religion, nothing could have been more perfect than the proof afforded in my case of the sincerity with which he professed the established creed upon this point. Not only was I met on the road, as we approached the city, by General Scott’s aide de camp and the chief of the Quarter Master’s Department deputed by him to conduct me to the quarters which he had caused to be secured for me; but I was subsequently called upon by the Governor, in compliance with orders from the General in Chief, to offer me a guard, (which I declined, there being no necessity for it). So far therefore, as ceremonial goes, and attentions to my person, as that of “a functionary of the Government”, nothing could be added to the proof, which it receives in this shape, of respect for its authority.

Manning, *op. cit.*, Vol. VIII, p. 902.

29 de mayo de 1847. Puebla. W. Scott a N. Trist.

Sir:

Your long studied letters of the 9th and 20th instant, making 30 pages, in reply to my short note of the 7th, were handed to me, under one cover, at Jalapa, the morning of the 21st when you knew, being on the spot, that I was about to march upon this place. Occupied, as I was, with business of much higher importance, I did not allow the seal of the package to be broken till the evening of the 22d.—which I took care to have done in the presence of many staff officers. One of them, at my instance, read a part and reported to me, the general character of the papers. I have not yet read them.

My first impulse was to return the farrago of insolence, conceit and arrogance to the author; but on reflection I have determined to preserve the letters as a choice specimen of diplomatic literature and manners. The jacobin convention of France never sent to one of its armies in the field a more amiable and accomplished instrument. If you were armed with an ambulatory guillotine, you would be the personification of Danton, Marat, and St. Just—all in one.

You tell me that you are authorized to negotiate a treaty of peace with the enemy—a declaration, which, as it rests upon your own word, I might well question; and you add that it was not intended, at Washington, that I should have any thing to do with the negotiation. This I can well believe, and certainly have cause to be thankful to the President for not degrading me by placing me in any joint communication with you.

From the letter of the Secretary of War to me, of the 14 ultimo, I had supposed you to be simply authorized to propose or to concede to the enemy, the truce or armistice, which usually precedes negotiations for a truce; and my letter to you was written on that supposition. If the terms of military conventions are left to me, the commander of the army, I have nothing more to desire or to demand for its safety.

In conclusion—for many persons here believe that the enemy, 20,000 strong, is about attack this place—I have only time to ask you, in your future communications to me

to be brief and purely official; for if you dare to use the style or orders or instructions again, or to indulge yourself on a single discourteous phrase, I shall throw back the communication with the contempt and scorn which you merit at my hands.

I remain, Sir, Officially and.

Manning, *op. cit.*, Vol. VIII, p. 904-905.

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4 de junio de 1847. Nueva York. M. Y. Beach a J. Buchanan.

Sir:

In rendering to the Department a report of my recent visit to Mexico; the object of which was to prepare the way for a treaty of peace with that country; it is but an act of justice to acknowledge, that the important feature of gaining the confidence of the clergy of that country, was greatly facilitated by the friendly advice and introductions of some of the heads of the Catholic Church in the United States and Cuba, to similar parties in the Mexican capital. With reference to this aid I passed through Charleston, Matanzas, and Havana, on my way to Vera Cruz.

From Vera Cruz I went directly to the city of Mexico by way of Jalapa and Puebla; having been arrested as a spy and subjected to a tedious examination of three days length, from which I was released after giving a full exposition of my object in regard to a proposed Canal across the Isthmus of Tehuantepec. At Mexico I succeeded at once in establishing friendly relations with the acting President, Don Valentín Gómez Farías, and the leading members of his party, on the basis of my plan for a National Bank. Meantime I opened negotiations with the special friends of General Santa Anna on the subject of the Tehuantepec Canal, in which they took the most lively interest.

I found that both parties, the enemies as well as the friends of General Santa Anna, were anxious to continue the war; each hoping that it would tend to confirm their power, at the expense of their rival and the church. The

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higher clergy, in common with all the religious orders, were at first disposed to favor the continuation of hostilities as the probable means of destroying the military despotism which is crushing alike the church and the people. The leading Bishops were in actual treaty with General Santa Anna when I arrived, and I not only convinced them of the danger of aiding him against the United States, but induced them to recall by express, the messenger whom they had already despatched to his camp with liberal offers. In support of my representations I did not hesitate to pledge the good faith of our Government for the protection of the Church in its freedom and property; and thus I found but little difficulty in persuading the influential Bishops of Puebla, Guadalupe, and Michoacán, though their excellent representative the Superior of the Orders of St. Vincent de Paul, to refuse all aid, direct and indirect, in the prosecution of the war; and I am confident that whatever was afterward received from them, or the treasury of the Archbishopric of Mexico, was yielded only to the pressure of force. They also promised to dispose their most reliable friends in Congress to advocate peace at the proper moment, and meanwhile, to thwart and paralyze the measures of the *bona fide* war party; and this I have every reason to believe they did, with great effect, through the secret session of February and a part of March. When the Government resolved to raise money on the Church property, I urged them to an organized resistance. They consented, and at the moment of General Scott's debarkation at Vera Cruz they made a most important diversion in his favor by raising the standard of civil war at the Capital, at Puebla, and in a degree at Michoacan. This occupied five thousand men and all the arms, munitions of war, and means of the government in the city of Mexico for twenty-three days; effectually preventing them from assisting Vera Cruz, or strengthening Puebla or the strongholds nearer the coast. On the tenth day of this rebellion or *pronunciamiento*, I was informed that forty thousand dollars would be required of the clergy to carry it another week, and that it would be paid if the importance of the crisis justified the outlay. As General Scott had but just landed his artillery at Vera Cruz, and might be detained there for some time, I deemed that almost any outlay would be justified. The rebellion was therefore kept up, until the sudden appearance of General Santa Anna closed the affair. On the tenth of March I despatched a messenger to General Scott apprising

him of the good will of the clergy, and all matters necessary for his information and guidance, as he approached the Capital.

As I have already reported to the Department, the outline for a treaty of Peace was discussed between several members of the Mexican Congress and myself. This outline had for its basis the twenty sixth degree of North Latitude as the boundary division between the two Republics; and the cession of a line for a mail route common to both Nations, six miles wide, and extending from the Gulf of Mexico to the Pacific Ocean at the most favorable point, the United States paying fifteen millions of dollars towards the construction of the necessary ship canal or rail road. Such was the outline of the arrangement, and it was in train with a decided probability of success, by a sudden movement in secret session, when the rapid march and sudden appearance of General Santa Anna disconcerted the plan, those most active in it, being obliged to retire from the City, and I, in particular, finding it expedient to leave instantly for the coast by the difficult and dangerous road to Tampico.

The foregoing includes, I believe, all the particulars which I have not heretofore communicated to the Department in detail.

With great respect [etc.].

Manning, *op. cit.*, Vol. VIII, p. 906-907.

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6 de junio de 1847. Puebla. Trist a Charles Bankhead.

Sir:

Perceiving from the published accounts of the proceedings of the Mexican Congress, that a proffer of the mediation of Her Britannic Majesty's government has recently been presented by you to that of Mexico, and finding myself placed at this moment, with reference to the same object for which that proffer was made, in a position of the gravest responsibility, it has occurred to me that I might, without any breach of the delicacy which belongs to the subject, venture so far as to address to you the enquiry contained in the present note.

I left Washington on the 17th of April, charged with a communication from the Secretary of State of the United States to the Minister of Foreign Relations of the Mexican Republic, the object of which is explained by the following passage:

"The President will not again renew the offer to negotiate, at least until he shall have reason to believe that it would be accepted by the Mexican Government. Devoted, however, to honorable peace, he is determined that the evils of war shall not be protracted one day longer than shall be rendered absolutely necessary by the Mexican Republic. For the purpose of carrying this determination into effect, with the least possible delay, he will forthwith send to the Head Quarters of the Army in Mexico, Nicholas P. Trist Esquire, the officer next in rank to the undersigned in our Department of Foreign Affairs, as a Commissioner invested with full powers to conclude a definitive Treaty of Peace with the United Mexican States".

This note was, immediately upon my arrival at Vera Cruz on the 6th May, forwarded by express to the General in Chief of the Army of the United States, then at Jalapa, with a view to its being transmitted by him under a flag of truce.

From causes, into which it is not necessary here to enter, the note has not yet been transmitted; and until yesterday, I saw no reason to regret this delay: having been led to believe that there no longer existed "a government, even *de facto*, in this republic" to which the note from my government could be delivered. Of the entire erroneousness of this information, I am now, however, fully convinced. The perusal of a few straggling numbers of various news papers, published at the city of Mexico during the last month, has sufficed to make manifest, that, not only has a regularly organized government— complete in all its parts, and its authority universally recognized, by General Santa Anna, himself, the President *ad interim*, as well as by all others— been in existence and in the undisturbed discharge of its functions from the time when the commotions connected with the ejection of Gómez Farías came to a termination; but that the very period, when the note from the Government of the United States reached the hands of General Scott, presented a juncture highly favorable for its delivery. The tone of the press, at that time and since, in regard to the dispositions of Señor Anaya, President substitute, as well as

of his Minister of Foreign Relations and many leading members of Congress, with respect to the proffered Mediation; the appearance of such a paper as the "Razonador", which by its signal ability and its honest boldness no [so?] nobly justifies the name it has assumed; these and other indications constitute proofs that cannot deceive, in regard to the great benefits which must have resulted from the presentation of the note at that crisis; and amongst, of the influence which it was calculated to exercise in the then impending election of President by the state Legislatures.

This opportunity, however, is now irretrievably lost, in consequence of the changes that have probably attended General Santa Anna's return to the capital, and the non-acceptance by Congress of the resignation tendered by him: which, as I am informed, was the state of things at the city so late as the 1st instant—My attention, therefore, is now given to the best practicable mode remaining, for giving effect to this measure on the part of my government, before another conflict on arms at the gates of Mexico shall complicate the question still further, and place at yet greater disadvantage those Mexican citizens who have given proof, at once of their patriotism and their wisdom, by avowing such views as those advocated by the "Razonador".

The best course, which seems to be left me, under all the circumstances of the moment, is that which I pursue in taking the liberty to address to you the enquiry, whether you would have any objection to receive (accompanied, of course, by an open copy for your perusal) the note from the Secretary of State of the United States, for delivery to the Minister of Foreign Relations, and meanwhile to make known the existence of this note and my presence at Head Quarters, so far as this knowledge may be deemed by you conducive to the opening of negotiations; the note of my government, when received by you, to be delivered immediately, unless it should appear decidedly advisable to await the installation of the new President; and should it so appear, then so soon as his ministry shall be formed, or his Minister of Foreign Affairs shall be in place.

Possibly, the Mexican Government, upon being made acquainted with the fact of your having received this communication—should it comport with your views to make it known—might deem it proper to despatch a flag of truce way, to receive the note from a similar flag sent from hence: giving me, at the same time, the proper notice. My only

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motive in making this suggestion is, that *time* would thereby be saved; and that upon the saving of a day or two of time, every thing may depend, so far as regards the prevention of further bloodshed and such consequences as might ensue from a battle at the gates of the capital: the immediate issue of such a battle being a point upon which no one here entertains a shadow of doubt; and this army being, to a man, eager for it.

Possibly, also, the Mexican Government might deem it proper, without waiting until the note from that of the United States should be actually delivered, to make the intelligence communicated to them respecting it, the ground of a proposition that this army shall suspend any further advance upon Mexico, until they shall have had time to receive and consider that note. Should such a proposition be addressed to the General in Chief of this army, fixing any reasonable period for the object, reference being had to the approaching installation of a new Executive and to the organization of its cabinet, I will recommend it to his favourable consideration. Upon him will devolve the duty of deciding upon the propriety of acceding to it: taking into view, on the one hand, the strong desire entertained by the United States to reestablish peace and amity with Mexico; and on the other the bearings which such suspension of the advance of the army might have, as a military question, with regard to future operations, should the necessity not be obviated for the further prosecution of the war.

I am [etc.].

Manning. *op. cit.*, Vol. VIII, p. 907-908.

11 de junio de 1847. Puebla. N. Trist a J. Bankhead.

Sir:

I need not say how truly obliged I feel to yourself and to Mr. Thornton for the mode adopted to afford me an opportunity to place the enclosed in your hands; although my first emotion was one of mingled surprise and regret, that he should have exposed himself to the very personal risk

attending such a journey: a point upon which my anxiety cannot but be intense, until I shall learn that he is again safely through the dangers of the road.

The conversation I have had the pleasure to hold with him has confirmed the correctness of the grounds for the regret expressed in my former letter, that the communication for the minister of Foreign Relations of this Republic had not been transmitted to him early last month.

The motive which actuated the President in causing this communication to be written, being a sincere desire to restore peace, and not the mere wish to throw upon this country the responsibility of protracting the war, the spirit of my instructions would consequently require me, under certain circumstances, to deviate from the intention of my government at the time I left Washington; which intention was, that the communication in question should be delivered at once upon my arrival in this country. Nevertheless, from the nature of the subject, I cannot allow myself much latitude upon this point. My legitimate discretion with reference to it does not, as I conceive, go further than to authorize me to postpone the delivery of the communication in one case, and in one case only: that is to say, for want of a government, having an actual and positive existence, to whom it could be delivered, and by whom it could be considered and acted upon, under the responsibility to their own country and to the world, proper to all determinations upon question of such deep import. This, I consider to be the limit of my discretion on the subject, unless I had the strongest reason to believe, both that the actually existing administration of the government was one from a fair and rational consideration of the communication could not be expected; and that it was, at no remote period, to be succeeded by a new administration, of a different complexion. Except in a case where very strong reason for such belief should exist, I should deem it my duty to limit myself to the one condition already stated; and without regard to the manner in which it might be received, to deliver the communication: provided only that there existed a government to whom it could be delivered, whose authority was sufficiently recognized to admit of its being considered a candid world as the organ of the nation, by its acts subjecting that nation to the responsibilities which belong to one.

In availing myself of the friendly readiness evinced by you to take charge of this communication, I have to request,

therefore, that you will govern yourself in regard to its delivery by the view here presented of my duty with respect to it, were I on the spot, to see and act for myself.

With respect to the fate which may attend this new effort on the part of the United States to bring the war to a close by means of an amicable and honorable understanding between the two parties, in which the views of both shall be consulted and shall exercise a fair and equitable influence, I will remark that I have become thoroughly satisfied since my arrival in the country, of what I previously had been strongly inclined to believe: that a very important, if not the chief, practical hindrance to the restoration of peace consists in the fact, that the mode of conducting the war thus far pursued on the part of the United States has inspired many with the hope that its indefinite protraction would prove highly advantageous to what, according to their views, is required, by the interests of particular classes, or of the country at large. This is a delusion which, for the welfare of Mexico, cannot too soon cease. The conduct of the war here referred to is but one of many modes, all equally practicable. There is, most obviously, a natural term to it; and this term, manifestly, is not far off. Should the United States, by the persistence of the Mexican government in a course that sets at naught every recognized international principle with respect to states that have come into collision with each other, here again be baffled in their endeavor to terminate the war by a negotiation which shall settle down upon terms just and honorable for both parties, and mutually satisfactory; and should they in consequence find themselves compelled to take the matter altogether into their own hands, no one can fail to perceive that the necessity thus forced upon them must involve a course of proceeding radically different from that heretofore pursued: one which shall cut off from every interest in this country all hope of deriving benefit from the continuance of the war, and which must ultimately cause the country at large to find itself deprived of many advantages, which, down to this moment, it depends upon her government to secure for her. This necessity may be forced upon the United States, and the time has drawn very nigh when the point must be decided; and should the question receive a solution so contrary to their sincere wishes and earnest endeavors, there will at least be nothing of self-reproach to hinder them from conforming to its dictates, and from giving to the second phase of the war a character no

less decided and decisive than that which the first has received from the purely military operations proper to it. Whether their present endeavor to avoid this necessity is to prove as fruitless as were their repeated efforts to avert the war in the first instance, is the point now soon to be decided.

Accept, sir, [etc.].

Manning, *op. cit.*, Vol. VIII, p. 909-910.

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13 de junio de 1847. Puebla. N: Trist a J. Buchanan.

Sir:

Knowing how great must be the desire of the president to receive intelligence from this quarter, I despatched by a courier to Vera Cruz, last Sunday night, a copy of a letter which I had just transmitted in duplicate to Mr. Bankhead, her britannic majesty's minister at Mexico. It had been my intention, when the arrangement for the departure of that courier was made, conjointly with another person, to write to you; but no time was left me for this purpose, and I preferred sending the copy of my letter, without accompaniment, to missing the opportunity altogether. Under the same cover, was a second copy of the letter referred to in my number 6 as having been received by me from a gentleman of great experience in this war, as well as of a very clear and comprehensive mind.

I now transmit copies of the same and of two subsequent letters from me to Mr. Bankhead. The last of these will make you acquainted with the result of the first, excepting only the fact which I have here to add, that the gentleman therein referred to, belonging to the legation, set out yesterday forenoon on his return to the city of Mexico, charged with your communication to the minister of Foreign Relations under a sealed cover addressed to Mr. Bankhead.

It will be perceived that in my last letter to Mr. B. I refer to the corroboration afforded my Mr. Thornton to what I had inferred from a few Mexico newspapers, in regard to the opportuneness of the period when your communication to the minister of Foreign Relation reached the

hands of general Scott, for its delivery to the Mexican government. Mr. T. stated that the loss of this opportunity was much to be regretted, and he mentioned several facts showing how favorable it had been. The most striking of these was, that Mr. B. had been applied to on the part of a high personage (named) to know if he would write to general S. Asking whether he would entertain a proposal for the suspension of his advance, as a measure preliminary to an offer to enter into negotiations. The motive, too, was stated: it was that the troops (doubtless the means also) which it would otherwise, be requisite to draw from the states for the defence of the capital might be kept there to give strength to those who would sustain the government in making such offer another was, that the british—offer of mediation had not yet been acted upon. The committee of Congress to which it had been referred had reported in favor of referring it to the Executive, to be acted upon by it, agreeably to its constitutional faculties; (and the way in which these would be exercised was looked upon as not doubtful) but this report—which the newspaper in which I had seen it mentioned had spoken of as having been rejected—had not been acted upon: the vote upon it having constantly been prevented by one artifice or another of the two factions, the *puros* and the *moderados*, fearful alike of the responsibility of either passing or defeating the measure. I will add, that since this conversation with Mr. T. I have read in the *Mexico Courier Français* of the 28th April, general Santa Anna's letter of the 22nd April (after his Cerro Gordo defeat) to general Anaya, the president substitute. The conclusion proves that he thought an exhortation against a "disgraceful treaty" as not being out of place, when addressed to the government at that moment: "You must not, my friend, give us up for dead. In the name of God, above all, do not allow yourself to conclude with the enemy a disgraceful treaty, which would make our position still worse". This, in itself, is nothing; and I should have passed it over as a mere *ad captandum* flourish, but for the other evidences of a disposition at that period, not to enter into a "disgraceful treaty", but to abandon the position of refusal to listen to offers to negotiate.

It has, for some time, appeared to me perfectly obvious that the advance of our army upon Mexico (or in other words, the occupation of that city) at this time, would be attended with consequences extremely adverse to peace; in a

word, to the object which has constituted with our government the motive to the vigorous prosecution of the war. Should the Mexican government remain at the capital after its occupation by us, there would then be the plea of actual *duresse*, to oppose as well to the doing of anything as to the validity of anything which might be done. But they certainly would not remain. They would disperse, after appointing some remote place at which to meet; and this would immensely increase whatever advantages may now be possessed means for preventing the reestablishment of peace. This same view was expressed by Mr. T., without any remark from me to elicit it; and being thus confirmed in its correctness, I purpose making it the subject of a communication to the general in chief. Aware that if any such ground were afforded, it might very possibly have the effect of inducing a determination to pursue a course the reverse of the one suggested by me, I shall take particular care that my communication affords no ground whatever for the pretense that he has been dictated to, or interfered with, in the discharge of his duties.

In my last, I stated that no intelligence of any sort had been communicated to me from head quarters since my arrival. This still continues to be the case. My reply to general Scott, commenced on the road between Vera Cruz and Jalapa, and concluded at the latter place, (and of which a copy has been transmitted to you) contains this passage:

The interests of the public service require that I be kept advised of the opportunities which are to occur, by government expresses or other public means, for sending communications to Washington; and this object can be fulfilled by a general direction on the subject, from the commanding general to the proper officers. The same reason may render it important that any intelligence received by the commanding general respecting the political affairs of the country, be communicated to me. On the other hand, should any prospect open, of the occurrence of the contingency upon which hostilities are to be suspended, no time will be lost by me in bringing it to the knowledge of the commanding general.

The intimations here conveyed proceeded from an excess of caution on my part, and not from any belief that anything of the kind could be at all necessary to secure such a line

of conduct between public servants possessing even the most ordinary degree of common sense, and actuated by even the most ordinary degree of fidelity to the public interests. It appeared to me as a thing nowise admitting of doubt, that the general in chief, entrusted as he is with means of every kind for obtaining intelligence, at the public cost, could not fail to consider himself bound in duty to the country, to communicate to me any intelligence, so obtained, which might be of the remotest interest to our government in connection with the object of my mission. In this expectation, I am to say, I have been disappointed. Not even a newspaper has been communicated to me. I have even been prevented from obtaining a sight of papers, in consequence of their being retained far longer than is usual in regard to borrowed newspapers, even in ordinary times. In one instance, for example, I heard, as a matter of common talk, that an interesting Mexico paper (in French) of the 29th May had been received at head quarters. Several days after, my enquiries after this paper proved so far successful that I obtained the address of a French resident who receives it. Upon applying to this gentleman, I was informed that the governor, general Worth, had sent to him for it. I afterwards succeeded in obtaining one, and it proved to be the *Courier Français*, containing, from the *Razonador*, the important indication that the Mexican press has afforded since the war began. The next day, the same thing happened in regard to several members of the *Republicano*, or the *Monitor Republicano* (I forget which) down to the 30th of May, that had been received by an English merchant. They also, he informed me, had been sent for by general Worth; and they had been transferred by him to head quarters: at least, I heard such papers spoken of as having been received there. Five days after, I again made application for them, and they had not yet been returned. Today, Mr. Kendall, on visiting this house (general Smith's head quarters) mentioned having seen and examined, either at general Scott's or at general Worth's (I forget which) a number of Mexico papers down to the 8th instant.—These are specimens of what is constantly occurring, and of the regard shown for the public interests in this respect. Had a different course been pursued, and had the newspapers so obtained, by virtue of the public posts occupied by the persons who possess themselves of them, been sent for my perusal, after they had served all the military purposes which they were susceptible of;

had this been done, I should doubtless have discovered at a much earlier day—and greatly, perhaps, to the public advantage—how totally general Scott was in error when he informed me that there no longer existed in this republic even so much as “a government *de facto*.”

Among the papers mentioned by Mr. Kendall was one containing some intercepted correspondence to this army, which has been taken on its way from Vera Cruz to Jalapa in charge of a Mrs. Powers and eight men. Mr. S. and three others were killed and the remaining five captured. It seems to be a very extraordinary piece of business, that such papers should be entrusted to such keeping, and I fear that it is likely to turn out a very disastrous one: for one of the published letters is said to be from colonel Hunt (Quarter Master at New Orleans) indicating an utter want of pecuniary resources in our government; and the Mexican, so Mr. K. said, are exulting in the idea that our money has run out, and that all that is necessary is for them to hold out a little while longer.

On the 2nd instant, general Santa Anna withdrew his resignation of the presidency *ad interim*. At the time when I last wrote, it was impossible, with the lights I had, to form a satisfactory opinion in regard to the character of that proceeding on his part, the resignation. This point is now settled by the fact—which I can state with positiveness—that its withdrawal took place on the very day when it was to be acted upon *and accepted*. A want of firmness alone, on the part of the majority in Congress, and not any lack of disposition to release him, has prevented the formal acceptance of the resignation, without regard to the withdrawal.

I am [etc.].

Manning, *op. cit.*, Vol. VIII, p. 908-914.

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14 de junio de 1847. Washington. J. Buchanan a N. Trist.

La carta que había recibido del general Scott remitida en mayo de 1847 tenía un carácter extraordinario. Estaba bien calculada para molestar y provocar su indignación y seguramente no la hubiera redactado de haber esperado la llegada

de Trist al cuartel general. Seguramente cuando pudo ver los documentos y las instrucciones junto con el proyecto de tratado las inquietudes del general se disiparon.

You were entrusted with no further agency in regard to my communication of the 19th April, last, addressed to the Mexican minister for Foreign Relations, after it was placed in the hands of general Scott. Your whole duty respecting it was then performed. If he has either refused or neglected to transmit that important document to the minister to whom it was directed, and thus violated a military order of the president issued to him through the Department of War, he has incurred a heavy responsibility, but for this, he is neither answerable to the Department of State nor to the commissioner to Mexico. The question belongs exclusively to the military branch of the government.

You might safely have relied upon the government here for the vindication of your character and conduct. Indeed, general Scott's letter to you had upon its face placed him so clearly in the wrong, that no commentary upon it, however able, which you may have written, can have made the same plainer. Some days before the arrival of your despatch, the War Department had received a despatch from the general, enclosing a copy of his letter to you, and a judicious and appropriate answer, dated on the 31st of May, was returned to him by the Secretary of War.

Whilst our armies are in the country of the enemy and our minister of peace is at the Head Quarters of the commanding general, this is no time for personal altercations between them if these can possibly be avoided. Under such circumstances, the greater sacrifice of private griefs, however well founded, which you may make upon the altar of your country, the more will this redound to your honor hereafter. You have been despatched to Mexico by your government as a minister of peace, and to accomplish the great object of your mission, a hearty cooperation between the general and yourself may be indispensable. Under these considerations, I am directed by the president, in case amicable relations shall not in the meantime have been restored, to instruct you to call upon general Scott and offer to communicate to him confidentially the instructions and project of a treaty with which you have been entrusted, and to report to this department without delay the circumstances and the result of your interview.

Governor Marcy has again written to general Scott by the messenger who will bear you this despatch.

El gobernador Marcy también había escrito de nuevo a Scott y mandaban a Trist las copias de las órdenes dadas por el presidente al ministro de la guerra y marina en 11 del mes sobre la tarifa mexicana y también sobre la opinión del secretario de Hacienda. En esa forma se daría cuenta de que todo había sido anunciado al mundo y que el gobierno trataba de conseguir, por medio de su nuevo tratado con México, que los bienes importados por cualquier puerto mexicano mientras estuvieran en manos de americanos, entraran sin ningún pago adicional al ser internados a partir del momento en que se hiciera la paz pero cubriendo lo que se venía pagando de costumbre.

En vista de ello le ordenaban insistir como sine qua non en la inserción del artículo 9 del proyecto del tratado.

Mexico. Instructions. November 10, 1845-April 6, 1854. Department of State. Vol. 16, doc. núm. 2, p. 62-65. NAW.

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22 de junio de 1847. México. Domingo Ibarra, secretario de Estado a J. Buchanan.

Había recibido una nota fechada en 15 de abril diciendo que el presidente de los Estados Unidos trataba de enviar en calidad de comisionado al cuartel del general Scott, que operaba en México, a Nicholas P. Trist con amplios poderes para celebrar un tratado de paz definitivo con los Estados Unidos Mexicanos. Cuando enteró al presidente, éste opinó que estando reservado el arreglo de semejante negocio al congreso soberano del país se le turnara la nota. La resolución que el congreso tomara sería comunicada de inmediato a través del ministro de Relaciones.

Mexico. Notes. February 4, 1837-June 28, 1848. Department of State. Vol. 4, doc. sin núm. NAW.

13 de julio de 1847. Washington. J. Buchanan a N. Trist.

El presidente había tenido un gran disgusto al ver que el cierre del tratado de paz se retrasaba y se dificultaba por las rencillas personales entre Trist y el general Scott, ambos funcionarios del mismo gobierno en tierra del enemigo.

Debió haber entregado los papeles al general Scott para que él los mandara al funcionario mexicano que debiera recibirlos, pero nunca debió haber recuperado la responsabilidad de semejante asunto después de que Scott se negó a hacer remitir la comunicación, en obediencia a la orden militar que le habían dado. Ese segundo paso estaba completamente fuera de su misión.

En su carte del día 20 el presidente lamentó la noticia de que retiró los documentos entregados al general en vista de que, tal como él mismo decía, se los devolvería cuando viera la situación y la disposición del gobierno mexicano favorable a su presentación.

La responsabilidad del general Scott había menguado en mucho en vista de su conducta, a pesar de su desobediencia a las órdenes militares que se le dieron por la Secretaría de la Guerra pues decidió ante sí mismo y sin ninguna justificación, que las circunstancias no eran favorables para presentar la petición de paz.

Its immediate delivery to the Mexican minister for Foreign Affairs could have done no possible harm and might have been productive of much positive good. Indeed, had it reached its destination soon after the victory of Cerro Gordo, from the state of public feeling then existing in the city of Mexico, it might and probably would have been productive of the happiest consequences. But whether or not, the time of its delivery was a question not left to your discretion.

Fue una lástima que no entregara los despachos al general en persona pues con seguridad no se hubiera malogrado la gestión.

Esperaba que de acuerdo con las últimas instrucciones, del 14 del mes anterior, hubiera visitado al general en persona y le hubiera enseñado los documentos y esperaba que ninguno de los dos funcionarios entorpeciera la conclusión del tratado de paz con México.

According to the suggestion in your despatch number 6, you are authorized to modify the boundary contained in your

instructions so as to make it read "up the middle of the Rio Grande to the 32nd degree of north latitude, thence due West to a point due south of the south western angle of New Mexico, thence due north to the said angle, thence northward along the western line of New Mexico" etcétera. This modification, which would embrace the Paso del Norte within the limits of the United States, is deemed important: still you are not to consider it as a *sine qua non* nor suffer it to delay the conclusion of the treaty.

Sin embargo recomendaría una redacción más conveniente de ese pasaje del tratado como por ejemplo que la frontera fuera con el paralelo 32 de latitud norte desde el Río Grande hasta la mitad del Golfo de California y desde allí por el centro del Golfo hasta el Océano Pacífico. Si no pudiera conseguir ese arreglo entonces podía hacer correr la línea hacia el oeste desde el ángulo sudoeste de Nuevo México hasta el centro del Golfo. Cualquiera de estas líneas incluiría para el territorio norteamericano todo el curso del río Gila pues por la información que se tenía del Mayor Emory, el valle del río presentaba posibilidades para la construcción de un ferrocarril que fuera hacia el Pacífico pues tendría que pasar unas veces por uno y otras por el otro margen del río.

Estaba autorizado a proponer la primera modificación y en caso de que no la aceptaran presentaría la segunda, pero en el entendimiento de que ninguna de las dos era un sine qua non y que el tratado no debía retrasarse por esas discusiones.

In case Lower California cannot be obtained, then the line might be run on the parallel of 32nd, or due West from the South West corner of New Mexico to the Pacific Ocean. If the latter line should be adopted, care must be taken that San Miguel shall be included within our limits.

Yours...

J. Buchanan

Mexico. Instructions. November 10, 1845-April 6, 1864. Department of State. Vol. 16, doc. núm. 3, p. 65-72. NAW.

19 de julio de 1847. Washington. J. Buchanan a N. Trist.

The more I reflect upon the subject, the better am I convinced of the importance of running the boundary line between the Rio Grande and the Gulf of California along the thirty second parallel of the North Latitude. We cannot learn that the boundaries of New Mexico have ever been authoritatively and specifically determined, and difficulties might hereafter arise between the two governments in ascertaining where the South Western angle of New Mexico is situated. A conversation with major Emory since the date of my last despatch, has convinced me still more of the importance of this modification.

You will therefore in the copy of the project of a treaty which you are instructed to present to the Mexican plenipotentiary, if this be not too late, substitute the following instead of the 4th article.

Article IV

The boundary line between the two republics shall commence in the Gulf of Mexico three leagues from the land, opposite the mouth of the Rio Grande, from thence up the middle of that river to the thirty second parallel of north latitude, from thence due west along this parallel of latitude to the middle of the Gulf of California, thence down the middle of the same to the Pacific Ocean.

It is not intended that you shall make the parallel of 32°, instead of the River Gila, a *sine qua non*; but yet it is deemed of great importance that you should obtain this modification, if it be practicable.

If Lower California cannot be obtained, then the line of the parallel of 32° might be extended to the Pacific Ocean, taking care, in that even to secure to our citizens, in accordance with your original instructions, "in all time to come, a free and uninterrupted access to and from the Ocean through the Gulf of California from and to their possession North of the said division line".

Major Emory, whilst in California, has accurately ascertained the latitude of two important points in that country. The latitude of the town of San Diego is 32°44'59". The harbor is some miles south of the town. The latitude of the

mouth of the Gila where it empties into the Colorado is 32°43'.

Your interesting and important despatch number 7 of the 13th June, was received at the department on the 15th instant. Although it had not been in the contemplation of the president to invoke the aid of the British minister in Mexico for the purpose of forwarding my communication to the Mexican Minister for Foreign Affairs, yet the necessity of the case, under all circumstances, constituted a sufficient justification for your conduct. Indeed, it does not seem that you had any other mode of transmitting it after the refusal of general Scott to perform this duty in obedience to the order of the Secretary of War.

The Secretary of War received last night an extra from the *Republicano* of the date of the 28th June, containing the letter of the Mexican Minister for Foreign Affairs to the secretaries of the congress, my letter to that minister and his answer. Your despatch number 5, if such an one existed, has not yet reached the department.

J. Buchanan

Mexico. Instructions. November 10, 1845-April 6, 1854. Department of State. Vol. 16, núm. 4, p. 72-74. NAW.

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23 de julio de 1847. Puebla. N. Trist a J. Buchanan.

Sir:

Yesterday morning a letter was read to me, dated Mexico—the instant upon which as full reliance may be placed as if it were from myself enjoying access to every desirable source of information after stating that Congress and the president were engaged in bandying between them the responsibility of the question presented by your note to the Minister of Foreign Relations, the writer concludes nearly in these words: (the import—I am sure of) *Santa Anna* had, I believe, a strong notion of taking the matter into his own hands in a military way; and this, I think, will be the end of it: and then negotiations will follow.

UNAM - IHH

Last night, a person to whom a letter from the capital of the 19th or 20th had just been read, imparted to me its contents; a domestic letter. The writer is a public character—(involuntarily) The leading man of his state.—Always a thorough republican, and prominent advocate of the confiscation of church property. My informant is, I know, on such terms with the family as would naturally lead to such a communication and he and myself are on such terms as would naturally lead him to make to me, in the conviction that committal would grow out of it. As reported (evidently not very accurately) that letter says: Santa Anna is using every effort to have his powers enlarged, which will very probably be granted. The last words of the letter are, I believe that not another cartridge will be burnt.

The precise state of the case, in regard to what is here termed the enlargement of powers, is shown by a communication made to Congress (or rather addressed to them for they have not been in session to receive it) by Señor Pacheco, the new secretary of "Relations" (Foreign and Domestic). This communication, under date the 16th instant and officially published in the *Diario del Gobierno* of the 18th, which I also obtained yesterday, is one of the very ablest state papers I ever read. Nothing could be more lucid or conclusive than its arguments, or more adroit and skilful than the manner in which it avails itself of every advantage, however slight, of the position of the Executive. Its force is irresistible, and Congress cannot but be altogether prostrate under it; and the latter of the *Two letters above mentioned doubtless said* that Congress (who must be conscious of their position) are about—not to increase the powers of the President, but—to restore to the Executive its constitutional authority to negotiate, by repealing the decree of the 20th April last, declaring the Government (Executive) incompetent to make peace with the United States. This, they evidently must do, or assume the entire responsibility of whatever consequences may result from the prolongation of the war; and this responsibility, I am convinced, they will not shoulder. The substance of this document is, of course, interlarded (it could not otherwise hope for acceptance) with the usual invective against the U. S., for "this war of invasion, the most unprovoked and iniquitous known to history", and with "Numantia and Saguntum" and the most vehement asseveration of an unshaken resolve to contend to the last extremity, and to embrace national annihilation

rather than submit. Of its character other and more important respects, and of the indication afforded by its tone towards congress, of the President's disposition "to take the matter into his own hands", the enclosed extracts will enable you to judge. He evidently, is, not only *the* man of this country, but the only one among them all capable of exercising a decisive or a commanding influence over its affairs.

In my number 8, under date the 7th inst, I transmitted a copy of a letter addressed by me to general Scott, under date the 25th June, and his reply to the same. This constituted the commencement of our official intercourse with reference to the duties with which I am charged. Justice—to say nothing of my own feelings towards a gentleman and a public servant, whose character I now believe that I had entirely misconceived—demands that I should embrace this early opportunity to say, that his whole conduct in this regard has been characterized by the purest public spirit, and a fidelity and devotion which could not be surpassed, to the views of the Government in regard to the restoration of peace. This spirit on his part—as will clearly appear when the details are communicated—has manifested itself, not in a passive way merely, (as might be supposed from the nature of our relative positions and duties) but in a disposition to assume responsibility—and responsibility of the gravest kind—in utter disregard of consequences to himself. And this disposition—or rather, this readiness and fixed determination—on his part, although the occasion which has called it forth did not relate to the discharge of his military duties, strictly speaking, has not required any appeal from me, to elicit; but has manifested itself in the most spontaneous and patriotic manner. Under these circumstances, it could not but be a cause of the most serious regret on my part, if the correspondence between us, that took place shortly after my arrival in this country, should in any way be brought to the notice of the public; and consequently, if in your judgment consistent with propriety, it would be highly gratifying to me, to be permitted to withdraw it from the files of the Department.

I am [etc.].

P. S. July 25.—Whilst awaiting the return from Mexico (whither, as a measure of precaution, he was sent, *to get his passport freshened*) of the person who is to carry this to Vera Cruz, I received last night the following: the source most indubitable. This intelligence decides that the move-

ment upon Mexico must now take place. It will be very soon after the arrival of General Pierce,—say in eight or ten days from this time. Nevertheless, upon grounds which will be fully explained in my next communication, I consider the probabilities of an early peace very strong: *Santa Anna is afraid to make peace now, and cannot. Mr.—Can do nothing with him, even with the aid he possesses from you. S. A. now says, secretly, that he shall allow your army to approach this city, even as far as the peñon, and then endeavor to make peace.*

The Peñon is the point where the direct and usual road to Mexico first strikes the Lake. (Tescuco) It is about nine miles from the city.

Manning, *op. cit.*, p. 915-916.

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27 de julio de 1847. Madrid. Thomas Cautá Reynolds a J. Buchanan.

You will perceive that in a recent article of the *London Morning Chronicle*, copied into the *Galignani* of July 17 there is a hint of European intervention in the affairs of Mexico, It is the first I have seen in a English paper for months. Though few will think England seriously entertains any such design, yet no one can doubt that she views with no small alarm our recent progress. A distinguished Tory Peer (I think the Earl of Ellenborough, late governor general of India), recently expressed in the House of Lords his profound conviction that your Oregon treaty was a mere ruse on the part of the United States, and that, as soon as we shall have made peace with Mexico, we will send our experienced generals and tried troops to drive England from the North American Continent! As Great Britain has prospects of a good harvest this year, her politicians have become more communicative; and it is possible that, as any attempt to interfere in Mexico would certainly occasion a war, it occurs to them as the safest and therefore the best plan to let the "Russia of the West" obtain the "uncontrolled mastery of the American Mediterranean"; but, by seizing Cuba, its Gibraltar, to put a bridle in her mouth to keep

her within it—thinking that, tired of war and expenses, we would forcibly resist the occupation by England as the means of bringing Spain to or with her consent, carrying out, what the *Chronicle* calls “the *only* terms on which any satisfactory settlement (of the debt) can *ever* be made”.

Spain. R. M. *Sounders*. March 10, 1846-September 29, 1849. Department of State. Vol. 35, doc. núm. 20. NAW.

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27 de julio de 1847. Mérida. Domingo Barret, jefe del gobierno provisional de Yucatán a Buchanan (traducción de la época).

Most Excellent Sir: In a note which I had the honor to address to your excellency on the 28th of last December, I manifested to you by a declaration of facts the political situation of this State and its former and present relations with the Government of Mexico, in order to prove that, without taking part in the war between this Republic and that of the United States, it maintained a true and effective neutrality, commissioning Don José Rovira to make to that Government, under the authorization and instructions given to him, proper explanations of the end that Yucatan might be considered as a neutral State, as Your Excellency promised the Commissioner it would be considered, according to the communications in which he recounted the results of his activities, returning to this Peninsula because he considered his commission ended.

In such a situation the promised neutrality has been and continues to be strictly maintained, but this Government, in accordance with its own desire and the like desires and opinion of the most excellent Council of State of April 20 last, has newly appointed doctor Don Justo Sierra, in order that in the special character of Commissioner and agent of this state, he may address himself to the Republic of the United States and its government, may make fitting explanations, promote, under the instruction given to him, whatever may be of reciprocal interest, and place in the hands of Your Excellency the present communication, so that through it and the credentials of his appointment entire faith and credit

may be accorded his representations and whatever he may offer and promise in the name of the State and his Government, hoping that the government of the United States will receive the agent with the consideration to be expected of that enlightened Government; and to this end I have the honor to assure Your Excellency of my sincere respect.

God and Liberty.

Manning, *op. cit.*, Vol. VIII, p. 917-918.

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31 de julio de 1847. Puebla. N. Trist a J. Buchanan.

Sir:

In my last I said, "I consider the probabilities of an early peace very strong". The enclosed will be found to corroborate this belief. *The first is from Mr. Thornton, secretary of her Britannic Majesty's Legation*, under date July 29; *the second*—from a foreign merchant to his correspondent here.

We had intelligence last night of general Pierce, from colonel Wyn Koop, Governor of Perote, which place general P. doubtless reached last night and will leave tomorrow morning. Allowing him three days for the march hither, and as many here to rest and recruit, we shall, in all probability, be on the march to Mexico in a week from this time, *with from 8 to 8 500 men*: a force abundantly—I may say overwhelmingly—sufficient to dispose of the 30,000 congregated in and about Mexico, and to add another hundred or two of pieces to the cannon that has passed into our hands. We are, however, I feel quite sure, not *destined to enter the city*: so entirely was I mistaken when I said that a march upon it, and its occupation, were convertible expressions. *After trying his fortune, not without hope, it seems that she may smile upon him at the Peñon* (See Venta de México in Manouvrier and Snell's recently published chart of the road—taken I think from Humboldt) or whatever point we may decide upon first carrying, successful or unsuccessful in his resistance—*contrive to have himself entreated to armistice for the appointment of commissioners*.—The only point which I consider at all problematical—for I feel as certain in re-

gard to the rest as one can well feel on such a subject—is, whether Congress can be kept there, and prevented from scattering to the four winds in which latter event, ratification would be a hopeless thing; and this, being evident, would probably prevent the negotiation of a treaty.

The *Diario del Gobierno* of the 24, 26, 26th instant slips from which are referred to in number 1—will be sent to you entire from the office of the New Orleans Delta,...

Number 1.—Extracts. "You will no doubt have been amused at the mutual endeavours of Congress and Santa Anna to put the responsibility of entering into negotiations upon each other; so far Congress have succeeded; for although S. A. addressed them the plain question of whether they wished peace or war, he was unable to make them meet to give him an answer; since that time *he has been saying to several people, and among the number to Mr. Mackinto (Mackintosh?) that he must let general Scott advance, even close up to Mexico; and since he is now abandoned by congress must then [sic] military chief endeavour to make peace.* There is no doubt that *he is very anxious for peace, for he knows well what will be the fate of his army, if he risks another battle; But he has many difficulties to contend with, and many enemies who are raising a war cry merely for the purpose of bringing on his overthrow; the principal of these is Valencia who returned two days ago from the north with 4 000 men. I have no doubt means may be found to quiet this man, for he is notoriously open to certain affection—now thinks that Congress might be brought together, and might be induced by the same means to speak their minds plainly; indeed some people have already been induced to do so by the mere support of some articles, which I enclose you, of the *Diario del Gobierno*, the only paper now allowed, which plainly speak peace, and of course the ideas of head quarters. I have heard it said that in case S. A. decides upon naming any one to meet you will be the man should that happen, I lock upon the Peace as made.* I was very sorry to hear of your bad state of health from Rafael Beraza, and.

Manning, *op. cit.*, Vol. VIII, p. 918-919.

14 de agosto de 1847. Ayutla. N. Trist a J. Buchanan.

Sir:

I left Puebla last Sunday morning, the 8th instant, in company with General Scott, whose guest I now am; and reached this place (on the margin of Lake Chalco, and within 18 miles of the capital) on the 11th, with the advance of the army, consisting of General Twiggs's division—General Pillow, whose division formed the rear arrived yesterday, and took up his quarters near the town of Chalco, where he had been preceded the day before by General Worth. General Quitman's division had followed us; so that our forces are now concentrated within very short supporting distance of each other. The movement from Puebla has been every thing that could be desired; no casualty of any kind having attended it, save the loss of a single man, a dragoon of Quitman's rear guard, killed, through his own rashness, in a rencounter with a comparatively large body of guerrillas. The enemy, after expending great labour in fortifying a long chain of heights, forming the pass of Rio Frio, had left them unoccupied; as he had similar fortifications, at numerous points, all along the road from Jalapa to this place. The whole route, indeed, presents a series of natural defences, which would have amply sufficed our countrymen to cut to pieces any army of one hundred thousand men that should have persisted in attempting the march from Vera Cruz to Mexico; and it would not have required more than a thousand of our riflemen to do it. There are hundreds of points where they would have decimated the enemy, under the certainty of effecting their retreat without the loss of a single man.

We are now in the presence of the Peñon, the last of their remarkable strongholds outside of the city; though besides the obstacles presented by the lakes, marshes, and artificial inundations, and bridgeless canals (a perfect labyrinth) there are numerous others of a less distinguished rank in all directions: for they have fortified every point and pass within a circle of eight to ten miles.

The Peñon, midway between us and the city, is about 8½ miles distant. The day after our arrival I accompanied General Scott to a spot between the main road and Lake

Tezcuco, about 2½ miles from that height, where we had it in full view, as well as a portion of the city beyond, including the cathedral. It (the "Peñon", or *Rocky Mount*) rises from a plain, open all round, and is now surrounded with water. It has been *ascertained* to be a place of great strength. Yesterday, besides previous reconnaissances by Captain Lee, and other officers of the Engineers, Lieutenant Stevens of that corps passed the whole day in a close examination of it, its defences and armament, the result of which he reported in detail last night. He was, the greater part of the time, going from one spot to another round the height, about 1 000 yards from the batteries, wading about in the Lake and the drowned land, in full view of the 10, to 12,000 troops collected there, including a large body of cavalry, and about a mile and a half from General Smith's Brigade, sent out as his support: his immediate escort being two dragoons. One of these waded across the inundation (to try the bottom) to within about 300 yards of the enemy.

I give this as a specimen of our Engineer corps; and there is not an arm of the service, that would not afford, in its own appropriate sphere, proof of the same spirit; and, at the same time, proof that this was not considered by the actors as a thing worthy of note, but as much a matter of course as buckling on one's sword to go on parade.—It is indeed a *noble* army: full of confidence in itself, and full of confidence in its commander. (and he gives every possible proof that this is nothing more than his strict due. To appreciate the man, to *know* him at all, one must see him in this sphere). There is not a man in it (or if there be such, they keep silent) but is determined to make his way to the "Plaza" of Mexico, and who does not look upon this just like any other part of the *march*, only a little rougher work perhaps—a thing which is to take place at any rate; a matter, about which there can be no sort a doubt. And it would be all the same, if there were a dozen Peñones in the way, to be carried by assault one after another.

The *Peñon* however will probably *not* be the point of attack. General Scott said to me the other evening that *if he could take the city in one way with the loss of 800 men, and in another with that of 900 he would deem himself a murderer if he adopted the latter however brilliant; and he evidently never loses sight of this principle. The plan, almost decided upon, is to carry the town of Mexicalingo, on the border of the canal leading to the city: this, as you will see will open*

to us with a little more reconnoitring and fighting *perhaps the smaller towns southwest and west of the capital and secure comfortable shelter to our troops, in case of proposals to negotiate, and should these not come, a comparatively bloodless capture of the city. The attack will, probably, take place on Tuesday.*

A Mexican who visited Colonel Harvey's camp the day before yesterday, said that the troops at the Peñon are very ill disposed towards Santa Anna, (who is reported as commanding there in person) and say, that he has been bought to betray them, and will, after allowing some hundreds of them to be killed, give up the place. This absurd story of an understanding between him and our government, totally groundless as it is, has evidently taken deep root in the Mexican mind, amongst all classes, and tends much to the dis-traction in their councils.

No intelligence having reached us from the capital since we left Puebla, I will here transcribe, as my freshest news, a passage from a very long despatch, nearly finished at that place and completed since my arrival here, but which I have not yet been able to put in cypher:

Something or other in going on at the city, which satisfies them both, that, notwithstanding your being compelled to pursue yr. march, not another cannon will be fired.—This has been said to me within the last half hour (August 6th) by a person who believed (and justly, the character of the persons referred to being considered) that he was bringing me interesting intelligence; and last night *a letter was received from the more important of my correspondents, showing that the business was rapidly maturing.*

Manning, *op. cit.*, Vol. VIII, p. 919-921.

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20 de agosto de 1847. México. J. R. Pacheco, secretario de Relaciones a J. Buchanan.

The Undersigned Minister of Domestic and Foreign Affairs has instructions from His Excellency the President *pro tem*-

pose of the Republic to say to His Excellency Mr. Buchanan, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the United States of America, that success in battles does not always accompany justice of the cause for which they have been fought: in consideration of this fact and no other, if there were any other to consider, the Chief of the United Mexican States has fought until on account of events which there is no occasion to mention, the troops of the United States of America are within the gates of the capital: giving heed then to other duties which are also his, as First Magistrate of his country, and in the exercise of the powers which devolve on him in conformity with its constitution, he has resolved to listen to the proposals which Mr. Nicholas Trist, appointed by the Government of the United States, may have to make, provided they be advantageous to both nations and safeguard the honor of the Mexican Republic, as has been continually said in the Congress at Washington and as the North American Minister assured the Government of Great Britain, and with the understanding that the Mexican Republic will agree to open peace preliminaries, a treaty to be concluded within the period of a year thereafter, the same to be submitted, in accordance with the Constitution of the country, to the approval of the Authority to which the Constitution assigns that power.

The nature of this communication does not permit of going into details, and the undersigned believes that he has said enough to reply to the note of his excellency Mr. Buchanan of April 15 last, to whom on this occasion he presents the assurances of his most distinguished consideration.

Manning, *op. cit.*, Vol. VIII, p. 921-922.

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21 de agosto de 1847. Coyoacán. W. Scott a Antonio López Santa Anna, presidente de México y comandante del ejército.

Sir:

Too much blood has already been shed in this unnatural war between the two great republics of this continent—It