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p. 735-743

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Apache Menace on the Frontier, 1876 - 1886: a View from Chihuahua

The period between 1876 and 1886 along the Río Bravo was especially violent. Apache Indians from the reservations north of the border wrecked havoc on villages and travelers in northern Mexico. In Chihuahua, Victorio, Juh, Geronimo, and others led their followers back and forth across the border, raiding on both sides and eluding the United States Army, Mexican *federales*, and state volunteers.[1] Indian raids also created tension between the two countries, leading to each government's insistence that the other was responsible for the attacks. Unites States Army officers such as George Crook believed that Mexicans were part of the problem, for they were buying from the Apaches livestock stolen in the United States and selling them guns and ammunition in return. Mexicans insisted that unscrupulous individuals north of the border bought cattle stolen in Mexico, and sold Apaches repeating rifles and ammunition. United States officials charged that Mexico was not contributing sufficient military support to control the Indians, while Mexicans countered with accusations that the real culprit was the poorly conceived and run reservation system of the United States.[2]

It is my contention that Mexicans in Chihuahua suffered such economic disruption and loss of life that the state and its residents did not encourage the hostilities by assisting Apaches through large-scale trading with them, and in fact devoted a much greater share of resources and made more personal sacrifices than the United States or its citizens north of the border. Although American officials charged that Mexicans were aiding the Indians, such accusations were not generally supported by fact and were perhaps motivated as much by ignorance or misinformation as anything else. There were a few unscrupulous individuals on both sides of the border who freely dealt with some of the Indians when the profit potential was great enough, but this trade had been more prevalent, especially on the Mexican side, before 1848. Mexicans were not during this period generally trading with Indians who resided on reservations in the United States.[3]

Suffering and sacrifice as a result of Indian raids was not a new phenomenon for northern Mexico. Spanish colonials until the 1820s and Mexican settlers later had to devote considerable energy to defend themselves from the various Indian tribes. The

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[1]For general information concerning Indians and border problems, see Joseph A. Stout, Jr., *Apache Lightning: The Last Great Battles of the Ojo Caliente* (New York, 1974); Dan L. Trapp, *Victorio and the Mimbres Apaches* (Norman, 1974); Clarence C. Clendenen, *Blood on the Border: The United States Army and the Mexican Irregulars* (New York, 1969); Florence C. Lister and Robert H. Lister, *Chihuahua, Storehouse of Storms* (Albuquerque, 1966); Stuart F. Voss, *On the Periphery of Nineteenth-Century Mexico: Sonora and Sinaloa, 1810-1877* (Tucson, 1982); Hubert H. Bancroft, *History of the North Mexican States and Texas*, 2 vols. (San Francisco, 1889); W. H. Timmons, ed., *John F. Finerty Reports Porfirian Mexico, 1879* (El Paso, 1974).

[2]P. Roa to Secretaría de las Relaciones Exteriores, Washington, October 2, 1881; Archivo Histórico de las Relaciones Exteriores, 11-9-7, Tlatelólco, D. F. (hereafter cited as SRE).

[3]I wrote this paper in 1985, and since then have done considerable additional research into the subject. Apaches and other Indians did, particulary before 1848, often trade with one Mexican village while raiding another. This did not often occur, however, during the period covered in this paper. See also for this type of frontier raiding but in an earlier period, William B. Griffen, *Apaches at War and Peace: The Janos Presidio, 1750-1858* (Albuquerque, 1988); and Griffen, *Utmost Good Faith: Patterns of Apache-Mexican Hostilities in Northern Chihuahua Border Warfare, 1821-1848* (Albuquerque, 1988).

Spanish government during the early colonial era set policies for administering the borderlands and controlling marauding Indians from north of the Río Bravo. Decisions made in Spain or later in Mexico were not always applicable to the distant frontier of the Provincias Internas, for central government officials often overlooked the hostile nature of the environment and the dearth of population. Missions and presidios which Spain created along the edge of settlement and colonias militares which Mexico established were often too few, too widely scattered, and too undermanned to ensure much safety. In 1777 Don Teodoro de Croix, Comandante General de las Provincias Internas, indicated to his government that more soldiers would be needed to stabilize the frontier. He reported that Indians had killed 1674 people and captured 154 between 1771 and 1776, but the Spanish government turned a deaf ear to this report and frontier security continued to be left to local officials.[4]

Spanish soldiers never defeated the northern tribes militarily, so late in the eighteenth century Spain began a policy of supplying the Indians with items they requested and thus temporarily convinced the tribes to remain peaceful. With Mexican independence came renewed problems with the Apache. Mexico was so deeply involved with internal political affairs that little national effort could be devoted to the Indian problem. This was especially so in the frontier state of Chihuahua, which was left to resolve its own difficulties. The state was large and sparsely populated. Part of the population on the northern frontier was composed of Tarahumara Indians, who were not generally integrated into the mainstream of Mexican society.[5] Throughout its history as part of Spain and Mexico one of its primary problems was stopping the raiding of Apache and Comanche Indians who ranged several hundred miles on either side of the Río Bravo. The significant handicap in controlling hostile Indians was the dearth of population and the shortage of money to buy guns and ammunition. José María Sánchez, a prominent citizen of Chihuahua, expressed it best when he wrote in 1850 that the most pressing needs were "dinero y hombres, hombres y dinero".[6]

Following independence in 1821 government officials in Mexico City, far removed physically and emotionally from the frontier, did not attempt consistently to help the frontier states in resolving the Indian problem. The Mexican national government was to encounter too many other serious difficulties to focus much attention on the frontier. Political instability was a constant theme after independence from Spain as conservatives and liberals vied for power. War with the United States, French intervention, attempts at governmental reform, and the rise to power of Porfirio Díaz all created too many crises for the nation. But during the period between 1876 and 1886 Díaz slowly established more control over the central government which was reflected in additional assistance to frontier states which continued to be plagued with Indian difficulties. Long before any lasting changes could be made by the Díaz government, the Mexican national authorities had attempted to resolve the problem on the frontier. On July 19, 1848, President José Joaquín Herrera called for the establishment of colonias militares along the frontier bordering the United Sates. Although the Congress agreed and established the colonias, it did not provide sufficient funding for them to be effective. By 1851 the entire federal force stationed

[4]Alfred Barnaby Thomas, ed., *Teodoro de Croix and the Northern Frontier of New Sapin, 1776-1783* (Norman, 1941); John Francis Bannon, *The Spanish Borderlands Frontier, 1513-1821* (Albuquerque, 1979); Max L. Moorhead, *The Presidio, Bastion of the Spanish Borderlands* (Norman, 1975); Moorhead, *The Apache Frontier: Jacobo Ugarte and Spanish-Indian Relations in Northern New Spain, 1769-1791* (Norman, 1968).

[5]Alberto Calzadiaz Barrera, *Dos Gigantes: Sonora y Chihuahua*, 2 vols. (Hermosillo, 1964); Fernando Jordán, *Crónica de un país bárbaro* (Chihuahua, 1956); Francisco R. Alamada, *Resumen del Estado de Chihuahua* (Mexico City, 1955).

[6]*El faro, El Periódico Oficial del Gobierno del Estado de Chihuahua*, 2 April, 1850; The Francisco Alamda Collection of Ciudad Chihuahua papers, University of Texas at El Paso Archives. The official newspaper of the state had a variety of names during this period, so for consistency I have cited this publication as Periódico Oficial. I also want to thank Cesar Caballero of the UTEP library fro his asitance with this archive.

at the colonias militares in Chihuahua consisted of only 334 soldiers, 38 officers, and 322 settlers, most of the latter relatives of the soldiers.[7] But government officials in Chihuahua did not wait for the national government to solve the state's problems. On May 25, 1849, Chihuahua declared that the Apache menace was the most urgent item of business. In this Ley Cuarta, Chihuahua stated its aim of ridding the area of the Apaches, and to encourage this the state offered bounties of 200 pesos for each dead Apache and 250 for each one captured.[8] Despite these efforts Indian attacks upon Mexican property and citizens intensified between 1848 and 1876. By the latter date difficulties which had stood in the way of resolving Indian problems were beginning to subside, for the Mexican national government was better able to send a limited amount of guns and ammunition to the frontier. The government, however, remained unable to provide sufficient money and manpower to bring the Indian menace to an end.

By 1876 the United States had recovered sufficiently from the Civil War to propel thousands of new settlers southwestward into the borderlands, and with this expansion came renewed difficulties between settlers and Indians. The United States Army was assigned the task of confining Indians to reservations and of protecting the local settlers. Indians north of the border, especially the Apaches, refused to be quartered on these reservations and raided on both sides of the international boundary, particularly during the ten years after 1876.[9] The United States had been legally bound to stop raids originating north of the border, for Article 11 of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo ending the war with Mexico in 1848 had specified that the Unites States was to stop such attacks. Despite the fact that this obligation was officially abrogated by the Mesilla Treaty or Gadsden Purchase Agreement of 1854, Mexicans still believed that the United States was morally responsible for stopping the Indian raids.

The Unites States government also was experiencing internal political conflict which kept it from concentrating sufficient resources to control Indians north of the border. In the immediate post-Civil War period, the United States Congress quarreled over the army appropriations and on occasion did not finalize a bill until late summer of the budget year. In 1866 it was July before the Congress finished its work on the bill, and this provision merely placed more limits upon the army. As a consequence, by September, 1867, the peak strength of the army was 56,815. In March, 1869, Congress again engaged in heated debates over the army appropriations, reducing the size of the army to 37,313; and in 1874 it further reduced the total strength to 25,000 enlisted men and 2,000 officers. These reductions in size, dictated by declining appropriations, imposed severe handicaps on the army. In fact, rarely did army regimental rolls contain more than 19,000 troops. There were thus just 430 companies to man 200 posts, and companies were always under strength. With many troops occupying sections of the South until 1876, there were not enough men to deal with the Indian problems along the international border. The United States was therefore either unable or unwilling to concentrate enough manpower on the frontier to stop raiding along the border. Consequently, Mexicans would have to solve their problems in any way they could, despite the fact that the attacking Indians were quartered in the United States on Indian reservations, and that they used the Mexican frontier for their raids and as a hiding place to escape any pursuit which the army could mount.[10] Despite such handicaps the Unites States Army did apply pressure, albeit inconsistently at times, upon the Apaches north of the border. As the army became

[7] For a translation of the decree of July 19, 1948, see Odie B. Faulk, ed., "Projected Mexican Military Colonies for the Borderlands, 1848," *Journal of Arizona History*, 10 (1968), pp. 30-47.

[8] A. Terrazas Valdés, "El Salvajismo apache en Sonora," *Boletín de la Sociedad Chihuahuense de Estudios Históricos*, 8 (1950), pp. 372-374 (hereafter cited as *Boletín*).

[9] Several general sources are available; for example, see Dan L. Trapp, *The Conquest of Apacheria* (Norman, 1967).

[10] The best general source for the problems the army faced is Robert M. Utley, *Frontier Regulars: The United States Army and the Indian, 1866-1891* (Ney York, 1973).

more effective in dealing with Indians between 1876 and 1886, the problems for Mexico intensified.

In 1876 Chihuahua was still in the throes of the Díaz revolution, but the state did not ignore the plight of its northern settlers. State officials turned to Don Joaquín Terrazas, a member of a prominent Chihuahua family, and an experienced Indian fighter. During most of the period between 1876 and 1886 he was commander of the state militia, a group referred to in periodicals as voluntarios or vecinos.[11] In February, 1876, the Apaches began their raiding for the year by attacking the ranch of Don Luis Terrazas, former governor of the state. The Indians stole several head of cattle and wounded some of the ranch hands.[12] In March the same group of Apaches swept down upon the Hacienda de San Lorenzo and several other frontier villages. In almost every instance Joaquín Terrazas organized voluntarios and followed the fleeing Indians, and on this occasion he pursued them just across the international border into the United States and attacked their camp. He managed to capture one small Indian girl, but apparently did not kill anyone.[13] By November, 1876, the city of Chihuahua itself was threatened as Apache raids occurred within view of the city. In early November state governor Mariano Samaniego proclaimed that he was raising a force of 200 men to protect the city. He also called upon all citizens and businesses to contribute money to buy arms and ammunition, and subsequently individuals and businesses in Chihuahua City contributed more than three thousand pesos during each of several months.[14]

Indian attacks in Chihuahua worsened in 1877 as Apaches suffering under increasing pressure from the United States spent more time in Mexico. Mexicans insisted that cattle stolen from their ranches were being sold north of the border. One Mexican stated that when he or others asked ranchers north of the border for the return of their cattle "los Americanos les contestan con la pistola de revolver".[15] In exasperation some local Chihuahua political leaders asked the Mexican national government directly for assistance. Francisco Herrera, the jefe político at Canton Degollado, asked President Porfirio Díaz for arms and ammunition with which to protect his village.[16] Former governor Angel Trias, who was elected again later in 1877, also informed the national government that the Indians were armed with repeating rifles and had plenty of ammunition.[17] He told the officials in Mexico City that the Mexicans must be as well armed as the Indians if they were to survive, and asked for more federal troops to be stationed permanently along the frontier.

Nothing changed during 1878, as Indian raids continued to take a high toll. In May one group again attacked the large ranch of Don Luis Terrazas, stealing horses, cattle and sheep, and in the first week of July these same Apaches killed 49 residents near Degollado.[18] Federal troops quartered at Hoking campaigned in the region for several days in response to the losses, but the hostiles already had fled. Frontier residents each day reported to the state government the activities of the Indians, and atrocities were committed by both sides. C. Valeriano Varela appeared before government officials with the scalp of an Indian whom he had killed after the Indian had killed Varela's twelve-year-old son.[19] Government officials expressed sympathy, but raids continued throughout the year, always with the same results. Mexicans lost their lives and livestock

[11] D. Joaquín Terrazas, *Memorias del Sr. Coronel D. Joaquín Terrazas* (Juárez, 1905) (hereafter cited as Terrazas, *Memorias*).
[12] *Periódico Oficial*, 25 February 1876.
[13] Terrazas, *Memorias*, pp. 68-69; *Periódico Oficial*, 12 April 1876.
[14] *Periódico Oficial*, 10 November 1876.
[15] *El Guardia Nacional*, supplement to *Periódico Oficial*, 28 June 1877.
[16] SRE, 2-1-1771, 17 October 1878.
[17] Angel Trias to SRE, 20 August 1877; AREM 2-1-1786; see also *Periódico Oficial*, 6 August 1877.
[18] *Periódico Oficial*, 14 July 1878.
[19] *Ibid.*, 21 July 1878.

and the Indians fled safely back across the international border to the sanctuary of the reservations.

In November, 1879, General Gerónimo Treviño was placed in command of the few federal troops in Chihuahua.[20] Treviño removed Governor Angel Trias and named Don Luis Terrazas, who had earlier held the office, to the position of interim governor. Terrazas immediately recalled Joaquín Terrazas to organize voluntarios and to begin a new campaign against the Apaches. Treviño responded to the increased Indian raids by ordering Colonel Ponciano Cisneros and troops of the 9th Infantry into the field, and though Cisneros complied with his orders, he encountered no Apaches, but instead found evidence that the Indians had passed through the region. Meanwhile, Terrazas took the offensive, for he energetically drove his voluntarios to San Andrés and then on to known Apache camping areas near Laguna Guzmán, where he joined forces with Cisneros. Together the force traveled to Cantón Galeana, scene of recent Indian attacks, and there met with another seasoned veteran of the Indian wars, Juan Mata Ortiz. By the time the groups all met in Galeana, the Apaches again had fled north of the international border.[21] In December, 1879, The Apaches ended their raiding season by attacking the Hacienda del Carmen, where they killed one hundred head of cattle, drove off five hundred sheep, and killed one resident. They also attacked San Andrés, killing one woman and wounding several others, and on December 25, during the early evening, these same Apaches attacked Ascensión, stealing additional cattle.[22] Each of these attacks prompted punitive expeditions from the various villages and from Terrazas-led state forces, but the elusive Apaches always escaped capture and fled to safety across the border.

If any year in the Indian wars in Chihuahua could be considered the turning point when Mexican forces began to make progress toward controlling the Apaches, it was 1880, for by that year volunteers had received more arms from the national government, as well as more assistance from state and local funding. On January 19 Terrazas led 62 men out of Carrizal carrying supplies for one month in the field, and the troops remained almost constantly on the trail of the Indians during the entire month.[23] On January 27 Terrazas and his men joined Cisneros and federal troops which also had remained in the field during much of the month.[24] Terrazas learned that the hostiles were in the Bosque Redondo, and he wanted Cisneros to assist him in trying to surround them. Cisneros had other ideas, for he allegedly had received orders from his superiors to head for Nuevo León, but Terrazas doubted that Cisneros had received such orders and believed that Cisneros wished to avoid a confrontation with the Indians.[25]

Between 1876 and 1880 it was chief Victorio of the Mimbres (or Ojo Caliente) Apaches who was causing most of the difficulty for Chihuahua. Camping most of the time just south of the Río Bravo at Laguna Guzmán, Victorio systematically attacked ranches and small settlements all along the frontier. Terrazas led his troops toward the Apache camp, but somehow the Indians usually knew of his approach and had time to return to the United States.[26] Colonel Adolfo Valle, commander of a few federal troops at Hoking, could possibly have assisted Terrazas but told him that his men had been campaigning for a month and were exhausted, and their horses also needed to be rested and reshod.[27] Thus federal troops would not be of any help yet

[20]Terrazas, *Memorias*, p. 69.
[21]*Ibid.*, p. 70
[22]*Periódico Oficial*, 18, 25 December 1879.
[23]Enrique González Flores, *Chihuahua de la Independencia a la Revolución* (Mexico City, 1949).
[24]*Periódico Oficial*, 19 February 1880.
[25]Terrazas, *Memorias*, pp. 71-73; see also Manuel Romero, "Episodios de la lucha contra los indios salvajes," *Boletín*, 8 (1954), pp. 718-720.
[26]*Ibid*, p. 73
[27]Francisco R. Almada, "Los Apaches", *Boletín*, 2 (1939), pp. 5-15.

again, but Terrazas was as usual undaunted by this inactivity and determined to end the Apache menace without any federal assistance.

On May 27, 1880, Don Luis Terrazas was officially re-elected governor of the state. With this new mandate he felt it time to address the state legislature about the war against the Indians. He referred to Indians as a terrible plague and he recognized that it was not safe to travel the roads of the state. He told this group that Indian attacks were interfering with commerce and agriculture as well as taking many lives, and promised to do all in his power to put an end to the difficulties.[28] Between June and October the governor kept Joaquín Terrazas constantly pursuing the Apaches. In September the Apache raids reached a feverish level, but by this time more federal troops were in the field and Terrazas led about 500 voluntarios. Both groups campaigned constantly. Early in the month Apaches killed two men at Colonia de Guadalupe and wounded two others.[29] On October 1, 1880, Joaquín Terrazas sensed that an opportunity was nearing to settle old scores with Victorio. That day de divided his weary troops into two columns, one of which he led toward El Borracho and El Fierro, the other of which Mata Ortiz led toward Cantarrecio. Constantly marching, the two groups were to unite somewhere in the plains near Tres Castillos. On October 7, Terrazas sent Mata Ortiz and his column to Sesigua, while he led the other directly to Los Llanos de Los Castillos, and on October 11-12 Terrazas and his men marched all night, emerging at daylight near Tres Castillos.[30] By this time he knew that he had Victorio trapped in these hills, some sixty miles from the United States border. Mata Ortiz and his men arrived on October 14, and the two parties surrounded the Indians. Finally, on October 15 Terrazas attacked Victorio, killing the wily leader and most of the men in his group, and capturing a number of women, children, and old men.[31]

Although Joaquín Terrazas and his voluntarios had eliminated Victorio and most of his band, some members had not been present and remained at large to create trouble. More than 150 people had been killed in Chihuahua during the twelve months before Victorio's death, but his followers were not the only ones responsible for these losses.[32] Thus, although Joaquín Terrazas temporarily disbanded his voluntarios after Victorio's death the Apaches resumed their attacks in November, prompting renewed state efforts to respond militarily. Apaches led by Juh and Geronimo crossed the border, often attacking as widely as had Victorio. Between October and December, 1880, Apaches attacked Torreón, Encinillas, Aldamas, and other small settlements, and killed at least eight Mexicans, wounding five and capturing another.[33] In December Governor Luis Terrazas again called upon Joaquín for assistance, naming him Jefe de Armadas del Estado. Once again, as he had done so many times before, Terrazas organized his troops to pursue Apaches. During icy rain, snow, and high winds he drove his troops, remaining in the field most of the month of December.[34] He did not return to Chihuahua until January 5, 1881. By this time Terrazas did have more help from federal forces since Brigadier General Carlos Fuero, jefe de la Zona de Chihuahua y Durango, had arrived at the frontier, an aggressive officer more determined than his predecessors to end Indian raids on the frontier.

Terrazas and his second-in-command, Juan Mata Ortiz, were still the most vigorous in their military efforts. For the next six months the two were almost constantly in the field searching for Indians. In June, after a campaign of several weeks, Terrazas journeyed briefly to Chihuahua to tell the governor of the recent activities of the state

[28] *Periódico Oficial*, 5 June 1880; see also José Carlos Chávez, "Extinción de los apaches, Victorio," *Boletín*, 1 (1939), pp. 336-346.
[29] *Periódico Oficial*, 18, 20 September 1880.
[30] Terrazas, *Memorias*, pp. 70-78.
[31] *Ibid.*
[32] *Periódico Oficial*, 30 October 1880.
[33] *Ibid.*, 27 November 1880.
[34] *Ibid.*, 25 December 1880.

forces, and ask for more manpower, guns and ammunition with which to continue his pursuits. Early in July the Apaches attacked a *coche-correo* running between Paso del Norte and Chihuahua, killing the *cochero*, one American, and burning the coche, and three days later near Charcos de Grado Apaches killed three more individuals. So in mid-July Terrazas again took to the field, departing from Carrizal and leading his men toward the Río Bravo, after the trail of the fleeing hostiles led north of the border once again.[35]

Throughout the rest of 1881 and into the next year the Apaches continued to exact a high toll. The Jefe Político of Cantón Degollado reported in January of 1882 that Indians had killed two people and wounded three more at Dolores, and during February these same Indians killed three more, wounded six, and captured three citizens from Cantón Rosales.[36] Terrazas spent most of this year campaigning against Juh or Geronimo. On one occasion he met with Juh and told him to convince the other Apaches to come to a meeting with state officials so that perhaps a peace settlement would be reached, but the Apaches' leaders refused to conform to the guidelines Terrazas offered.[37] By September of 1882 the local leaders in Canton Degollado were claiming that an additional forty persons had been killed in or near their settlement in the past year. Apaches also had driven off hundreds of head of cattle, sheep, and horses. Travelers on any of the roads in the frontier were not safe from these attacks.[38] Terrazas suffered a setback during the fall, for on the morning of November 13 Juh and a band of Apaches trapped Mata Ortiz and 21 of his men in an indefensible position, and annihilated them. Mata Ortiz had been a respected frontier citizen and valued Indian fighter, and his death elicited a barrage of anger, much of it directed at the United States.[39] One individual lamented that "mil veces hemos dicho que ese cruel azote de nuestra frontera no es posible que cese, mientras en el territorio Americano se mencione, se arme, se proteja y se azuce a los bárbaros como se hace actualmente con flagrante violación de los más sagrados principios del derecho de gentes".[40]

By early 1883 Mexican voluntarios were better armed then ever before. Colonel Diego M. Guerra, an aggressive and experienced officer, assumed command of the federal troops on the frontier. In January Terrazas surrendered command of frontier voluntarios to this Mexican regular army officer, but groups from various cantones continued to operate somewhat independently in response to attacks. In January voluntarios from Degollado trapped and killed twelve Apaches from Juh's group, and captured 33 of the band. The voluntarios had pursued the Indians for eleven days in a near blizzard, and they fought for three and one-half hours.[41] In February Apaches attacked Casas Grandes and drove off almost 300 head of cattle.[42] In May Colonel Guerra campaigned throughout northern Chihuahua but found only the bones of cattle which the Indians had slaughtered.[43] Pressure from Mexican federal troops and the efforts of state voluntarios were finally paying off, and Indian raids had been declining since the death of Victorio. In October of 1883 several Apaches appeared at Casas Grandes asking for peace. Some returned several times thereafter, but the young men had not come with them and thus no settlement could be reached.[44]

[35]Terrazas, *Memorias*, pp. 80-84.
[36]*Periódico Oficial*, 4 February 1882.
[37]*Ibid.*, 15 July 1882.
[38]*Ibid.*, 2 September 1882.
[39]Terrazas, *Memorias*, pp. 90-91.
[40]*Periódico Oficial*, 25 November 1882.
[41]*Ibid.*, 10 February 1883.
[42]*Ibid.*, 24 February 1883.
[43]*Ibid.*, 16 June 1883.
[44]José Carlos Chávez, "Extinción de los apaches, Indio Juh," *Boletín* 1 (1939), pp. 355-357, 376-377.

Between January 1884 and 1886 fewer raids occurred partly because of the increased control the United States was finally exercising over the Indians on the reservations, and partly as a result of the growing efficiency of the Mexican federal forces and voluntarios. Indian attacks still occurred during this period, but loss of life declined greatly as did losses of cattle, sheep, and horses. Joaquín Terrazas remained ready to campaign against the Apaches and on numerous occasions led voluntarios in the field for days at a time. His efforts continued until September, 1886, when he was accidently shot in the arm. The arm had to be amputated and his convalescence demanded more than six months. By the time he recovered, the United States Army had finally captured Geronimo, and most of the troublesome Apaches had been confined to reservations far from the international border.

It is clear from the events which occurred between 1876 and 1886 that the people of Chihuahua suffered such extreme hardships as a result of Indian attacks that they generally would not have assisted the Apaches. A few individuals on each side of the border undoubtedly did continue trade with the Indians, but the number of Mexicans killed, wounded, or made captive precluded most Mexicans having a tolerant attitude toward the raiders from north of the border. Almost everyone on the Mexican frontier recognized that the state's economy was unstable owing to the problems of protecting transportation and the incessant stealing of cattle, horses, mules, and sheep by the Apaches.

That the state of Chihuahua and the residents of the frontier were willing to sacrifice to bring an end to the Apache raids was illustrated by the willingness of the voluntarios to follow Joaquín Terrazas in the field for months at a time looking for the hostiles, and by the fact that the state and its people were willing to devote a considerable amount of personal and state funds to the campaigns. Chihuahua did not have a large or consistent state income, and it needed to fund public education and to pay the normal costs of the government. Nevertheless, the state devoted on the average approximately twenty percent of each month's budget during this ten-year period to *seguridad pública*. During some months the percentage was considerably higher. Between October 1, 1877, and March 1, 1878, the state spent $12,330.11 for public defense--mostly to fight Indians-- out of a total budget of $62,027.22 pesos. No other state expenditure amounted to even half that outlay.[45] In April of 1878 the state dedicated $1,619.16 out of $8,377.08 pesos for this purpose,[46] and similarly disproportiate sums in July 1878 and the first six months of 1879. The government in Mexico City was aware of the continuing difficulties on the frontier and of the need for additional financial assistance. On one occasion the government sent $300,000 pesos to the frontier officials to buy arms and ammunition, and Chihuahua received $60,000 pesos of this amount, not sufficient to solve the problems but surely evidence that the national government wished to help.[47]

Victorio and his band caused considerable trouble during 1880, and the Chihuahuenses were determined to put an end to his activities. More state resources were used this year to fight Indians than ever before or later. Governor Luis Terrazas also sought to generate enthusiasm by offering a $2,000-peso reward for Victorio, dead or alive. In addition, the governor asked again that individuals and businesses make donations to help buy arms and ammunition, and many who had already been making monthly contributions increased their offerings.[48] The state also raised its contribution to *seguridad pública*, and as in the previous several months, a special appropriation for Indian fighting was passed. In October alone the state and

[45] *Periódico Oficial*, 2 December 1878.
[46] *Ibid.*, 25 August 1878.
[47] SRE, 2-1-1776, July 19, 1877; see also Ulíses Irigoyen, "El problema económico de las ciudades fronterizas," *Boletín*, 4 (1882), pp. 64-68.
[48] *Periódico Oficial*, 1 May 1880.

individual citizens contributed $16,119.73 pesos to fight Indians. The total state budget, including donations from individuals to continue the war against the Apaches, was $33,978.65 pesos. Governor Luis Terrazas, for instance, gave the state 600 pesos, and other prominent citizens made large contributions.[49] After the death of Victorio, Chihuahua continued to fund fighting against the Indians. In February 1881 the state spent $9,790.18 out of $54,497.63 for defense,[50] and as late as December of 1883 Chihuahua spent $14,280.61 out of $24,433.13 pesos to pay voluntarios and buy additional supplies for them to continue their pursuit of the hostiles.[51] Although the frequency and intensity of the Indian raids declined after 1883, especially, as late as April 1886 the state still spent $2,012.40 out of $14,147.70 pesos for public defense.[52]

It seems apparent that with the sacrifices which the Chihuahuenses made to resolve the Indian problem, no charge that they aided or abetted raiding Indians could be realistic.[53] In fact, between 1876 and 1886, as Mexican national politics slowly stabilized, the government was able to help Chihuahua more consistently by ordering some troops to the frontier and sending additional supplies for volunteers in Chihuahua. Thus after 1886 federal troops did the majority of the Indian fighting. Chihuahua, however, had born the largest amount of the responsibility between 1876 and 1886. The state raised money for guns, ammunition, and payments to volunteers. In also had devoted a significant share of it monthly revenue to such purposes, and its citizens willingly joined the state voluntario units in an effort to curtail the Apache depredations. The states of New Mexico and Texas, across the international border, suffered Indian attacks just as did the Mexican frontier. There the Unites States Army was responsible for controlling the Indians, but the army was limited by Congressional refusal to fund enough troops. Moreover, pay and allowances were often so poor that the army seldom could keep its regiments up to authorized strength. The United States, with vastly superior resources, did not sacrifice or contribute as much as it could have to resolve the Indian problem. Mexico, and Chihuahua particularly, suffered and contributed more in relation to resources than the richer and better prepared United States.

[49] *Ibid.*, 4 December 1880.
[50] *Ibid.*, 6 March 1881.
[51] *Ibid.*, 19 April 1884.
[52] *Ibid.*, 8 May 1886.
[53] Mexican Minister in Washington to SRE, October 2, 1886, AREM, 11-9-7, SRE. *The Washington Post* carried an article charging Mexicans with helping the Apaches..