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p. 317-336

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Donald F. Stevens*

Conditions and Convictions: Social Aspects of Political Factionalism in Early Republican Mexico City

Historians have long debated the relationship between political convictions and social conditions in nineteenth-century Mexico. Some have speculated that political positions coincided with social divisions; others have argued that they did not. Each position has a long tradition. The proposition that social and political characteristics are not closely related has two main variations. For close to fifty years historians have elaborated on hypotheses that the social background of politicians was unrelated to ideology because stated political programs were sported frivolously to mask individual ambition. Politicians were merely opportunistic caudillos who used "the then- fashionable labels of liberalism and conservatism... to cover their personal rivalries".[1] In this tradition, politics provided an avenue of social mobility for those eager to pillage the treasury. There would be no correlation between social and political divisions, according to this thesis, because caudillos adopted ideologies to hide their true intentions, and could alter, exchange, or drop these pretenses as the occasion demanded. Social stratification, then, was not a real obstacle to individual ambition since violence enabled the caudillo to improve his personal economic position. Entry into the political elite was possible for those of any social background, even the most humble.

The tradition that political ideology was unrelated to social characteristics has a second and more recent variation. Since the late 1960s, ever larger numbers of historians of Latin America have proposed that the family rather than the individual is the appropiate unit of analysis.[2] Recent studies of investment and business interests have noted the tendency of families to diversify their investments, suggesting that those owning substantially the same kinds and amounts of property were likely to have been equally divided on political matters, and that there would be no clear social or property contrasts among political factions. In any event, such studies argue, politicians were more likely to act in the interest of extended family and diversified businesses rather than narrow individual or political interests.[3] Thus political conflicts were incidental rather than substantial.

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[1]Jacques Lambert, *Latin America: Social Structure and Political Institutions* (Berkeley, 1967), p. 156. See also William H. Beezley "Caudillismo: An Interpretative Note", *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs,* 11 (1969), pp. 345-352; Merle Kling, "Towards a Theory of Power and Political Instability in Latin America," *Western Political Quaterly,* 9 (1956), pp. 21-35; Eric R. Wolf and Edward C. Hansen, "*Caudillo* Politcs: A Structural Analysis," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 9 (1967), pp. 168-179. Antonio López de Santa Anna, president of Mexico on eleven separate occasions, has been the principal example of this phenomenon. For instance, see Michael C. Meyer and William L. Sherman, *The Course of Mexican History* (New York, 1979), pp. 332-333; Frank N. Samponaro, "Santa Anna and the Abortive Anti-Federalist Revolt of 1833 in Mexico," *The Americas,* 40 (1983), pp. 95-107; Leslie Byrd Simpson, "Santa Anna's Leg," in his *Many Mexicos* (Berkeley, 1941), pp. 202-226; Fernando Díaz Díaz, *Caudillos y caciques; Antonio López de Santa Anna y Juan Alvarez* (Mexico City, 1972); and Wilfred Hardy Callcott, *Santa Anna: The Story of an Enigna Who Once Was Mexico* (Norman, 1936).

[2]See the review essay by Elizabeth Kuznesof and Robert Oppenheimer,"The Family and Society in Nineteenth-Century Latin America: An Historiographical Introduction," *Joural of Family History*, 10 (1985), pp. 215-234. Diana Balmori, "The Family and Politics: Three Generations (1790-1890)," *Journal of Family History,* 10 (1985), pp. 247-257, concludes (p. 256): "In nineteenth-century Latin America political institutions were less important than families and many political structures were in fact the institutionalization of a dimension of family activity."

[3]For general trends, see John E. Kicza, "The Role of the Family in Economic Development in Nineteenth-Century Latin America," *Journal of Family History*, 10 (1985), pp. 235-246. The risks of clear identification of family business with distinct political factions are evident from studies of families that did not diversify: the Martínez del Río and the Sánchez Navarro

This recent trend in family history is in part a reaction to another, older tradition in which political positions were thought to coincide with the broader social divisions of class or status, or with geography. For at least thirty years, some historians have emphasized occupational groups as the key to political divisions. On the one hand, those who had prospered under Spanish rule --wealthy landowners, monopolistic merchants, and the upper ranks of the ecclesiastical and military hierarchies-- are supposed to have provided the basis for conservative support. The lower clergy and military, professionals, and merchants who were victims of monopoly, on the other hand, allegedly supported the liberals.[4] But research on the occupations of Mexican politicians has provided few clues to the origins of political divisions. Richard Sinkin, in his pioneering quantitative study of mid-nineteenth-century Mexican politics, found that 67 percent of the delegates to the convention that wrote the liberal Constitution of 1857 were either lawyers or military men.[5] Recent research on Mexican politicians of the early nineteenth century closely parallels Sinkin's earlier results. Over 64 percent of the 208 presidents and cabinet ministers studied who served between 1824 and 1867 were either lawyers or military officers, and differences among radicals, moderates, and conservatives were relatively minor.[6] Despite the traditional wisdom, occupation is not a reliable guide to political divisions.

In much the same way, regional interpretations have been developed to explain political divisions. David Brading offered the most precise modern explanation of the geographical origins of early republican political conflict more than ten years ago, suggesting that differences between liberals and conservatives might be related to regional variation in social structure. He proposed the existence of two regions which gave rise to competing liberal and conservative politicians: a central conservative core surrounding Mexico City, the administrative seat of both the Aztec empire and the colony of New Spain, and a "Liberal Crescent", consisting of "a vast arc of territory stretching from Guerrero, through Michoacán, Jalisco, part of Guanajuato, Zacatecas, and San Luis Potosí to Veracruz".[7] Over the years, Brading's hypothesis has enjoyed wide acceptance as an emplanation of the relationship between early republican politics and society, despite the fact that the hypothesis has not been confronted with the available evidence. In fact, comparison of the bithplaces of presidents and cabinet ministers from 1824 to 1867 does not confirm the hypothesis as originally stated. Table 1 compares the politics of presidents and cabinet ministers born in Mexico City and the region that is now the states of Mexico, Hidalgo, and Puebla. More liberals than conservatives were born in the region Brading specified as the conservative core. Even restricting the definition of the conservative core to the boundaries of Mexico City provides no more than a slight conservative majority of 51 percent. Liberals as well as conservatives were born in the core region.

families each suffered major losses when the liberals finally defeated the conservatives in the 1860s; see David W, Walker, *Kinship, Business, and Politcs: The Martínez del Río Family in Mexico, 1823-1867* (Austin, 1986), and Charles H. Harris, III, *A Mexican Family Empire: The Latifundio of the Sánchez Navarro, 1765-1867* (Austin, 1975).

[4]Jesús Reyes Heroles, *El liberalismo mexicano,* 3 vols. (Mexico City, 1956-61), vol. 2, pp. 107-111; François Chevalier, "Conservateurs et libéraux au Mexique: Essai du sociologie et géographie politiques de l'independence a l'intervention française," *Cahiers d'Histoire Mondiale,* 8 (1964), pp. 457-474; Michael P. Costeloe, *La primera república federal en México (1824-1835): un estudio de los partidos políticos en el México independiente* (Mexico City, 1975), pp. 438-439.

[5]Richard Sinkin, "The Mexican Constitutional Congress, 1856-1857: A Statistical Analysis," *Hispanic American Historical Review,* 53 (1973), pp. 2-3; and see also the same author's *The Mexican Reform, 1855-1876: A Study of Liberal Nation-Building* (Austin, 1979), pp. 31-54.

[6]More moderate liberals were lawyers (40 percent of the moderates compared with 28 percent of the radicals and 26 percent of the conservatives). About 40 percent of the moderates and conservatives held military commissions, but only 28 percent of the radicals were army or militia officers; Donald Fithian Stevens, "Instability in Mexico from Independence to the War of the Reform" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 1984). Although rough occupational categories do not reveal major differences among radicals, moderates, and conservatives, important differences were found in career patterns and varieties of military experience.

[7]D.A. Brading, "Creole Nationalism and Mexican Liberalism," *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs,* 15 (1973), p. 185. Brading restates a hypothesis that goes back at least as far as Henry Bamford Parkes, *A History of Mexico* (Boston, 1938), p. 180.

Table 1

Political Affiliation of Presidents and Cabinet Ministers (1824-1867) Born in Brading's "Conservative Core" and in Mexico City

	"Conservative Core" (inc. Mexico City)	Mexico City
Liberals	28 (55%)	18 (49%)
Conservatives	23 (45%)	19 (51%)
Total	51	37

Source: D.F. Stevens, "Instability in Mexico from Independence to the War of the Reform" (Ph. D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 1984).
Notes: "Conservative Core" includes birthplaces in what are now the City of Mexico and the states of Hidalgo, Mexico, and Puebla.

Table 2

Political affiliation by Birthplace: Expanded Categories

	Mexico City	Other Regions	Total
Radicals	5 (12%) (14%)	36 (88%) (26%)	41
Moderates	13 (27%) (35%)	36 (73%) (26%)	49
Conservatives	19 (22%) (51%)	68 (78%) (48%)	87
Total	37	140	177

Source: See Table 1.

Drawing distinctions between moderate and radical liberals, however, helps to clarify the relationship between birth in Mexico City and political factionalism.[8] As Table 2 illustrates, only a minority of each group was born in Mexico City but the percentages of conservatives and moderates are roughly twice as high as the percentage of radicals. Twelve percent of the radicals, 27 percent of the moderates, and 22 percent of the conservatives were born in Mexico City. Conservatives were the largest single group connected by birth to the city of Mexico. Of those presidents and cabinet ministers born in the national capital, about half (51 percent) grew up to be conservatives. Most of the remainder (35 percent) became moderates and only a small minority (14 percent) radicals. The vast majority of the radicals (88 percent) were born in the provinces. Thus, there is some evidence to support the traditional identification of radicals with the provinces and conservatives with the national capital, but the identifications are not as strong or complete as has been thought. While the detail of Brading's hypothesis has not been confirmed, the fundamental relationship between region and politics is clearly complex and worthy of further study.[9]

The relationship between a regional social structure and the social origns of politicians from that region is problematic, given the potential ecological fallacy.[10] That is, we can imagine a connection between the social characteristics of a region and groups from that region, but aggregate data may obscure the connections between these varibles at the individual level. Even if conservatives were more likely to be born into the area of high elite concentration in Mexico City, that does not mean that they were more likely to be members of that elite itself. Data aggregated at a regional level may hide rather than reveal the relationship between variables at the individual level. The relationship between political and social positions in Mexico City can be examined by studying the relationship between individual politicians and social stratification in the national capital. The 1848 census of Mexico City provides the opportunty to examine the social variation among the politically active members of the elite.[11] Of approximately 200 individuals who held office as president or cabinet minister between Independence and the Wars of the Reform and French Intervention, 52 were listed in the census.[12] A few examples will illustrate the possibilites of linking conventional political information to the evidence from the census.[13]

José María Jauregui, a 53-year-old native of Veracruz, acted as Minister of Justice for a few weeks during the chaotic days during the United States invasion of Mexico en 1847, but little is known about his political opinions. Either he was fairly modest or the census taker was perfunctory, for his occupation is listed in the census as merely "employee". Jauregui and his twenty-year-old wife were childless and had no domestic servants in the household. They shared a modest apartment, the same three rooms Jauregui had occupied for the last nine years in a house owned by the Hospital de Jesús, to which they paid eight pesos a month in rent.

[8]Most historians of nineteenth-century Mexico recognize a distinction between moderates and "democratic liberals" or "puros". For a more detailed treatment of how I have applied these categories, see Stevens, "Instability in Mexico," Chapters 4-6 and Appendix.

[9]The strong relationship between moderate liberals and the national capital is particularly intriguing. Perhaps the common experience of birth in the nation's largest, wealthiest, and most powerful city gave many moderate liberals and conservatives a common ground not shared by the radicals.

[10]On the ecological fallacy see the classic statement by William S. Robinson, "Ecological Correlations and the Behavior of Individuals", *American Sociological Review*, 15 (1950), pp. 351-357. For a more recent treatment of the significance of this problem and suggested remedies, see Laura Irwin Landbein and Allan J. Lichtman, *Ecological Inference*, Sage University Paper series on Quantitative Applications in the Social Sciences, no. 07-010 (Beverly Hills, 1978).

[11]Padrón Municipalidad de México (1848), Archivo del Antiguo Ayuntamiento (Mexico City), v. 3408-3409.

[12]These 52 are listed in an appendix to this paper. The census usually lists the address, portion of the dwelling occupied, the names of heads of household and residents, age, marital status, origin, occupation, length of residence, rent paid or value of the property if the resident is the owner, and the name of the owner of the property. Some of those carrying out the census consistently failed to note some of the information, especially the names or numbers of residents other than the head of household.

[13]There remainder of the biographical information included in these sketches is taken principally from *Diccionario Porrúa de historia, biografía y geografía de México*, 4th ed. (Mexico City 1986). The examples included the three households with fewest servants and the three households with the most servants.

Juan Pablo Anaya, born in Lagos, Jalisco in 1785, had joined the insurgents when Hidalgo took Guadalajara in November of 1810 but was involved in little combat. He seconded the Plan of Iguala in 1821 and was raised to General de Brigada in 1823. By 1848 he was an elderly military officer and political moderate who had served briefly as Minister of War in 1833. He and his wife had lived alone for almost a year at Monte Pío number 1, which they rented from a private landlord, Don Mariano P. Castro, for 15 pesos per month.

Miguel María Arrioja, born in the city of Puebla in 1807, would make his reputation as a radical and later serve as Minister of Foreign Relations for a month in 1855 during the administration of Juan Alvarez. In 1848, he was employed in the government and living at Santa Brígida y Letrán number 1 with his wife, a daughter, and three sons, but no servants. The family had occupied the house for about five years, paying a rather substantial 90 pesos a month in rent to the convent of Santa Brígida.

Juan Rondero was a merchant born in Puebla in 1802. In 1847 he had served half a year as Minister of Hacienda. A political moderate, Rondero was evidently prosperous, living with his wife, five children, two employees, and ten household servants in a house he owned, valued at $14,000 pesos. The house sheltered not only Rondero's large family, his employees, and his numerous servants, but a number of others as well; but he was not so prosperous that he was averse to the additional income gained by renting portions of the house to others for a total of 30 pesos per month.

A prominent lawyer and political radical born in Orizaba, Veracruz in 1803, José Bernardo Couto had received his law degree at the Colegio de San Ildefonso in Mexico City. Later he represented his home state many times in the national legislature, and was appointed to the post of Minister of Justice in 1845. By 1848, Couto had been living for seven years in a large house at Acequia number 7 with his wife and four children. Couto was apparently quite well-off, since the family was attended by 14 servants. In an age when 90 percent of the city's elite rented their residences, Couto owned his own home, which was valued at $22,500.

Luis Gonzaga Cuevas was known as a political conservative with considerable experience in government. Born in Lerma in the state of Mexico in 1800, he also received his law degree from the Colegio de San Ildefonso in Mexico City. He made a profession of the Foreign Service; by 1848 he had already served seven terms either as Minister of Foreign Relations or as Minister of Government. He would later serve as Minister of Foreign Relations for Félix Zuloaga and the conservatives during the War of the Reform. In addition to his government service, Cuevas managed his investments; his occupation is listed in the census as "propietario".

Table 3

Frequency of Household Sizes for National Political Elite, Mexico City, 1848

Household Size	Frecuency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
2 - 5	7	16.2	16.2
6 - 8	11	25.6	41.9
9 - 11	11	25.6	67.4
12 - 7	8	18.7	86.0
18 - 23	6	14.0	100.0

Statistics: Mean = 10.4
Median = 10.0
Mode = 7.0
Std. Dev. = 5.4
Minimum = 2.0
Maximum = 23.0
N = 43

Sources: See appendix.

Table 4

Analysis of Covariance: Household Size by Politics, Political Endurance, and Marital Status, with Age of tenant and Years in residence held constant

Grand mean= 9.97			
Variable + Category	N	Unadjusted Dev'n Eta	Adjusted for Independents + Covariates Dev'n Beta
Politics			
0 Unknown	6	1.53	1.18
1 Radical	6	-3.64	-2.59
2 Moderate	9	0.36	-0.26
3 Conservatives	17	0.56	0.64
		0.32	0.24
Political endurance			
0 Up to 3 Months	12	-1.47	-2.62
14 to 11	13	-0.05	-0.37
212 Plus	13	1.41	2.79
		0.23	0.44
Marital status			
1 Single	8	-2.47	-4.18
2 Married	25	0.95	1.51
3 Widowed	5	-0.77	-0.87

Statistics Source of variation	Sum of Squares	DF	Mean Square	F	Signif of F
Covariates	17.264	2	8.632	0.366	0.696
Age	4.446	1	4.446	0.189	0.667
Years	16.268	1	16.268	0.691	0.413
Main effects	290.210	7	41.459	1.760	0.135
Politics	46.921	3	15.640	0.664	0.581
Endurance	124.241	2	62.120	2.637	0.089
Marital status	114.264	2	57.132	2.426	0.107
Explained	307.474	9	34.164	1.450	0.215
Residual	659.499	28	23.554		
Total	966.974	37	26.134		

N=38, Multiple r squared=0.318. Multiple r=0.564.
Sources: See appendix

He lived with his wife and three young children at Montealegre number 9, along with 15 servants and their two children. The family enjoyed the attentions of a doorman, a housekeeper, a cook, a coachman, a footman, and numerous specialized maids. Despite the evident luxury of abundant household servants and his profession as a property-owner, Cuevas did not own the building where he lived. It belonged to a Don José María Cuevas, almost certainly a close relative, to whom he paid only 60 pesos per month in rent.

These examples suggest both the wealth of information that can be gleaned from the census and the complexity of any relationship between social conditions and political convictions. There was considerable variation between these individuals in their political positions, in the size and composition of their households, in the numbers of servants they employed, in their length of residence and political service, in their regional origins, in the value and ownership of their dwellings. But studied together, these variables can provide a clearer indication of the relationship between society and politics in mid nineteenth-century Mexico.

An anecdotal approach can suggest possibilities, but quickly becomes bogged down in the fascinating facets of particular cases; the examples cited earlier are only six of several dozen candidates. Clearly a multivariate statistical analysis is in order to distinguish among the effects of the different variables and to attempt to describe the essential structure beneath the delicate ornamentation of the individual experiences, and the complex interrelationships between multiple variables. For example, we could use household size as a proxy for social class. The size of household is generally a good indication of its social status. Historians and sociologists of the family have found a remarkable degree of consistency in the size of the average household over the last several centuries. From England to Latin America, the mean size of the household has remained fairly constant at about five, while varying somewhat with social class and economic means. The more prosperous have generally had large households, and the lower classes smaller.[14] By this standard, most of the households of the mid-nineteenth-century political elite were large. Of the 43 politicians whose households were enumerted in the census, more than 80 percent had six or more members, and more than half had 9 or more people living under the same roof. At the same time, there was considerable variation among this political elite with households ranging in size from 2 to more than 20. Even if household size is closely correlated with social class, we would still expect the number of people living under the same roof to vary not only according to social status, wealth, or political philosophy, but with a number of other factors which reflect the stage in the life-cycle of the head of household, and factors such as age and marital status. We would not want to confuse the effects of these other factors with those bearing directly on the question of social stratification and political ideas. For example, middle-aged married couples will usually have larger households on average than single young men or elderly widowers. We would expect these variables --age and marital status-- to be independent of social class and politics. In the same way, those prominent politicians who achieved a greater degree of success might be expected to have larger households than those with similar ideas who were not as successful in holding high office.

Such complications call for an approach which can separate the effects of the different variables. Analysis of covariance is a statistical technique that compares the effects of independent categorical divisions (called "factors") of a group on a continuous dependent variable measured at the interval level (in this case household size). At the same time, analysis of covariance adjusts for continuous variables (called covariates). This provides a correction for interval level independent variables considered peripheral to this study: the age of the tenant and the number of years the family has occupied the dwelling. In other

[14]For Latin America, see Elizabeth Kuznesof and Robert Oppenheimer, "The Family and Society in Nineteenth-Century Latin America: An Historiographical Introduction," *Journal of Family History,* 10 (1985), pp. 215-234 and the works cited therein. For England, see the essays by Peter Laslett, Richard Wall, and W.A. Armstrong, in Laslett, ed., *Household and Family in Past Time* (Cambridge, 1972), especially pp. 126, 154, 207.

words, by distinguishing among the effects of the factors and covariates, analysis of covariance can determine whether conservatives, moderates, or radical liberals tended to have distinctly different size households without regard to their ages, marital status, political durability, or length of residence in 1848.[15]

Table 4 displays the results of this analysis of covariance in multiple classification analysis format, permitting the comparison of means of subgroups as deviation from the "grand mean" for all groups, 9.97 members per household. The results are presented showing both "unadjusted" and "adjusted" deviations. The column labeled "unadjusted deviation" at the center of the table shows variations in group means before considering the effects of the covariates and other independent variables. Deviations "adjusted" for independent variables and covariates appear in the column at the right side of the table. The "adjusted" figures show variation in the group means after taking into account the effects of the other factors and covariates; they avoid confusing the effects of multiple variables. For the independent variables studied in this table, the adjusted deviations refine the size of the deviations but do not change the relative positions of the groups. These results confirm the speculation that household size varied with politics, success, and marital status. Single men tended to have substantially smaller households with more than four fewer residents than the overall average. Married men averaged households slightly larger than the grand mean, while widowers tended to have somewhat smaller households.

The factor "political endurance" divides the renters into three groups of nearly equal size depending on the total number of months during his political career that each occupied a ministry or the presidency. The ability to maintain a long political career at the cabinet level is linked to socio-economic status, as indicated by the size of the family. Those who held a prominent position for a total of 12 months or more had an average of nearly three additional members resident in their households. Those with relatively average careers (totaling from 4 to 11 months in office) fall very close to the mean household size. The least prominent or enduring politicians averaged nearly three persons less than the mean and more than five residents less than the households of the most politically prominent. These results show a positive correlation between political endurance and household size; those presidents and cabinet ministers who served the longest terms tended to have the largest households.

Radicals, moderates, and conservatives were all members of a social elite with households larger than the rest of the population, but the average size of their households varied between groups. After taking into account the effects of these other variables, there is some evidence that political convictions varied with social status. Moderates averaged households only slightly smaller than the mean for the elite as a whole, while conservatives tended to have slightly larger households. Both moderates and conservatives averaged households of about ten members, while radicals averaged smaller households by two to three members. Radicals tended to have considerably smaller households of between seven and eight residents, much closer to the average of the population as a whole. The variation among the mean sizes of the households of the political elite is consistent with the thesis that their ideas varied with social status and that the radicals were likely to be less prosperous than the moderates or the conservatives.

The correlation between politics and household size raises other important questions. Those whose political positions could not be readily determined averaged the largest households, an observation that is difficult to explain. Part of the anomaly may result from the inadequacy of household size as a proxy for social status. Since households were composed of both family members and servants, the aggregate number of persons housed under a single roof may confound indications of social status with other preferences. A

[15]The results presented in the following tables were calculated by subprogram ANOVA of SPSSX, release 2.1, using a classical experimental approach. Interaction effects were not statistically significant. See SPSS Inc., *SPSSX User's Guide* (New York, 1986), pp. 450-463.

larger household might indicate only a desire to gather more family members under the same roof, or it may indicate the necessity of crowding more of the family together to save on housing costs. At the same time, a large household may indicate that the family enjoyed the services of numerous domestic servants, or a large household might require that the housekeeping chores be carried out by numerous family members working at home, a potentially degrading inconvenience in an elite

Table 5

Frequency Distribution of Household Servants for National Political Elite, Mexico City, 1848

Number of Household Servants	Frequency	Cumulative Percent	Percent
0	3	7.0	7.0
1-2	11	25.6	32.6
3	10	23.3	55.9
4-6	13	30.2	86.1
7-15	6	13.9	100.0

Statistics: Mean= 4.1
Median= 3.0
Mode= 3.0
Std. Dev.= 3.4
Minimum= 0.0
Maximum= 15.0
N= 43

Sources: See appendix.

society that devalued manual labor. The number of servants in the household might be a better indication of wealth and social positiion than household size alone.

Silvia Arrom has suggested that the number of live-in servants is "perhaps the best single indicator of status in nineteenth-century Mexico".[16] From her analysis of the 1848 census, Arrom concluded that the upper class regularly employed at least three live-in servants in each household. This upper class may have constituted as much as 4 percent of the population of the capital and included the wealthy nobles, miners, and merchants, and the top levels of the governmental, ecclesiastical, and military bureaucracies. The next 18 percent of the population she describes as intellectuals, clerks, professionals, and more modest businessmen, clergy, and military, as well as the most prosperous artisans and shopkeepers, who were still part of the *gente decente*. This "middle class" lived quite comfortably and enjoy the services of one or two live-in servants.

The data in table 5 show that the households of the political elite varied considerably in the number of domestics they employed. Very few had no live-in servants at all, roughly one-quarter lived "middle class" lives with one or two household servants, and the rest of the political elite --more than two- thirds of the total-- maintained conspicuously upper-class households with three or more servants. This would place most elite politicians among the top 4 percent of the population of Mexico City. Since the national capital was the center of wealth and privilege in Mexico, this would probably mean that most of the political elite were part of an even smaller and distinctly prosperous percentage of the

[16]Silvia Marina Arrom, *The Women of Mexico City, 1790-1857* (Stanford, 1985), p. 7.

Table 6

Analysis of Covariance: Number of Domestic Servants by Politics, Political Endurance, and Marital Status, with age of tenant, Years in residence and Family size held constant

Grand Mean=3.71				Adjusted for Independents	
Variable+Category	N	Unadjusted		+Covariates	
Politics		Dev'n	Eta	Dev'n	Beta
0 Unknown	6	-0.21		-1.27	
1 Radical	6	-2.71		-2.32	
2 Moderate	9	0.85		-0.13	
3 Conservatives	17	0.58		1.33	
			0.43		0.48
Political Endurance					
0 up to 3 months	12	-1.38		-1.03	
14 to 11	13	-0.10		-0.84	
212 Plus	13	1.37		1.79	
			0.39		0.45
Marital Status					
1 Single	8	-1.46		-1.42	
2 Married	25	0.41		0.59	
3 Widowed	5	0.29		-0.68	
			0.27		0.30

Statistics Source of variation	Sum of Squares	DF	Mean Square	F	Signif of F
Covariates	39.629	3	13.210	2.282	0.102
Age	10.257	1	10.257	1.772	0.194
Years	2.297	1	2.297	0.397	0.534
Family	30.244	1	30.244	5.224	0.030
Main effects	111.872	7	15.982	2.761	0.027
Politics	45.988	3	15.329	2.648	0.069
Politics Endurance	46.105	2	23.052	3.982	0.031
Marital status	15.312	2	7.656	1.322	0.283
Explained	151.502	10	15.150	2.617	0.023
Residual	156.314	27	5.789		
Total	307.816	37	8.319		

N=38, Multiple r squared=0.492. Multiple r=0.702.
Sources: See appendix.

Table 7

Political Groups by Owner of Residence

	Self-Owned	Rented from Private Landlord	Rented from Church	Total
Unknown	2 (20%) (33%)	3 (30%) (21%)	5 (50%) (16%)	10
Radical	1 (11%) (17%)	2 (22%) (14%)	6 (67%) (19%)	9
Moderate	1 (10%) (17%)	1 (10%) (7%)	8 (80%) (25%)	10
Conservative	2 (9%) (33%)	8 (35%) (57%)	13 (56%) (41%)	23
Total	6 (11.5%)	14 (26.9%)	32 (61.5%)	52

Sources: Rental categories from Padrón Municipalidad de México (1848), Archivo del Antiguo Ayuntamiento (Mexico City), v. 3408-3409. For an explanation of political categories see: Stevens, "Instability". An appendix to this paper provides a list of individuals included in this table, their classifications, and locations in the padrón.

Table 8

Frequency Distribution of Monthly Rents Paid by National Political Elite, Mexico City, 1848

Amount of Monthly Rent	Frecuency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
7-25	7	15.2	15.2
26-40	11	23.9	39.1
41-50	11	23.9	63.0
51-75	11	23.9	86.9
76-125	6	13.0	99.9

Statistics:
Mean = 48.1
Median = 46.0
Mode = 60.0
St. Dev. = 25.3
Minimum = 7.0
Maximum = 125.0
N = 46

Source: See appendix.

Mexican population as a whole. Half of these politicians were probably merely wealthy, enjoying the attentions of between three and six servants. The most affluent fourteen percent of the total lived extravagantly in households served by seven or more domestics. At the top end of the scale, the most opulent had a dozen or more housekeepers, cooks, scullions, chambermaids, nursemaids, doormen, coachmen, footmen, valets, and others to attend to their comfort. These figures indicate considerable social stratification among the political elite. While most of the political elite were very well-off, a substantial portion lived lives that were notably less luxorious and might be described as merely middle class. Even among those with the ability to hire several specialized servants there was substantial variation.

Table 6 addresses the question of whether the political factions varied in the average numbers of servants in their households. As before, the table includes covariates and factors to account for other sources of variation due to age, years in residence, marital status, and political durability. This table adds family size as a covariate so that the average numbers of servants in each group will not be affected by variations in the size of families. The grand mean for the 38 cases without missing data is 3.7 servants per household. As before, the numbers indicate greater prosperity for the politically durable and the married. The elite politicians who held office for a year or more in their careers had nearly 50 percent more servants in their homes than the average. Single men averaged fewer servants than either widowers or married men.

Once again, when these other factors are taken into account, the political factions vary in social status. Conservatives averaged the greatest number of servants in the home. At a mean of five, the average number of servants in conservative households is 36 percent higher than the grand mean, placing the conservatives well into the fraction of the total population that Arrom's figures indicate was a tiny upper class. Moderates tended to have an average number of domestics not much below the grand mean, placing them toward the lower end of the upper 4 percent of the population. Those whose politics could not be determined and the radicals employed the fewest servants. Radicals had 62 percent fewer domestics than the grand mean, placing them in the social stratum where one to two household sevants were common, the group commonly described as "middle class". Although they were still part of the *gente decente*, the radicals were living in conditions less lofty than the economic and social stratum of the conservatives.

The census data permit yet another attempt to test the relationship between social and political divisions. In mid-nineteenth-century Mexico City few families even among the social and political elite owned their own homes. Of the former or soon-to-be presidents and cabinet ministers resident in the city in January of 1848, nearly 90 percent were renters. Two-thirds of the total rented from the Church, or more precisely from variuos convents, monasteries, hospitals, schools, parishes, chapels, churches, and pious funds. One quarter rented from private landlords. Only about twelve percent (six of 52) owned their residences.[17] The relationship between landlord type and political categories is not strong but the direction of the relationship is intriguing. Liberals, who supported proposals to require the Church to sell its property to private individuals, were more likely to rent from the Church than were conservatives, who defended .the Church's right to own property. A large majority of the liberals (80 percent of the moderates and 67 percent of the radicals) paid rent to ecclesiastic corporations. In contrast, only a little more than half the conservatives rented from the Church, while the other half rented from private owners or owned their own homes.[18]

Like the other indicators of social status, rent varied considerably within the elite. Table 8 indicates that most of the rents paid by the national political elite fell into the range between $25 and $75 per month. Since nearly 90 percent of the elite rented rather than

[17]Of these six, two were conservatives, two moderates, one a radical, and one I have not been able to classify; see Appendix.
[18]See Table 7.

owned their homes, we would expect these variations in rent would be positively correlated with status; the greater a family's wealth, the more they would spend on housing to enjoy the comforts of money, entertain friends, and impress acquaintances. Rents paid by the political elite in 1848 varied from a low of $7 per month paid by Luis Arroyo (a thirty-year-old unmarried conservative) to a high of $125 per month paid by Ignacio Trigueros (a forty-four-year-old married conservative). Certainly other factors enter into the equation besides income: family size, years of residence, age of housing, location, and taste, for example. Of these variables, most can be accounted for statistically, but location does not seem to have had a significant impact on the rental cost of housing among the elite. Nearly all of the political elite (88.5 percent) lived in the area within a few blocks of the Zócalo, but the rents of those who lived on the fringes of the capital were not significantly lower than the average.[19] The literature from the period suggests an additional variable which would influence the rent paid for a house in Mexico City. Houses in Mexico City were expensive and hard to find for outsiders. Even during the boom years at the end of the eighteenth century, little new housing was constructed in Mexico City. There is little reason to believe that there was much improvement in the supply of housing after independence, given the deleterious effects of instability and war which not only hampered the economy but brought more migrants to the city as well. Shortages of housing were common in nineteenth-century Mexico.[20]

Preferential renting at below-market rates may have been one way families helped to mitigate these circumstances. The experiences of one of Mexico City's most famous new residents illustrate the problems of new arrivals in the city. Frances Calderón de la Barca, the wife of the first Spanish ambassador to Mexico, arrived in late 1839 to find that rents for houses in Mexico City were "extremely high," adding that in the capital there was "nothing tolerable to be had under two thousand five hundred dollars per annum, unfurnished".[21] This is a sum roughly twice the highest rent paid by a member of the political elite in 1848, and one suspects that the landlords of Mexico were suggesting rents far beyond the normal, assuming the new ambassador would pay. Securing a residence required not only appeasing the owner, but at times the previous tenant as well. Among other expenses, Madame Calderón de la Barca noted "the extraordinary custom of paying a sum called *traspaso*, sometimes to the amount of fourteen thousand dollars, taking your chance of having the money repaid you by the next person who takes the house." After weeks of looking for a suitable home she was ready to explain the problems she faced, noting in her journal, "As to prices, I conclude we pay for being foreigners and diplomates [*sic*]".[22]

The Calderóns' search for a suitable residence might not have been a unique experience. Internal migrants as well as international migrants had imperfect knowledge of the housing market in Mexico City, and migrants to the capital from the Mexican provinces faced an additional obstacle, a step increase in the amount they would need to spend on housing. Once again this fact did not escape the observation of Madame Calderón. Sometime later, while on a tour of the provinces, she noticed that the rents

[19]Forty-six of 52 lived in the 1st, 3rd, 5th, 7th, 9th, 13th, and 14th *cuarteles*. The rents of those six who lived further from the Zócalo averaged $43, about the same as the overall average (see Appendix). Although the edge of the city was partially inhabited by Indians living in shacks, there were also substantial houses for the elite. The first Spanish ambassador to Mexico, for example, settled in a house north of the Alameda park. See Frances Calderón de la Barca, *Life in Mexico: The Letters of Fanny Calderón de la Barca, with New Material from the Author's Private Journals*, edited and annotated by Howard T. Fisher and Marion Hall Fisher (New York, 1966), p. 697, fn. 2.

[20]Sonia Lombardo de Ruiz, "Construction and Contractors: A Methodological Approach to the Study of Architectural Styles in Mexico City," *Latin American Research Review,* 10 (1975), pp. 128-129; Alejandra Moreno Toscano and Carlos Aguirre Anaya, "Migrations to Mexico City in the Nineteenth Century: Research Approaches," *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs,* 17 (1975), pp. 27-42.

[21]The comments on the costs of housing do not appear in all published versions of her letters, but were part of the tenth letter, written 25 February 1840. The most convenient edition of the work containing these lines is *Life in Mexico* (Berkeley, 1982), p. 101. The edition most frequently cited by historians, the Fishers' edition of *Life in Mexico*, does not contain this material.

[22]*Life in Mexico,* p. 102.

Table 9

Analysis of Covariance : Rent by Politics, Political Endurance, Regional Origin, and Owner of Dwelling, with Age of tenant, years in residence, Family size, and Servants held constant

Grand mean = 45.79

Variable+Category	Unadjusted N	Dev'n Eta		Adjusted for Independents + Covariates Dev'n Beta	
Politics					
0 Unknown	6	4.54		9.06	
1 Radical	6	0.54		17.13	
2 Moderate	9	0.65		-7.04	
3 Conservative	17	-2.14		-5.52	
			0.11		0.42
Political Endurance					
0 up to 3 months	12-8.5	12.84			
14 TO 11	13	3.36		10.74	
212 plus	13	4.52		1.11	
			0.26		0.43
Regional origin					
1 Mexico City	16-7.66-11.85				
2 Provincial	22	5.57		8.62	
Owner of Dwelling					
1 Private	14	-7.00		-12.96	
2 Church	24	4.09		7.56	
			0.24		0.45

Statistics Source of variation	Sum of Squares	DF	Mean Square	F	Signif of F
Covariates	2 596.701	4	694.175	1.967	0.129
Age	0.726	1	0.726	0.002	0.963
Years	10.925	1	10.925	0.033	0.857
Family	783.017	1	783.017	2.373	0136
Servants	975.197	1	975.197	2.955	0.098
Main effects	7 462.882	7	1 066.126	3.230	0.013
Politics	1 986.113	3	662.038	2.006	0.138
Promscal	2 352.044	2	1 176.022	3.563	0.043
Native	3 179.627	1	3 179.627	9.634	0.005
Owner	2 576.399	1	2 576.399	7.807	0.010
Explained	10 059.584	11	914.508	2.771	0.016
Residual	8 580.732	26	330.028		
Total	18 640.316	37	503.792		

N=38, Multiple r squared=0.540. Multiple r=0.735.
Sources: See appendix.

were much lower outside Mexico City. From the capital of the state of Michoacán she wrote: "Living and house-rent is so cheap here, that a family who could barely exist upon their means in Mexico, may enjoy every luxury in Valladolid".[23] Those with kin and other social connections, the natives of Mexico City, and its long-term residents may well have had an advantage in securing housing through better knowledge of the market and preferential treatment by landlords, and the same market may have worked against outsiders.[24]

These variables are examined in Table 9, which displays mean house rents for social and political groups, controlling for the effects of the covariates age, years in residence, family size, and the number of domestic servants. The factors which affected the rents paid include the origin of the head of household. The results indicate that natives of Mexico City did enjoy a comparative advantage in the housing market in their natal city. Elite politicians of provincial origins tended to pay $54 per month in rent while those born in the capital paid only about $34, amounting to almost a 50 percent increase in rent for provincial politicians in otherwise equal social circumstances. Those who rented from the Church also paid a premium amounting to almost 50 percent, since those who paid rents to private landlords averaged $33 at the same time those renting from the Church paid a mean rent of $53 per month. Other things being equal, the best housing deals in the national capital were enjoyed by natives of the city who rented from private individuals rather than the Church.

The widest variations in house rent are associated with variations in political positions. Moderates and conservatives paid rents that were nearly equivalente and roughly 15 percent less that the average for all groups. Only about $1.5 per month separated the average rents of these two groups, a difference equivalent to about three percent of the average monthly rent. This similarity in social conditions between the conservatives and the moderate liberals stands in contrast to the social distance between them and the more extreme liberals. The radicals paid rents considerably higher by more than $17 per month, a sum that is 37 percent higher than the mean. The difference is especially pronounced between the rents of the radicals and the rest; with an average monthly house rent of $62.9, radicals paid 56 percent more than the average of conservatives ($40.2), and 63 percent more than that of the moderates ($38.7). Given that radicals tended to have smaller households and fewer servants than the moderates or the conservatives, it seems more likely that the higher rents radicals paid took a larger bite out of the household budget than the relatively lower amounts paid by moderates and conservatives. Those who were most determined to alter the distribution of property in Mexico were those whose personal situations demonstrated to them the existence of a link between the conservative policies and the economic advantages of their political opponents.

These articulations between social strata and political divisions in nineteenth-century Mexico have long been the subject of speculation, but seldom the object of investigation. Previously little direct evidence has been brought to bear on the question raised by generations of historians who have suggested links between social conditions and political convictions. Earlier investigations have examined two proxies for social class, occupation and regional origins. Of these, occupation is the more superficial. The political factions of post-independence Mexico were not readily distinguishable by the professions of their leaders; most of the liberals as well as the conservatives tended to be lawyers or military officers. Differences in regional origins may have been more significant. Historians have traditionally linked conservatives to the economic and social elite resident in Mexico City, but the hypothetical articulation between the social stratification of the capital and the political fissures evident in the political conflict of the time has been marred by a potential

[23] *Life in Mexico*, p. 509.

[24] The role of the family in distributing economic resources is well known. On kinship and housing choices see Linda Greenow, "Microgeographic Analysis as an Index to Family Structure and Networks," *Journal of Family History*, 10 (1985), pp. 278-279.

APPENDIX

Last names	First names	Origin	Marital Status	Age	Politics	Rent/ Value	Owner	Cuartel	Manzana
Alegría	Mariano	Provincial	Married	43	Conservative	$27	Church	11	104
Anaya	Juan Pablo	Provincial	Married	63	Radical	$15	Private	14	131
Anievas	Ignacio	Mexico City	Widower	29	Conservative	$10	Private	13	122
Arrioja	Miguel María	Provincial	Married	41	Radical	$90	Church	29	219
Arroyo	Luis	Mexico City	Single	28	Conservative	$7	Private	26	186
Barrera	Ignacio de la	Mexico City	Married	49	Santanista	$50	Church	1	6
Canseco	Manuel María	Mexico City	Single	49	Conservative	$39	Church	14	139
Ceballos	Juan	Provincial	Married	37	Moderate	$30	Church	5	43
Cervantes	José María	Provincial	Widower	32	Conservative	$60	Church	5	49
Couto	José Bernardo	Provincial	Married	45	Radical	$22,500	Self	11	92
Cuevas	Luis Gonzaga	Provincial	Married	48	Conservative	$60	Private	14	130
Díaz de la Vega	Rómulo	Mexico City	Married	44	Conservative	$27	Private	11	93
Diez de Bonilla	Manuel	Mexico City	Married	48	Conservative	$30,000	Self	1	4
Durán	José María	Mexico City	Married	48	Unknown	$33	Church	14	135
Elguero	José Hilario	Mexico City	Single	33	Conservative	$40	Church	1	5
Espinosa de los Monteros	Juan José	Mexico City	Widower	80	Moderate	$30	Church	9	79
Fernández del Castillo	Pedro	Provincial	Married	49	Conservative	$42	Private	14	129
Fonseca	José Urbano	Mexico City	Married	56	Moderate	$40	Church	1	2
Garay	Antonio	Provincial	Married	42	Unknown	$50	Church	5	41
García	José	Mexico City	Single	33	Conservative	$10	Church	1	4
García Aguirre	Manuel	Mexico City	Widower	50	Conservative	$12,000	Self	1	13
García Conde	José	Mexico City	Married	47	Moderate	$41	Church	1	5
Gochicoa	Francisco	Mexico City	Single	23	Radical	$25	Private	5	47
Gómez Pedraza	Manuel	Provincial	Married	59	Moderate	$85	Church	1	4
Gorostiza	Manuel Eduardo	Provincial	Married	49	Radical	$60	Church	14	129
Herrera	José Joaquín de	Provincial	Widower	56	Moderate	$46	Church	14	125
Hierro Maldonado	Juan	Provincial	Single	46	Conservative	$100	Church	1	4
Iglesias	José María	Mexico City	Single	25	Radical	$53	Church	7	61
Jáuregui	José María	Mexico City	Married	53	Unknown	$8	Church	1	5
Jorrín	Pedro	Provincial	Single	36	Unknown	(missing)	Self	3	30
Lafragua	José María	Provincial	Single	35	Moderate	$46	Church	7	63
Larraínzar	Manuel	Provincial	Married	39	Conservative	$60	Private	3	77

Lerdo	Miguel	Provincial	Married	36	Radical	$90	Church	1	1
Lombardini	Manuel	Mexico City	Married	46	Santanista	$26	Church	2	16
Marín	José Mariano	Mexico City	Married	36	Unknown	$80	Private	24	189
Marín	Teófilo	Mexico City	Single	23	Conservative	$41	Church	17	150
Ortiz Monasterio	José María	Mexico City	Married	48	Unknown	$7	Church	1	10
Otero	Mariano	Provincial	Married	31	Moderate	$60	Private	7	62
Palacio	Lucas	Provincial	Married	34	Moderate	(missing)	Self	1	5
Pavón	José Ignacio	Provincial	Married	57	Conservative	$30	Private	13	122
Pérez de Lebrija	Agustín	Mexico City	Married	60	Unknown	$61	Private	9	79
Piña y Cuevas	Manuel	Mexico City	Married	44	Conservative	$5	Church	14	125
Rodríguez Puebla	Juan	Mexico City	Married	50	Radical	$35	Church	14	131
Rondero	Juan	Mexico City	Married	46	Unknown	$14,000	Self	5	47
Sagaceta	Gabriel	Mexico City	Married	39	Conservative	$83	Church	14	124
Salas	Mariano	Mexico City	Married	51	Conservative	$60	Church	1	12
Suárez Iriarte	Francisco	Mexico City	Married	44	Radical	$60	Church	1	1
Trigueros	Ignacio	Provincial	Married	43	Santanista	$125	Church	14	131
Vélez	Pedro	Provincial	Widower	61	Moderate	$5	Church	1	6
Villamil	José Lázaro	Provincial	Married	40	Unknown	$5	Private	5	50
Zaldívar	José María	Mexico City	Single	28	Conservative	$16	Private	15	140
Zubieta	Pedro	Provincial	Widower	43	Unknown	$5	Church	1	1

SOURCES: Padrón Municipalidad de México (1848), Archivo del Antiguo Ayuntamiento, v. 3408-3409. D. F. Stevens, "Instability in Mexico from Independence to the War of the Reform" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 1984).

ecological fallacy. The traditional capital was, in fact, the birthplace of a preponderance of conservative politicians, and home to a disproportionately large number of colonial New Spain's and republican Mexico's wealthy and powerful families. Yet this essential connection between the social and the political elites has not been demonstrated conclusively before. Lacking crucial evidence, the arguments linking social strata to political factions have been only speculative, and the hypothesis of a connection between region and politics has been subject to the appropriate logical qualification that the ecological fallacy might apply. There was no systematic evidence linking conservative politics to the economic elite.

The evidence examined here is subject to three significant limitations and qualifications. First, is the data examined here in any sense representative of a large group? Roughly two hundred men dominated the executive offices of the national government between independence and the Wars of the Reform and French Intervention. The individuals included in this study were not selected at random; the sample is stratified, consisting of only elite executives. It may be that different results might characterize a political elite selected on the basis of legislative, local government, or other experience. Roughly one-quarter of the national executive elite were residents of the national capital in 1848 when the census was taken. In some ways, the data comprise a fortuitous sample; some of the elite had died before 1848, others were living elsewhere, and several residents were not adequately enumerated by the census taker. Enough crucial data were missing to reduce the number of cases used in the analysis of variance from 52 to 38. Despite these limitations, these three dozen individuals comprise nearly 20 percent of the men who served as presidents or cabinet ministers during the period.

Second, the study is also limited geographically. In a country as varied as Mexico, it may well be that different patterns applied in other regions. The relationship between social conditions and political convictions in the provinces would certainly be worth investigating, but in many ways a study of the elite in Mexico City has its advantages. The national capital drew ambitious politicians from the outlying states and may be more representative of the nation as a whole than any other single city or state. At the same time, there is no reason to slip back into the facile assumption that the individuals who migrated from a particular state were representative of any particular class there. Nor can the general patterns found in this study explain every individual case. Radicals in general may have come from a lower social stratum and may have felt greater economic pressures from an expensive and arbitrary housing market in the national capital, but one of the examples cited earlier in this paper is a conspicuous contradiction to this generalization. José Bernardo Couto was a radical but he lived well, served by 14 domestics in an expensive house that he owned rather than rented. Wealthy radicals certainly existed but they were not as common as prosperous moderates and plutocratic conservatives. The condition of any individual is not a refutation of the general trends and multivariate analysis presented here. Statistical anomalies will always exist, but the idiosyncratic example does not invalidate the generalization.

Third, this reasearch is also limited in its ability to examine the family beyond the inmediate household. Much of the speculation here, suggesting that many prosperous families paid what seem to be unreasonably low rents as a result of social connections, is subject to empirical verification. Investigation of the family business relationships between landlords and tenants might well require a modification of this conjecture, but evidence from other historical and anthropological studies suggests that the hypothesis is at least reasonable. Kinship can substantially affect access to the housing market and the location of residences.

Subject to these qualifications and limitations, the data examined here lead to the conclusion that the social differences were politically significant. The political factions of mid-nineteenth-century Mexico did vary in wealth and social position. The national political elite was drawn from the middle and upper classes, placing them among the top

20 percent or so of the population of the country. Within this strata, the factions occupied different positions in that hierarchy. Political radicals occupied the lower rungs of the social elite; they were more likely to live middle class lives with smaller households and fewer servants than the upper class. Conservatives held the uppermost social positions with the largest households and greatest profusion of household servants. Moderates tended to occupy the intermediate social space; their lives were neither so opulent and pampered as the conservatives', nor as unpretentious and prosaic as the radicals'.

On the basis of these variables the social hierarchy seems clear and direct, but the rents these families paid for housing do not correspond directly to their social positions. Moderates and conservatives tended to have larger households and more servants, but they paid lower monthly rents than the radicals. Ownership also had a significant impact on house rent. The Church tended to charge rents that were substantially higher, in equal circumstances, than the rents charged by private landlords. Part of this differential may be due not to the deviation of the Church from prevailing market rates, but to family members granting their relatives preferential access to housing. In addition, anecdotal evidence suggests that prevailing rents were probably higher in general in the capital than in the provinces. According to a contemporary observation, an income that permitted a life of luxury in the provinces was not sufficient in Mexico City. Together these circumstances put additional pressure on the household budgets of those outsiders who migrated from the provinces to take up positions in the national political elite. Family connections and long-term residence probably meant that the natives of the city got the best deals. This argument suggests another intriguing hypothesis: the Church may not have been as great an obstacle to the operation of market forces in the capital as were the actions and preferences of private landlords. If private landlords tended to discriminate by renting at discount rates to kin and business associates, the rents charged by the Church might have been higher, but more accurate indicators of the actual market for rental housing. Nevertheless, ownership of about half of the property in the city made ecclesiastical corporations a convenient target for radicals seeking to alter the distribution of property. None of this need imply that liberals were solely or even predominantly concerned with their own private circumstances, but neither were the social and political realms entirely separated. Political convictions correspond to social conditions.